

USING INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER TO FIGHT AGAINST TERRORIST STRATEGY: THE CASE OF JAMA'AH ISLAMIYAH AND ITS AFFILIATES

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Thus, what is supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy. The next best is to disrupt his alliances, then attacking the army, while attacking the cities is the worst strategy. (Sun Tzu).²

Abstrak - Paper ini mencoba mengelaborasi penggunaan elemen-elemen kekuatan nasional yang terdiri dari: Militer, Informasi, Diplomasi, Penegakan Hukum, Intelijen, Keuangan dan Ekonomi dalam pemberantasan terorisme di Indonesia. Seperti telah kita ketahui bahwa sejak terjadinya aksi bom bunuh diri di Bali pada tanggal 12 Oktober 2002, pemberantasan terhadap kegiatan terorisme di Indonesia terus dilakukan secara intensif. Aparat keamanan Indonesia, dalam hal ini polisi, terus bekerja keras untuk memberangus para teroris dan jaringannya melalui operasi penegakan hukum. Jaringan terorisme regional Jemaah Islamiyah dan pendukung serta sempalannya dapat terus ditekan. Ratusan teroris telah diburu, ditangkap, dan diadili untuk dihukum, bahkan tidak sedikit dari mereka yang kehilangan nyawanya karena dijatuhi hukuman mati ataupun terbunuh dalam operasi penegakan hukum tersebut, tetapi terorisme di Indonesia terus berlanjut dan masih menjadi ancaman terhadap keamanan nasional. Pertanyaannya, dimana kelemahannya dan bagaimana strateginya?

Pelaksanaan pemberantasan terorisme yang cenderung koersif, mengutamakan penindakan dengan "hard power" seperti yang terjadi hingga saat ini, dinilai tidak cukup dan kurang efektif karena kurang menyentuh pada akar permasalahan dan faktor-faktor pendorong yang menyebabkan orang menjadi teroris ataupun mendukung aksi-aksi terorisme. Pemerintah perlu mengutamakan penggunaan "soft power" dengan mengintegrasikan seluruh elemen kekuatan nasional untuk menetralsir strategi para teroris dan kelompoknya. Penanganan masalah radikalisme (ideologi radikal) dan penderitaan-penderitaan masyarakat akibat tekanan ekonomi, sosial dan politik, seperti: pengangguran, korupsi, pelayanan masyarakat yang buruk, pendidikan yang mahal, perjudian, pelacuran, dan lain-lainnya perlu ditangani dengan baik karena isu-isu tersebut menurunkan legitimasi pemerintah dan dapat dieksploitasi oleh para teroris sebagai alasan untuk melakukan aksinya. Pakar strategi perang dari Cina, Sun-Tzu, mengatakan bahwa keberhasilan yang paling utama dalam perang itu apabila kita bisa mengalahkan musuh-musuh kita tanpa berperang sehingga konflik bersenjata yang bakal merenggut nyawa manusia dapat dicegah. Tentunya kita tidak ingin membunuh masyarakat kita meskipun dia teroris sekalipun.

Kata kunci: terrorism, jamaah islamiyah, government, strategy, operational art.

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² Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, (Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo, eds.) Strategic Studies a Reader, (USA: Routledge, 2008), p. 60-61.

Introduction

Following the first Bali bombing on October 12, 2002, Indonesia's security forces have stepped up their operations against JI and its affiliates group. Quite a number of JI and its affiliates terrorists have been killed, captured and brought to justice; however, terrorism remains poses serious threat to Indonesia. JI remains able to radicalize people and regenerate new terrorist actors. For example, on April 16, 2011, suicide bomber exploded himself in the Police's Mosque, in the city of Cirebon.³ On September 25, 2011, again the same modes of bombing occurred at Kepunton Church Solo. Just recently Indonesian Police raided and killed five suspected terrorists in Bali. These are the signs that the current approach does not end the act of terrorism because it does not address the underlying causes of terrorism. JI and its affiliates use ideology to justify their violent means to achieve their ends. In addition, they also use economic, social, and political (ESP) grievances to delegitimize government. In contrast, the government efforts to defeat them have yet been developed to fight their ideological appeal and ESP grievances, as their key strategy to radicalize people to terrorist.

