

## IS COUNTER TERRORISM IN INDONESIA A TRIUMPH?

Angel Damayanti<sup>1</sup>

**Abstract** - Banyak pihak memuji keberhasilan pemerintah Indonesia dalam menjalankan strategi kontra-terorisnya. Keberhasilan ini antara lain ditunjukkan dengan kemampuan Densus 88 menangkap para pelaku peledakan bom, anggota serta pendukung jaringan teroris. Keberhasilan ini didukung pula dengan kemampuan intelijen nasional Indonesia dalam mengumpulkan informasi. Keberhasilan lainnya ditandai dengan berkurangnya kuantitas dan kualitas aksi terror. Kendati demikian, pemerintah Indonesia sejauh ini hanya mampu menangkap teroris dan gagal memberantas terorisme sampai ke akarnya. Untuk itu, pemerintah perlu mempersiapkan strategi kontra-teroris yang komprehensif. Tidak cukup hanya dengan menggunakan pendekatan secara 'hard' tetapi juga harus digabungkan dengan pendekatan secara 'soft.' Hal ini berarti perlu melibatkan seluruh komponen bangsa, mulai dari aparat keamanan, militer, intelijen, departemen-departemen kementerian terkait, tokoh agama dan masyarakat. Selain itu, strategi ini harus dibuat secara terpadu dan menyeluruh, mulai dari upaya preventif, penangkapan, rehabilitasi sampai pada program pengawasan setelah eks-teroris dilepaskan kembali ke masyarakat.

**Keywords:** terrorism, counter-terrorism, hard approaches, soft approaches, comprehensive strategy.

### Introduction

Many terrorist observers have praised of Indonesian government for its counter-terrorism strategy. Indeed, Sydney Jones mentioned that Indonesia is the best country on the efforts of counter-terrorism.<sup>2</sup> Credit is given to the provision of law and hard counter-measurements in Indonesia. Supported mainly by the United States (U.S.), Australia and United Kingdom (UK), the Indonesian police, particularly Special Detachment 88 (Densus 88), have arguably succeeded to arrest terrorists. This affirms that the financial and logistic supports coupled with training from the U.S. government through U.S. Diplomatic Security Service, as well as Australian and British authorities, have developed the capability and professionalism of Densus 88 in countering terrorism in Indonesia.

Nonetheless, there are some critics who are skeptical of this special detachment.

One of these claimed that Densus 88 is only good at conducting counter-terrorist strategy

<sup>1</sup> The writer is a lecturer at International Relations Program, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Christian University of Indonesia. Email address at ANGEL001@e.ntu.edu.sg or Angel.Damayanti@uki.ac.id

<sup>2</sup> "Pemberantasan Teroris di Indonesia Terbaik," (The eradication of terrorism in Indonesia is the best), accessed from <http://www.antaraneews.com/berita/286992/pemberantasan-teroris-di-indonesia-terbaik>, 29 November 2011.

but not counter-terrorism.<sup>3</sup> This suggests that Indonesian police is very capable in arresting the perpetrators but cannot prevent terrorists from doing their acts nor prevent the bombing for taking place. Despite its sophisticated weapons and professional training, Indonesian police continues to miss detection of bombing and consequently the terrorist attacks continue to occur. This is also confirmed by Ansyad Mbai, Head of the Indonesian National Agency for Counter-Terrorism (BNPT).<sup>4</sup> Since the creation of DKPT (Coordination Desk for Terrorism Eradication) in 2002, later known as BNPT, and Densus 88 in 2003, Indonesia experienced more than ten times of terrorist acts.<sup>5</sup>

In fact, the terrorist bombings in Indonesia occur almost every year until 2005. However, terrorist attack seems to have disappeared between the years 2006 and 2009. Then, it continues to occur again afterwards. Therefore, this paper will answer the question of why the counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia could not entirely eradicate terrorism in this country. What factors have caused the efforts of counter-terrorism authorities to be ineffective? And what should the Indonesian government do to manage this problem?