The government current approach which focuses on law enforcement strategy by using police force is not enough to fight against terrorism. Apprehending, jailing and killing terrorist is not the key solution in fighting terrorism. This approach only address the symptom of terrorism, it does not address the root of terrorism itself. To completely defeat JI and its affiliate radical group, government must develop new approach which emphasizes on counter terrorist's strategy by utilizing all elements of national powers: Military, Information, Diplomacy, Law Enforcement, Intelligence, Financial, and Economy (MIDLIFE). Preventing people from being infected by infectious jihadist ideology and addressing their ESP grievances is the core long term Indonesia counter terrorism strategy that will prevent JI and its affiliate radical jihadist group recruits new terrorist actors. As Sun Tzu suggested that one must strive to defeat the enemy's strategies so that potential armed conflict can be avoided. It means that we must avoid kinetic action to defeat our enemy. This philosophical thinking advises us that defeating enemy without fighting is the best. How can it apply in the case of combating terrorism in Indonesia? This

³ The Jakartapost, "Police Name 2 New Suspects on Cirebon Bombing", <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/04/26/police-name-2-new-suspects-cirebon-bombing.html>, accessed April 27, 2011.

paper will devise the strategy to answer that question. First, I will start the discussion on JI strategy followed by its operational art. Second, I will continue the discussion on the government strategy and the relevant law to develop the strategy, and then followed by the government operational art. Finally, paper will be ended by the conclusion.

JI Strategy

JI is not an opened giant revolutionary front like FARC, Armed Revolutionary Movement in Columbia, instead it is a network of clandestine cells, which has long history of political context to establish Islamic States through both violence and non-violence means. The JI non-violence movement has spectrum of support from Islamic radical mass organization because of sharing their goal to establish Islamic States in Indonesia. For example, the Mujahideen Council of Indonesia (MMI), an Islamic mass organization in which Baasyir established in August 2000. This is an organization that strives to impose Sharia law peacefully through political process. As Abuza put it :

“It is an overt organization headquartered in Yogyakarta that serves as an umbrella organization and coordinating body for many militant and hardline Islamic organization and a groups who are committed to the establishment of an Islamic state”.⁴

JI ultimate goal, “Ends State” is the establishment of regional pan Islamic state. The creation of an Islamic state in Indonesia is the first step toward the restoration of a caliphate. JI plans of caliphate include Malaysia and the Philippines, Singapore and the southern parts of Thailand.⁵ The argument behind JI intention to establish Indonesian Islamic state is based on the JI subjective thinking that Indonesia, as the majority population is a Muslim, must impose Sharia laws.⁶ As Baasyir put it, the long term strategy is to get Indonesia 100 percent based on Sharia. As long as Muslims are majority, the country should be ruled by Sharia.⁷ To that end, JI uses not only non-violent ways but

⁴ Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in South East Asia: Crucible of Terror*. (USA: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2003), p. 139.

⁵ Australian Government, “Jemaah Islamiyah(JI)”, http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/nationalsecurity.nsf/Page/What_Governments_are_doing_Listing_of_Terrorism_Organisations_Jemaah_Islamiyah, accessed October 10, 2010.

⁶ “Abu Bakar Baasyir, “Free to Fight for Sharia”, *Asia News*, <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Abu-Bakar-Baasyir-free-to-fight-for-Sharia-6438.html>, accessed October 10, 2010.

⁷ Zachary Abuza, *op.cit.*, p.142

also violent ways to create an Islamic state. As Sungkar contended that the Islamic community had to build up three strength: *quwwatul aqidah* (faith's strength); *quwwatul ukhuwah* (brotherhood's strength); and *quwwatul mussalah* (military strength).⁸ This conceptual struggle to achieve JI ultimate goal is also clearly written on the JI manual book, as a JI ways.

Ji's "Ways" is violence and nonviolence. It is based on *Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Jemaah Islamiyah* (PUPJI), the General Guide for the Struggle of Jemaah Islamiyah. PUPJI outlines the group's administrative structure and guiding religious principles. In addition, it provides insights into its organizational development, membership recruitment, and operational strategy.⁹ According to PUPJI, the way of JI to establish Islamic state can be achieved through double strategy which are *counter society and counter states*. Counter society means how to turn the society into Islamic way as JI perceived to further strategy on counter state. While counter state means to overthrow the government either through mass movement, military means or both of them. PUPJI provides guidance to JI which outlines a broad organizational and operational procedure based on *Salafi Jihadist* religious principles whether it is violence or non violence. The conceptual ways of JI struggle consist of: the emphasis on *Daulah Islamiyah*, Islamic state as a stepping stone towards the restoration of the global Islamic Caliphate, global Islamic governance; the process of preparing for the Islamic state through a persistent and patient "molding" of the individual, the family, and the *Jema'ah*, group, as Islamic entities; the prominence of military training and *jihad musallah*, armed struggle, as the final outcome and the ultimate test of success for JI long preparations.¹⁰ The effort to develop strength is a long process that includes building potential until the organization reaches the stage where this potential has become real, effective, and ready to be used in a show of strength and combat operations. It is similar to using classical Maoist People's War with violence delayed until it is strong enough to fight against state security forces. In this sense, it is not surprisingly, JI employs combined means, overt and covert organizations, including terrorist cell to achieve its goal.


⁸ Ibid., p. 127

⁹ Elena Paplosa, "From Counter Society to Counter State: Jemaah Islamiyah According to PUPJI", *Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies*, No. 117, 2006, p. i.

¹⁰ Ibid.

Jl “Means” is overt and covert network not only in Indonesia but also in neighboring countries such as in Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines.¹¹ For example, the Malaysian cell had five discernible functions: it worked very closely with Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM); it was the primary conduit between the Jl and Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan; it was responsible for recruitment and education; it was responsible for establishing several front companies that could be used to channel Al-Qaeda funds and procure weapon and bomb-making materials; and establishing a cell in Australia.¹² The Philippine cell was responsible for acquiring explosives, gun, and other equipment, while Singapore cell was responsible for planning and coordinating an attack on US and western target in Singapore.¹³ Additionally, Jl uses Islamic Boarding School such as Pondok Ngruki in Solo as fundamental inducement to disseminate Salafi-Jihadism.

Jl also uses Madrasas, Mosques, and University to recruit cadre and propagate its ideology overtly and covertly.¹⁴ Jl also uses ESP grievances to de-legitimate government and to attract followers. Corruption, poverty, prostitution, unemployment, is the issue that Jl exploits to capitalize the support from the community. To remedy this problem Jl offers alternative solution by offering the establishment of Islamic state.¹⁵ As a clandestine movement which moves to establish counter state organization, Jl operates all these means, though not exactly the same as Mao did, in certain degree are similar to Mao’s operational art, which include non-violence and violence operational art in achieving its ultimate goal.¹⁶



¹¹ Australian Government, *Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)*

¹² Zachary Abuza, *op.cit.*, 134-136

¹³ *Ibid*, p. 136-138

¹⁴ JTIC, “Jemaah Islamiyah Key Fact”,

http://www8.janes.com/JDIC/JTIC/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/binder/jwit/jwito490.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=&backPath=http://jtict.janes.com/JDIC/JTIC&Prod_Name=JWIT&activeNav=http://www8.janes.com/JDIC/JTIC, accessed December 3, 2010.

¹⁵ The *Jakartapost*, “Violent jihad is tolerated for those who have resources: JAT leader”, “JAT” is a New Islamist Organization Established by Abu Bakar Baasyir in 2008. It is merely the continuation of Jl, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/08/27/violent-jihad-tolerated-those-who-have-resources-jat-leader.html>, accessed October 10, 2010.

¹⁶ Thomas A. Mark, Sebastian L.v. Gorka and Robert Sharp, “Getting the Next War Right: Beyond Population-centric Warfare”, *Prism* 1, No. 3, 91.