This paper argues that the counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia is ineffective mainly due to its partially conducted and not coordinated adequately. There are at least three factors that resulted in a lack of strategy of counter-terrorism in this country. Firstly, is the lack of coordination within the Police institutions and with other security-related apparatus. Secondly, although Indonesian authorities are about to launch the counter-terrorism law to justify its pre-emptive measures, it has a poor preventive strategy. Finally the problem lies in the lack of other agencies and public engagement in their strategy. These shortcomings cause the Indonesian government to fail to eradicate terrorism thus.

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<sup>3</sup> Kumar Ramakrishna, "US Strategy in Southeast Asia: Counter-Terrorist or Counter-Terrorism?" in *After Bali: the Threat of Terrorism Southeast Asia*, Kumar Ramakrishna and Tan See Seng (eds), (Singapore: IDSS, 2003), pp. 305-337.

<sup>4</sup> "Densus 88 Andalkan IT Tangkap Teroris" (Densus 88 counts on technology to arrest terrorists), accessed from <http://www.sindonews.com/read/2012/03/08/435/589790/densus-88-andalkan-it-tangkap-teroris>, 8 Maret 2012.

<sup>5</sup> Budi Gunawan, *Terorisme: Mitos & Konspirasi (Terrorism: Myth & Conspiracy)*, (Jakarta: Forum Media Utama, 2006), pp. 114-116. See also "Ledakan Bom di Jakarta Sejak Tahun 2000" (Bom Explosions in Jakarta since 2000), accessed from <http://www.kompas.com/lipsuso72009/ledakanmegakuningan>, 17 Juli 2009.



To examine the argument, this paper adopts the comparative research method. As comparative method is to compare particular nations, societies or cultural units,<sup>6</sup> this paper mainly compares the hard approaches of Indonesian government and the soft approaches carried out by Saudi Arabian government, particularly in conducting counter-terrorism strategy. The hard approaches carried out by Indonesian government refer to the security forces that are deployed in eradicating terrorism. The security forces are profoundly good at counter-terrorist but not counter-terrorism. The police, through Densus 88, have succeeded to detain more than 600 terror perpetrators, but they cannot entirely eradicate the terrorism in Indonesia. Therefore, this paper suggests the Indonesian government to look at the soft counter-terrorism strategy implemented by Saudi Arabian government.

Essentially, the Indonesian government needs to combine both the hard and soft approaches in her counter-terrorism strategy. In so doing, the government, through BNPT, should coordinate all elements of this nation. This includes the security apparatus, military, intelligent, other related ministries, religious leaders and public to implement a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. The government should also effectively implement a holistic and inter-connected strategy. To examine my argument, this paper will be divided into four sections. First section describes the strategy of countering terrorism that is carried out in Indonesia. The second section explains the working ways of Densus 88, which mainly uses hard counter-measurements. The third section examines the achievements of counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia coupled with its weaknesses. Eventually, this paper examines the challenges faced by counter-terrorism agencies in Indonesia by looking at the counter-measurements of Saudi Arabian government.

### **Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Indonesia**

Every country has its own perception on threats that originate externally and internally. Accordingly, they need to set up their respective policy to protect their national interest and homeland security. With regards homeland security, Christopher Bellavita defines it as a concerted national effort involving the state and local government, combining with

<sup>6</sup> W. Lawrence Neuman, *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*, Third Edition, (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1997), p. 402-405.

the responsibilities of the private sector and individuals to prevent and to protect their territory, domestic population and critical infrastructure against threats, namely terrorism, man-made and natural hazards, catastrophic events and social trends that may disrupt their stability. This is in addition to threats against the sovereignty of their state.<sup>7</sup>

In the case of Indonesia, which is the focus of this article, terrorism is perceived as one of threats that should be managed. In fact, this country has experienced many terrorist actions carried out with political and religious purposes. Since its declaration of independence, Indonesia has encountered insurgent movements, coupled with terrorist actions that challenge her sovereignty. Among these are Darul Islam (DI), RMS (the Republic of South Moluccas), PRRI/Permesta and GAM (Aceh Freedom Movement). In addition, since 1990s the government of Indonesia has to deal with Jemaah Islamiyah Indonesia (JII) that was originated from DI but are arguably more radical in the sense of their ideology and methodology.