JI Non-Violent Operational Art

Politically, JI uses ESP grievances to de-legitimate government and to attract followers. Corruption, poverty, prostitution, and unemployment are the issues that JI exploits to capitalize the support of the community. These are the critical issues that could hit the government legitimacy but fertile for JI to get more foot soldiers. Thereby, to remedy this socio-political problem, JI offers alternative solution by offering through the establishment of Islamic state.¹⁷ Indonesia is a country where the majority population is Muslim; therefore it must apply Sharia law.

Subjectively, JI accuses that the trouble in the country because Indonesia of being not an Islamic Government and collaborates with the West. The global war on terror is the West grand strategy to oppress the Muslim community because the infidels and government of Indonesia are afraid of Baasyir. This is what JI and its affiliate radical group perceives, as Mochamad Achwan, a Baasyir's successor, put it when he commented on Baasyir's arrest:

“Ba’asyir’s arrest is just a test from God in the fight between good and evil, and between Islam and the infidels. The infidels and corrupt officials are just afraid of Ba’asyir’s call for the establishment of an Islamic state under total Sharia rule. If Sharia law is applied then there will no longer be any corruption. The government and the Western world see pure Islam like the one we apply as a threat because we do not recognize democracy, which is not an Islamic way of life”.¹⁸

In term of recruitment, JI uses Mosques, Mussolas and Madrasas as facility for indoctrination and recruitment. JI is also using kinship, family and friendship relationships to recruit their followers. To radicalize the recruits, JI systematically follows three steps.¹⁹ First is *tabligh* (awakening). It is the step that cadre receives strict codes of Islamic law, religious dogma, dressing patterns and detailed methods of religious practices. This step

¹⁷ The Jakartapost, “Violent jihad is tolerated for those who have resources: JAT leader”, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/08/27/violent-jihad-tolerated-those-who-have-resources-jat-leader.html>, accessed October 10, 2010.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ JTIC, “Jemaah Islamiyah Key Fact”, http://www8.janes.com/JDIC/JTIC/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/binder/jwit/jwito490.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=&backPath=http://jtic.janes.com/JDIC/JTIC&Prod_Name=JWIT&activeNav=http://www8.janes.com/JDIC/JTIC, accessed December 3, 2010.

is conducted in a broad group. Second is *tamrin* (indoctrination). At this step, cadre is thought clandestinely, more specific and deeply about radical Islam within closed audience. Third is *tamhish* (Jihadist). This is a further indoctrination for the hardest principles of JI, only a few members of Jemaah Islamiyah ready to sacrifice themselves in suicide attacks.

In term of strategic communication, JI spreads its messages through public media and sermon. Its basic message focuses on a few key issues that have broad resonance, even among the moderate Muslims: Islam is under attack; westerners especially the Americans are oppressors who occupy Muslim lands, and kill Muslim civilians; it is a religious obligation to wage jihad.²⁰ It is clear that the messages spread hatred to encourage JI follower to use violence means against their perceived enemies. JI also influence the Indonesian people by disseminating information that Indonesia is not a country which should exercise democracy. Democracy is the product of the West and it will not fit with Muslim communities. On his sermon, Abu Bakar Baasyir says democracy will only bring injustice system, which causes Muslim suffering and as a vital sin which will not be forgiven by God.²¹ To further disseminating hatred to the secular and democratic system that Indonesia follows, Baasyir sees the world is divided into two segments, which are the follower of Allah and those who follow Satan. On his sermon, he put it:

“Allah has divided humanity into two segments, namely the followers of Allah and those who follow Satan.... God’s groups are those who follow Islam, those who are prepared to follow his laws and struggle for the implementation of Sharia, [Hezbollah]. Meanwhile what is meant by Satan’s group is humanity which opposes Allah’s law, humanity which wishes to bring pressure to bear upon Allah’s law, and wishes to throw obstacles in the path of the implementation of Allah’s law..... Because the character of followers of Satan is always opposing Allah....there is no non believer who allows the development of Islam, who will allow Islam to be free; non believer must work hard to threaten Islam and the laws thereof. This is the character of non-believers. Non-believers

²⁰ Alan Foo Chai Kwan, “Countering Radical Islamic Terrorism In Southeast Asia - A Case Study On Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Network”, <http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/pointer/journals/2009/v35n2/feature4.html>, accessed March 15, 2011.

²¹ Abu Bakar Baasyir, “Syirik Demokrasi Sebagai Dosa Besar Yang Tidak Diampuni”, <http://video.aol.com/video-detail/syirik-demokrasi-sbg-dosa-yg-tidak-terampuni-ust-abu-bakar-baasyir/2125315777/?icid=VIDURVHOV01>, accessed December 10, 2010.

will always expend their wealth to impede the way of God, to impede the law of Islam. Non-believers will expend not insignificant sum to destroy Islam. This is the character of non-believers".²²

In term of alliances, JI has no link with the state actors however it has link to several non-state actors' organizations. Domestically, JI has a shared ideology with other radical Islamist groups in Indonesia such as Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI), Hizbut Thahir Indonesia (HTI), Jemaah Ansyari Tauhid (JAT), Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front), Jundulah, Kompak (Islamic Committee for Crisis Responsive).²³ Covertly, JI is having link with all splinters group such as Ring Banten, Ring Palembang and Ring Cilacap—all are radical's Muslim underground organization which believed as the terrorist elements—to continue conducting terrorist at any time.

Internationally, JI links to Al-Qaeda were through a group around Hambali and there were qualms as early as 1999 from some in JI's central command about adopting the Al-Qaeda line on targeting the US and its allies. JI also had very close ties with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) until the senior MILF leadership began to distance itself from JI as it inched toward a peace agreement with the Philippines government. Additionally, JI also has close link with Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Many of the Indonesians in Mindanao have moved closer to the more radical Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A handful of fugitives in Mindanao- Dulmatin (until he was killed in Jakarta in March 2010); his brother-in-law, Hari Kuncoro (an alleged member of Mujahideen KOMPAK - not JI); Umar Patek; Asep alias Darwin; and Zulkifli bin Hir alias Marwan - appear to be working so closely with the ASG that some JI members in Java consider them to be more ASG members than JI.²⁴

²² A Transcript of Baasyir Sermon, cited from Zachary Abuza, op.cit., p.127

²³ Alan Foo Chai Kwan, "Countering Radical Islamic Terrorism In Southeast Asia - A Case Study On Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Network", <http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/pointer/journals/2009/v35n2/feature4.html>, accessed March 15, 2011.

²⁴ JTIC, "Jemaah Islamiyah Key Fact", http://www8.janes.com/JDIC/JTIC/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/binder/jwit/jwit0490.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=&backPath=http://jtic.janes.com/JDIC/JTIC&Prod_Name=JWIT&activeNav=http://www8.janes.com/JDIC/JTIC, accessed December 3, 2010.

JI Violent Operational Art

JI violent operational art includes bombing, shooting, armed robbery, and assassination. Its campaign against its enemies has been done through bombing, shooting, and assassination. To do so, JI uses weapons such as IED, SVBIED, Fire Arms and Machetes, AK-47, M-16.²⁵ JI and its affiliate group's targeted major bombing during the last decade consist of:

August 2000, the Philippines Embassy in Jakarta caused 2 people killed and 21 other injured. December 2000, JI series of bomb explosions at the night of Christmas in several big cities around Indonesia including Jakarta, Bekasi, Sukabumi, Mataram, Pematangsiantar, Medan, Batam, and Pekanbaru. October, 2002, JI suicide car bombs targeted Paddy's Pub and Sari Club (SC) in Bali killed 202 people and 200 more others injured. August 2003, suicide car bomb targeted JW Marriot Hotel that cause 14 people killed. September 2004, suicide car bomb targeted Australian Embassy Jakarta killed 6 people. October 2005, suicide bomb targeted tourism area in Kuta & Jimbaran, 22 people killed. July 2009, suicide bombs at Ritz Carlton and JW Marriot killed 9 people and 60 more people injured.²⁶

In addition to bombing, JI also committed with strong armed robbery. This crime is part of JI ways to fund its activity. Series armed robbery as follow:

March 2002, Imam Samudra and his comrades robbed gold store in Serang, Banten. April 2010, terrorist group robbed Bank Sumut, Medan. June 3, 2010, terrorist group robbed BRI Bank Ampelas in Medan. June 2010, Abu Tholut terrorist group robbed Money Changer in Medan. August 18, 2010, terrorist group attacked and robbed CIMB bank in Medan, 3 terrorist shot deaths 13 others captured. September 25, 2010, a terrorist group robbed ATM in Padang West Sumatra, all suspected terrorist was captured and under police investigation.²⁷

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Author own note on Indonesian terrorist group's bank robbery.