JII is perceived as a political-religiously driven terrorist group.<sup>8</sup> The ideology and strategy of JII were primarily influenced by Al Qaeda as some cadres of this movement were trained in Afghanistan in the late 1980. In the training camp, together with the Afghanistan and Arab Mujahidin, JII's members gained their ideology in so-called Salafi Jihadism coupled with military capability. The ideology essentially allowed their followers to conduct violence and extreme measures to overthrow their government, in achieving their goals, mainly to establish a Khalifah system and spread Salafi Jihadism to all Moslems in the world.<sup>9</sup> The military training accommodated them with a capability to set a military strategy and conduct it for achieving their goals.<sup>10</sup>

After proclaiming his 1996 and 1998 fatwa, Osama Bin Laden personally invited Sungkar and Ba'asyir, the highest leaders of JII, to visit his sanctuary in Afghanistan and

<sup>7</sup> Christopher Bellavita, "Changing Homeland Security: What is Homeland Security?" in *Homeland Security Affairs*, (Vol. IV, No. 2, June, 2008), pp. 1-30.

<sup>8</sup> Kumar Ramakrishna, *op.cit.*, p. 305-337. Regarding religion and terrorism see also Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 81-130.

<sup>9</sup> Mark Stout, "In Search of Salafi Jihadist Strategic Thought: Mining the Words of the Terrorist," in *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, (Vol. 32, No. 10, Sept, 2009) p. 872-892. See also William E. Shepard, "Sayyid Qutb's Doctrine of Jahiliyya" in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, (Vol. 35, No 4, Nov, 2003), p 521-545 and John C. Zimmerman, "Sayyid Qutb Influence on the 11 September Attacks, in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, (Vol. 16, No. 2, 2004), p. 222-252.

<sup>10</sup> Solahudin, *NII Sampai Ji: Salafi Jihadisme di Indonesia (NII to Ji: Salafi Jihadism in Indonesia)*, (Depok: Komunitas Bambu, 2011), p. 204-207.



asked them to support the ultimate purpose of Al Qaeda.<sup>11</sup> This is to fight against the U.S. and her allies wherever they might be found. Initially, JII applied its strategy to gain public support and spread Salafi Jihadism thought through their engagement in Poso and Ambon in the late 1990s as there were religious conflicts in this country. They then continued their strategy to attack Christians with a series of church bombings in 2000-2001 and used religion sentiment as its justification.<sup>12</sup> However, Al Qaeda's attack on World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001 ultimately encouraged JII to shift their strategy. Consequently, JII stopped attacking Christians and started destroying the U.S. and her allies as well as their interests in Indonesia by bombing iconic targets such as embassies, hotels, restaurants, cafes, malls, stock exchanges and so forth.<sup>13</sup>

Although Indonesia has experienced a number of public terrorist actions carried out by JII since 2000,<sup>14</sup> it was the first Bali Bombing in October 2002 that forced the Indonesian government to include the strategy of the eradication of terrorism in their national political and security agenda. Initially, the government of Indonesia incorporated legal measures in their counter-terrorism acts. They published the Government Regulation in lieu of Law No. 1/2002 regarding the criminal act of terrorism in accordance with Government Regulation in lieu of Law No. 2/2002 regarding the procedures for protection of victims and witnesses in the heavy human rights violence. Later, these two regulations become *Undang-undang* (Law) No. 15/2003 and No. 16/2003. Both laws essentially define terrorism as a criminal that related to domestic security.<sup>15</sup> Consequently, the agency that has ultimate authority to deal with is Indonesian police

<sup>11</sup> Bilveer Singh, "The Challenge of Militant Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia," in *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, (Vol. 58, No. 1, March, 2004), p 47-68. See also Solahudin, *ibid*, p. 247-250.

<sup>12</sup> Noorhaidi Hasan, *Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity, in Post-New Order Indonesia*, (New York: Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2006), p. 185-206. See also Tjandra Dewi, "Jejak Peledakan Bom di Indonesia (1998-2002)" (Trace of Bombing Explosions in Indonesia (1998-2002)) accessed from <http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/2002/10/21/LU/mbm.20021021.LU81897.id.html>, 21 Oktober 2002.

<sup>13</sup> "Ledakan Bom di Jakarta Sejak Tahun 2000" accessed from <http://www.kompas.com/lipsus072009/ledakanmegakuningan>, 17 Juli 2009.