To destabilize and undermine the government effort to protect the people, JI also committed to some assassination activities. This violent line of effort is intended to delegitimize the government. Several assassinations below show the list of terror that JI committed during the communal and religious conflict in Ambon and Poso as well as an attack on police precinct in North Sumatra, in September 2010.

On November 8, 2005, terrorist shot 2 high school students in Poso. On November 19, 2005, terrorist shot Puji Laksono, University Lecturer in Palu. On January 25, 2006, two terrorists shot the chief of Poso District Police, Rudy Sufahriadi.²⁸

JI attack based on its belief that all people which not follow its course are infidels therefore they are legitimate target. JI also perceives that the West, particularly the US is the big enemy, because the US attacked and oppressed Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as injustice to Palestine. As Kumar Ramakrishna said that ideology has very concrete, operational implications emerges from the following excerpt from a November 2002 Indonesian police interrogation of Imam Samudra, the convicted field coordinator of the Bali attacks of the previous month²⁹. When asked why he had engaged in the Bali terrorist strike, Samudra replied:

“To oppose the barbarity of the US army of the Cross and its allies ... to take revenge for the pain of ... weak men, women and babies who died without sin when thousands of tonnes of bombs were dropped in Afghanistan in September 2001 [sic] ... during Ramadan To carry out a [sic] my responsibility to wage a global jihad against Jews and Christians throughout the world As a manifestation of Islamic solidarity between Moslems, not limited by geographic boundaries. To carry out Allah’s order in the Book of An-nisa, verses 74-76, which concerns the obligation to defend weak men, weak women, and innocent babies, who are always the targets of the barbarous actions of the American terrorists and their allies ... So that the American terrorists and their allies understand that the blood of Moslems is expensive and valuable; and cannot be – is forbidden to be – toyed with and made a target of American terrorists and their allies. So

²⁸M. Tito Karnavian, dkk, *Indonesian Top Secret: Membongkar Konflik Poso*, (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2008), hlm. 04-115

²⁹ Kumar Ramakrishna, “The Southeast Asian Approach” to Counter- Terrorism: Learning from Indonesia and Malaysia”, *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, Singapore, p.33-34

that the [American and allied] terrorists understand how painful it is to lose a [sic] mothers, husbands, children, or other family members, which is what they have so arbitrarily inflicted on Moslems throughout the world. To prove to Allah – the Almighty and most deserving of praise – that we will do whatever we can to defend weak Moslems, and to wage war against the US imperialists and their allies”.³⁰

In short sentence, JI and its affiliate group definitely pose a significant security threat to Indonesia. They consolidate for a long strategy to overthrow the democratic secular country into theocratic Islamic country. To achieve their goal, they use non-violent and violent strategy. Embracing other radical non-violent movement in the country is essential for JI to draw more political power, while line up with other radical violent groups is also necessary to strengthen its power against the state.

Government of Indonesia Strategy

The government strategy is based on the Gol’s general framework in combating terrorism, which is a direct and an indirect approach, while the frame work is based on five principles—law enforcement, non-discrimination, international cooperation, democracy and community participation.³¹ Within this context, the direct measures include the use of force and judicial process, while indirect measures include strategic communication, community based organization empowerment, and international relation.³²

The “Ends State” of this strategy is defeating JI and its affiliates radical group in order to prevent them from radicalizing Muslim community; thereby the freedom of religion, human right, national unity, democracy, and social justice prevail in Indonesia.³³ On this strategy, the Gol “Ways” is the combination of soft and hard approaches. These are intended to: prevent Indonesia’s Muslim community from JI radical influence; protect

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, “Terrorism, A New Fight to ASEAN”, Key Note Speech at the Opening of ASEAN Chief of Police (Aseanpol) Conference Denpasar Bali, May 17, 2005.