<sup>14</sup> See Solahudin, *op. cit*, p. 256-262. Imam Samudra with his team planned to explode some churches in Medan, North Sumatra in 28 May 2000. One of the bombs exploded at GKPI Church, the other two bombs at other churches failed to explode.

<sup>15</sup> Government Regulation in lieu of Law No. 1/2002, chapter I, article 1 (1), can be accessed from [http://hukum.unsrat.ac.id/uu/perpu\\_1\\_02.htm](http://hukum.unsrat.ac.id/uu/perpu_1_02.htm)

and subsequently they need to conduct criminal justice process prior to arrest of the alleged perpetrators.

Further, President Megawati Soekarnoputri instructed the Coordinator Minister of Political and Security to formulate a set of an integrated and comprehensive policy to eradicate the crime of terrorism as well as create a non-structural task force unit to support his duty.<sup>16</sup> Accordingly, the Coordinator Minister of Political and Security at that time, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, formed a Coordination Desk in his ministry to coordinate the terrorism eradication, known as Desk Kordinasi Pemberantasan Terorism (DKPT), as he launched a decree no. 26/2002 in November 2002. Essentially, this coordination desk consists of Indonesian police, military and intelligence that should work together.

### **The Hard Approaches of Densus 88**

Nonetheless, DKPT could not work effectively and cooperatively so that each unit worked separately. As of 2002, there was a debate regarding the distinctive functions between Indonesian police and military. It was then suggested that the police should have full control in the domestic security and law enforcement while the military had to serve the general national security and defense matters. This also had an impact on counter-terrorism measures. The simultaneous attacks of terrorist group, coupled with investigation process of previous attacks, caused the Indonesian police to launch its anti-terror unit. The decree launched by Chief of Indonesian Police no. 30/VI/2003 justified its creation. It was later known as Special Detachment 88 of Anti-Terror (Densus 88).<sup>17</sup>

The creation of Densus 88 was initially funded and trained by the U.S. government. The U.S. granted about US\$ 24 million to form and train this special force in 2003. This is not to mention the training, operational assistance and logistic support from Australian and British government. As they were primarily trained by the U.S. Secret Service, CIA and FBI, the capability of Densus 88 is similar to the anti-terror special force in the U.S. In its development, Densus 88 now has about 400 personnel who have

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<sup>16</sup> Instruction of President to Coordinator Minister of Political and Security no. 4/2002 can be accessed from [http://hukum.unsrat.ac.id/uu/inpres\\_4\\_02.htm](http://hukum.unsrat.ac.id/uu/inpres_4_02.htm)

<sup>17</sup> Galih Priatmodjo, *Densus 88: The Undercover Squad*, (Yogyakarta: Narasi, 2010), pp. 45-46.



capabilities in investigation, intelligence, bomb squad, strike forces as well as sniper.<sup>18</sup> This is all essential for their operation in capturing bombing perpetrators and terrorist's supporters.

One characteristic of Densus 88 is secrecy in their operation so that only the commandant knows all plans and strategy. To some extent, confidentiality is vital as they have to raid the terrorists' sanctuary and catch them without any deterrence. However, Thomas Quiggin from Centre of Excellence for National Security, Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) confirms that a globally observed obstacle to good intelligence on asymmetric threats such as terrorism is the obsession with secrecy. To him the interactions between the press, the administration and various intelligence community officials are inevitably. In fact, most of the individuals involved outside intelligence agencies knew that there was nothing new in the press stories that would aid terrorists in any way.<sup>19</sup>

Moreover, secrecy causes security apparatus in other districts and other authorities to refrain from fully supporting the operations of Densus 88 as misunderstanding may arise. Consequently, they may not reach an optimal outcome. Even so, they became victims in some operations due to their lack of information and coordination. This happened, for example in 2009, when Densus 88 asked the Regional Police in East Java to support them in carrying out its action to arrest Azhari in Batu, East Java. The Regional Police had to sterilize the area where Azhari was hiding. By the time of their action, some members of the Regional Police did not know that they were about to arrest Azhari. This situation might hamper the operation. Further, Hendropriyono, the former head of Indonesian intelligence agency, also commented that they could have arrested Azhari alive and gotten more information from him. It is important for intelligence task, to request for help and coordinate with another anti-terror squad from Indonesian army that is more capable.<sup>20</sup>

In another occasion, three police officers in sector Hamparan Perak, North Sumatera, were murdered as some terrorists attacked their office in September 2010. The

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<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 50.

<sup>19</sup> Thomas Quiggin, *Seeing the Invisible: National Security Intelligence in an Uncertain Age*, (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd, 2007), pp 162-164.

<sup>20</sup> "Bagus tapi dengan Kritik" (Good but with critics) in *Tempo* magazine, No. 40/XXXIV/28 November – 4 December 2005.

perpetrators were allegedly members of the group of Abu Tholut, the leader for JII military camp in Aceh. Indeed, the terrorists attacked police office as they wished to revenge against Densus 88 who has previously arrested and shot several terrorists in tacit raids in Tanjung Balai, Deli Serdang and Lampung, near Hamparan Perak. The lack of information and coordination caused the police officers to be ignorant and unprepared for terrorist attacks to their office.<sup>21</sup> Essentially, the lack of coordination caused the local authorities and other security agencies, which understand the situation and local geography as well as ways to conduct a tacit raid better, cannot involve effectively and optimally.

### **The Achievement of Counter-Terrorism in Indonesia**

Since its creation, Densus 88 has arrested more than 650 perpetrators of terror as well as killed the leaders of JII in a number of missions. According to Tito Karnavian, Deputy of Enforcement and Nurturing Capabilities of National Agency of Terrorism Eradication (BNPT), the success of their efforts mainly depends on the role of intelligent combined with investigation and hard measurements of Densus 88.<sup>22</sup> This confirms that the actions carried out by Densus 88 are strengthened by the capability of intelligence in carrying out their role. The success of Densus 88 to arrest Amrozi, the first Bali bomber, in less than 4 weeks after the bombing in October 2002 was arguably one of its achievements. From the arrest, police could then catch Ali Ghufron, Ali Imron, Ali Fauzi and Imam Samudra several weeks later.

Despite its efforts in arresting a number of perpetrators, Densus 88 remains failed to prevent the bomb attacks. In reality, they kept occurring. Among such attacks are the bombings at Mc Donald Restaurant in Makassar, December 2002; Hotel JW Marriot in Jakarta, August 2003; Australian embassy in Jakarta, January 2004; the second Bali Bomb in 2005, Hotel JW Marriot and Ritz Carlton in July 2009 and Cirebon Bombing in April 2011. These are the testimonies of the weaknesses of intelligence capabilities in countering-

<sup>21</sup> "Aksi Jaringan Sang Gubernur Militer" (The Action of the Military Governor's Network) in Tempo magazine, No. 3931/27 September – 3 October 2010.

<sup>22</sup> "Penanganan Terorisme 70% berkat Peran Intelijen" (70% of terrorism handling is due to Intelligence) accessed from <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/hukum/11/08/03/lpcank-penanganan-terorisme-70-persen-berkat-peran-intelijen>, 3 Agustus 2011.



terrorism as mentioned by former head of Densus 88, Suryadarma Salim.<sup>23</sup> This is in addition to the weaknesses of law enforcement regarding intelligence as acknowledged by Ansyad Mbaai.<sup>24</sup>

However, the decrease in numbers of terrorism actions lately, in terms of both quality and quantity, coupled with the endorsement of Intelligence Law recently, show the strengthening and development of the role and capability of intelligence institution. The law remains debatable and the capability still needs to be proven. Yet, it justifies the intelligent acts. Therefore, this paper suggests that the problem of counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia lies not in the intelligence *per se* but mainly in the preventive program. The police is still lacking in surveillance, although the counter-terrorism agencies in Indonesia have developed the capability to prevent further attacks by predicting as well as collecting information of the potential bombings such as those which happened in Bali last March,<sup>25</sup> and the government is about to launch counter-terrorism law to justify its pre-emptive measures.<sup>26</sup> Their failure lies in the preventing the spread of the Jihadist ideology, which justifies the use of violence to achieve their goals.