³² Ibid.

³³ *The Preamble of Indonesian Constitution 1945*, <http://pfsindonesiaku.wordpress.com/2007/11/05/preamble/>, accessed March 29, 2011

Indonesian and its asset from JI attack; *disrupt* JI's sources of funding, recruiting, training, linking with other radical groups; and *destroy* JI's infrastructure.

The four tenets of Gol strategy are pursuing four strategic objectives. First objective is to undermine JI's ideology and eradicate ESP grievances so as JI will not be able to influence and radicalize Muslim community. Second objective is to strengthen the Indonesian and its asset security so as JI will not be able to carry out any terrorist attack. Third objective is to disrupt JI's secure of funding, recruiting, training, and linking with other radical groups so as JI will no longer be able to regenerate new terrorist actors. Fourth is to destroy JI infrastructure so as JI has no longer be able to exist.

To achieve these objectives, the Gol "Means" is all elements of national power, MIDLIFE (Military, Intelligence, Diplomatic, Law Enforcement, Information, Financial, and Economic). This paper will discuss the use of each of these elements in depth after the discussion of relevant law on this strategy.

The Relevant Law

In this campaign against JI and its affiliate radical group, the government of Indonesia applies several related international and national laws as well as regulation, communiqué and agreements. The related international law/ instruments in Indonesia's counter-terrorism includes Convention on Offences and Certain Others Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963), Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure Aircraft (1970), Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999), Biological Weapon Convention (1972), and Security Council Resolution SR 1368/2001, as well as SR 1373/2001.³⁴ In March 2006, Indonesia has ratified the 2 (two) following Conventions relating to international counter-terrorism: the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999), the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997), Law No.39/1999 on Human Rights, Law No.8/1981 on Criminal Procedures, Law No.1/1946 on Penal Code, and Law No.5/1998 on

³⁴ Romli Atmasasmita, "Strategy of Combating Terrorism in Indonesia", Paper Presented at the Asia Pacific Conference Homeland Security Summit Honolulu, Hawaii, 14-17 November 2004.

the Ratification of the International Convention against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.³⁵

Additionally, there are also ASEAN convention, agreement, joint statements among the ASEAN leaders and the world leaders which relate to fighting against terrorism. First is the ASEAN convention on counterterrorism.³⁶ It is powerful convention which emphasizes of an ASEAN strong commitment to enhance cooperation in countering terrorism which covers the prevention and suppression of all forms of terrorist acts. It also reiterates the need to improve regional cooperation on counter terrorism and undertake effective measures through deepening cooperation among ASEAN law enforcement agencies and relevant authorities in countering terrorism. Second is the ASEAN-United States of America Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism.³⁷ This Joint Declaration was signed in Brunei Darussalam on August 1, 2003. This declaration emphasizes the need to undertake and strengthen the cooperation at bilateral, regional and international levels in combating terrorism in a comprehensive manner and affirms that at the international level the United Nations should play a major role in this regard. All parties reaffirms their commitment to counter, prevent and suppress all forms of terrorist acts in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, international law and all the relevant United Nations resolutions or declarations on international terrorism, in particular the principles outlined in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373, 1267 and 1390. This declaration emphasizes the important of the association to having a framework for cooperation to prevent, disrupt and combat international terrorism through the exchange and flow of information, intelligence and capacity-building. Third is the ASEAN-Australia Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism 2004.³⁸ Through this declaration, all parties reaffirm the importance of having a framework for cooperation to prevent, disrupt and combat international terrorism through exchange and flow of information

³⁵Indonesia, "Fifth Report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) of the United Nations Security Council Pursuant to Paragraph 6 Security Council Resolution 1373", 2001, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/362/67/PDF/N0636267.pdf?OpenElement>, accessed March 29, 2011.

³⁶ "ASEAN Convention on Counterterrorism", <http://www.aseansec.org/16205.htm>, accessed March 29, 2011.