Amongst Southeast Asia countries, Indonesia suffered the most from JII attacks. This is because JII originated from Darul Islam that aimed to establish Indonesian Islamic State.<sup>27</sup> Although this movement was defeated when Indonesian government executed the leader, Kartosuwirjo, in 1962, his ideology was still embraced and developed by his followers, including Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir. Both of them were Yemeni

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<sup>23</sup> "Kemampuan Intelijen Indonesia Memprihatinkan" (The capability of Indonesian intelligence is a concern) accessed from [http://us.nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/76874-\\_kemampuan\\_intelijen\\_indonesia\\_memprihatinkan](http://us.nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/76874-_kemampuan_intelijen_indonesia_memprihatinkan), 22 Juli 2009.

<sup>24</sup> "Ansyad Mbaai, Peredam Gelombang Radikalisme" (Ansyad Mbaai, The Absorber of Radicalism Wave) accessed from <http://www.intelijen.co.id/wawancara/1313-ansyaad-mbai-peredam-gelombang-radikalisme>, 15 Agustus 2011.

<sup>25</sup> "Polri: Jaringan Teroris Hendak Rampok Toko Emas Money Changer di Bali" (Indonesian Police: Terrorist Network is about to steal Jewelry shop and money changer in Bali) <http://us.news.detik.com/read/2012/03/18/233400/1870431/10/polri-jaringan-teroris-hendak-rampok-toko-emas-money-changer-di-bali?nd992203605>, 18 Maret 2011.

<sup>26</sup> "Counter-Terrorism Get Legal Boost," accessed from <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/01/18/counterterrorism-get-legal-boost.html>, 18 Januari 2012.

<sup>27</sup> Greg Fealy, "Half a Century of Violent Jihad in Indonesia: A Historical and Ideological comparison of Darul Islam and Jemaah Islamiyah," in Marika Vicziany and David Wright-Neville (eds.) *Islamic Terrorism in Indonesia: Myths and Realities*, (Victoria: Monash University Press, 2005), pp. 15-32.

descendants, used to be committees of Al Isryad, which is one of modernist movements in Indonesia, and later became founder of JII.<sup>28</sup>

Sungkar and Baasyir coupled with their cadres had spread the ideology of Salafi Jihadism in Indonesia through *dakwah* (preaching) either in the Mosque or in their cell groups meeting. They also published 'Jihadist' books and built *pesantrens* and *madrrasah* (Islamic schools) with their ideology.<sup>29</sup> In accordance with their strategy, JII has ultimately introduced the ideology and to gain sympathy and support from the public. The latter comprises financial support, logistic and human resources. Consequently, it is difficult to predict how much of this ideology has spread and influenced the people, mainly in rural areas in West and Central Java, as this region used to be a base for DI.

Although the government, through BNPT, has conducted de-radicalization program to detainees<sup>30</sup> and seminars to prevent the radicalism in universities,<sup>31</sup> it cannot entirely stop the terrorism acts so far. To some extent the program is also rejected by Islamic movements, including Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) in Solo.<sup>32</sup> The government may use the ex-jihadists and *ulamas* to de-radicalize the terrorists. However the acts of terrorists keep on occurring. This is not to say that the de-radicalize program run by the government fails. Yet, the government misses the point.

### The Future Challenges of Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Indonesia

As mentioned earlier, a homeland security strategy involves a concerted national effort of state and local government who act in accordance with private sector and individuals. Similarly, Rohan Gunaratna confirms that to effectively combat the very current terrorism, the governmental, inter-governmental and societal response must conduct a

<sup>28</sup> Solahudin, *op. cit.* pp. 65-77. See also Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), pp. 125-128 and Greg Barton, *Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islamism in Indonesia*, (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005), pp. 48-50.

<sup>29</sup> Solahudin, *op.cit.*, pp 240-245.

<sup>30</sup> Tito Carnavian 'Terrorist Rehabilitation: Indonesia's Experience,' in Report on International Conference on Terrorist Rehabilitation, Singapore: RSIS and RRG, 24-26 February 2009.

<sup>31</sup> "Kerjasama BNPT – Perguruan Tinggi Dorong Aparat Intelijen Masuk" (Cooperation between BNPT and Universities encouraged intelligent agency to enter campuses" <http://www.intelijen.co.id/warta/1654-kerjasama-bnpt-perguruan-tinggi-dorong-aparat-intelijen-masuk-kampus>, 22 Desember 2011.

<sup>32</sup> "5 Ormas Islam tolak proyek deradikalisasi eks teroris" (5 Islamic movements reject de-radicalization to ex-terrorists) accessed from <http://us.news.detik.com/read/2011/12/19/100222/1794200/10/5-ormas-islam-tolak-proyek-deradikalisasi-eks-teroris>, 19 Desember 2011.



comprehensive strategy.<sup>33</sup> This implies, firstly, that terrorism cannot be managed solely by hard approaches but needs soft approaches. This also suggests that all elements of a nation should cooperate to protect their national interest and internal security, particularly in dealing with terrorism. Eventually, for an effective counter-terrorism measurement, government must conduct a holistic and interconnected action against terrorist groups at all stages, from the pre-formative to the post-destruction phase.

So far, the Indonesian government has conducted two approaches of counter-terrorism strategy. In addition to Densus 88, the Indonesian government has also formed a national agency, namely BNPT, to eradicate terrorism in a 'softer' way. The government accommodated this agency with President Decree No. 46/2010 regarding the creation of BNPT and its tasks. As mentioned in the decree, BNPT is primarily in charge to formulate a policy, strategy and program in eradication of terrorism, which includes prevention, protection, and de-radicalization. Therefore, this paper suggests the Indonesian government to look at the "soft" counter-terrorism strategy carried out by the Saudi government. It is called 'soft' as the Saudi government involves other ministries rather than merely security forces. Christopher Boucek, in his paper, explains the three interconnected programs of counter-terrorism strategy that is aimed at prevention, rehabilitation and aftercare.<sup>34</sup>

In so doing, the Indonesian government should activate all her resources. This ultimately requires the involvement and coordination of security apparatus, intelligent agency, military, other ministries, local authorities as well as public. The other ministries that are needed in this program involve education, religion, psychological, social and economic ministries. Their cooperation is needed in conducting detention of terrorists, prevention of the spread of the ideology, rehabilitation of the detainees and after rehabilitation care program to prepare ex-jihadist in re-entering the society.

In Indonesia context, prevention program can be primarily led by Ministry of Education who runs a lecture and program throughout schools from a very basic to

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<sup>33</sup> Rohan Gunaratna, "Introduction: Change or Continuity?" in *The Changing Face of Terrorism*, (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2004), pp. 1-17.

<sup>34</sup> Christopher Boucek, "Saudi Arabia's "Soft" Counterterrorism Strategy," in *Carnegie Papers, Middle East Program*, (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, No. 97, September 2008), pp. 1-25. See also Rohan Gunaratna, "De-radicalization Programs around the World", in *Combating Terrorism in Libya through Dialogue and Reintegration*, March 2010, pp. 7-8.

university levels as the majority of the extremists in Indonesia are young people. This program contains education and warning about the dangers of extremism as well as the impact of terrorism and violence. This also promotes nationalism that will prevent any violence that is based on religious or ethnicity as Indonesia embraces the motto of “unity in diversity”. Further, in particular events, the government may distribute books, pamphlets and other materials regarding the program to enlighten students’ parents and families. The government and schools should also take some steps to combat recruitment and deployment of the radical ideology within the school. This usually comes from deviant teachers or senior students who exploit their time with students by discussing issues out of their courses such as politics as well as religions and subsequently spread hatred.

Ministry of Religions should also run the same program in *pesantrens* and *madrasahs* (Islamic schools). Moreover, they need to supervise books and other materials that are used in these schools and take a decisive action on Salafi Jihadists books. This is especially important as the police have just found books about conducting jihad in Tangerang, West Java.<sup>35</sup> In addition, they need to engage respected and moderate Ulama to spread the non-violence ideology such as loving, caring and peace of Islam through *dakwah* (preaching). They may also involve the ex-jihadists, such as Nassir Abas to join this program and share their experience.

As for the rehabilitation process, BNPT should cooperate with religious clerics and scholars coupled with psychologists and social researchers, and hold dialogues with arrested perpetrators after the completion of interrogation phase. The clerics should apply the dialogue in a close and conducive way, so that the prisoners may feel that they are being humanized and thus communicate openly. The government should also engage ex-JII members who have higher authorities and are more respected by the other members, so they may be heard by detainees.<sup>36</sup> Once the higher ranking JII members change their worldview, as an outcome of this communication, it will provide greater

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<sup>35</sup> “Police found ‘jihad’ books and explosive powder in raided house,” accessed from <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/03/30/police-found-jihad-books-and-explosive-powder-raided-house.html>, 30 Maret 2012.

<sup>36</sup> Hasibullah Satrawi, “Deradikalisasi Berbasis Ideologi,” (Deradicalization based on Ideology) accessed from <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2011/10/29/03584393/Deradikalisasi.Berbasis.Ideologi>, 29 Oktober 2011.



opportunity to other members to respect and follow his instruction. Further, the psychological and social division is responsible to determine what support to give to the prisoners and their families who may need help during and after release to society. Similarly, the clerics should remain in contact with the ex-prisoners so the former jihadists may continue to study with the *ulamas*, who were counseling them in prison.

In the aftercare program, the Indonesian government needs to facilitate the lives of the detainee when he returns back into life in society. The government may put them into a specialized rehabilitation care center for a certain time prior to their return to a 'normal' life. This also provides opportunities for BNPT to observe whether to release a candidate. The government should also provide skill training and job opportunities to ex-jihadists so that they can be productive to support themselves and their family, and be accepted by the society. This will reduce the possibility of going back to their former groups. The provision of job opportunity applies to preventive actions as well. The access to a better economy and education will essentially reduce the possibility of terrorist recruitments.

In addition, there is a growing trend for Islamic radical groups to utilize social media to spread their ideology and recruit their potential cadres. They also share the same grievances about a corrupt and injustice government, which is the foundation to their ideology.<sup>37</sup> Therefore, role of Ministry of Communication is needed here to supervise the activities in social media. Moreover, law enforcement together with wholeheartedly efforts to increase the social and economic welfare as well as education arguably reduces the concern of potential supporters and sympathizers.

All of these programs ultimately are carried out as a holistic and interconnected strategy. The conduct of this strategy certainly needs cooperation and coordination from all elements of this nation. As mentioned in President's decree, BNPT will take responsibility for this. This effort may face challenges as it is not easy to coordinate all programs, needs a greater budget, takes a longer term<sup>38</sup> and deals with Indonesian

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
<sup>37</sup> Nur Azlin Mohamed Yasin, "Social Media and Terrorism in Indonesia: Enhancing or Diluting its Appeal?" in RSIS Commentaries no. 051/2012, 22 March 2012.

<sup>38</sup> Kumar Ramakrishna, *op. cit.*

democracy political system.<sup>39</sup> However, with a strong political willingness from government, involvement of all state's elements and inter-governmental cooperation, a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy, which essentially pays respect to the law and human rights, may prevail.

### Conclusion

Despite its lack of coordination, Densus 88 has arguably succeeded to raid the terrorists' safe house, arrest the bombing perpetrators and, to some extent, prevent the upcoming attacks. Yet the government fails to eradicate terrorist group's ideology, so called Salafi Jihadism, which is the foundation of their actions, and prevent the spread of it. Therefore, it is essential for all elements of this nation to cooperate in stopping and countering terrorism. The Indonesian government should put an effort to carry out soft counter-terrorism, as carried out by Saudi government, which interconnects prevention, rehabilitation and aftercare program. This effort should be combined with the hard counter-measurement of Densus 88. Consequently, BNPT should coordinate not only among the security agencies but also the related Ministries, local authorities as well as public which are involved in the program. Essentially, in this reform era, the Indonesian government should conduct a holistic and comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy and this is in such way to respect the law and human rights of Indonesia.



<sup>39</sup> Syahdatul Kahfi, "Memberantas Terorisme, Menjaga Konsolidasi Demokrasi: Sebuah Dilema?" (The eradication of terrorism and protection of democracy is a dilemma?) in *Terorisme di tengah Arus Global Demokrasi* (Jakarta: The Circle for Contemporary Political Studies, 2006), pp. 277-287. See also Kofi Annan, "A Global Strategy in Fighting Terrorism," accessed from <http://english.safe-democracy.org/keynotes/a-global-strategy-for-fighting-terrorism.html> , 10 Maret 2005.



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