³⁷ "ASEAN-United States of America Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism", Bandar Seri Begawan, 1 August 2002, <http://www.aseansec.org/7424.htm>, accessed March 29, 2011.

³⁸ "ASEAN-Australia Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism", <http://www.aseansec.org/16205.htm>, accessed March 29, 2011.

and intelligence, and capacity-building. The participants stress their commitment to enhance cooperation and liaison among their law enforcement and security agencies to strengthen counterterrorism regimes and engender practical and effective responses to the terrorist threat. Additionally, the parties commit to continue and improve intelligence and information-sharing, including on terrorist financing, crime related to money laundering, and other counter-terrorism measures including the development of more effective policies and legal, regulatory and administrative counter-terrorism regimes. Strengthen capacity-building efforts through training and education; consultations between officials, analysts and field operators; and seminars, conferences and joint exercises as appropriate. Forth, there are also several similar declaration between ASEAN and others countries such as: the ASEAN-Japan Joint Declaration for Cooperation in the Fight against International Terrorism Dec 12, 2003;³⁹ the ASEAN-Russia Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism signed in Jakarta Indonesia, July 2, 2004;⁴⁰ the ASEAN-Pakistan Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat Terrorism, signed by the Foreign Ministers at the sidelines of the 12th ASEAN Regional Forum in Vientiane, Lao People's Democratic Republic on 29 July 2005;⁴¹ and the ASEAN-Canada Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism signed in Kuala Lumpur Malaysia in July 26, 2006.⁴²

In term of national law, there are also several related laws and regulation that governs Indonesia's counter-terrorism measure which are ranging from the constitution to the government regulation. First is the preamble of the Indonesian constitution 1945. This constitution provides basic principle and lays the foundation for Indonesia's counterterrorism measure to acknowledge and respect the freedom of the people of Indonesia to practice whatever religion they want, human right, and democracy.⁴³ Second is Law No.15/2003 on the Enactment of Government Regulation in lieu of Law No.1/2002

³⁹ "ASEAN-Japan Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism", <http://www.aseansec.org/16808.htm>, accessed March 29, 2011.

⁴⁰ "ASEAN-Russia Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism", <http://www.aseansec.org/16225.htm>, accessed March 29, 2011.

⁴¹ "ASEAN – Pakistan Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat Terrorism" Vientiane, 29 July 2005, <http://www.aseansec.org/17639.htm>, accessed March 29, 2011.

⁴² "ASEAN-Canada Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism", <http://www.aseansec.org/18596.htm>, accessed March 29, 2011.

⁴³ *The Preamble of Indonesian Constitution 1945*, <http://pfsindonesiaku.wordpress.com/2007/11/05/preambule/>, accessed March 29, 2011.

on Combating Terrorism. According to Professor Tim Lindsey, this laws is powerfull because it gives a power to Indonesia authority to arest suspected terrorists for seven days and detained for six months for questioning and prosecution. In addition, it also gives the power to the relevant authority (Police, Prosecutor, and Judge) to check the mail, block the finance, and sentence to death in conjunction with terrorism case.⁴⁴ Third is Law no.15/2002 on Money Laundering which was amended by Law No.25/2003. This law stipulates that funds and assets of legal or illegal origin employed directly or indirectly in terrorist attacks are deemed as the proceeds of money laundering crime and are subject to freezing and confiscation.⁴⁵ Forth is the law and regulation to license, control or monitor the possession, transfer and export of firearms, ammunition and explosives, as follows: Law No.8/1948 on the Licensing and Permits of Firearms; Emergency Law No.12/1951 on Firearms and Explosives Materials; Ordinance on Explosive Devices LN.1931 No.168; Government Decree No.20/1960 on the Authorization of Permits; and Presidential Decree No.125/1999 on Explosive Materials.⁴⁶ Fifth is the Immigration Law No.9/1992. The article 60 of the Immigration Law states that any person who provides temporary accommodation within their premises to foreign nationals is required to report to the Police or to the Local Government, the identity of those foreign nationals within 24 hours since their first arrival. The failure to report to the above authorities is punishable by a fine or prison sentence for a maximum of 1 (one year).⁴⁷

Government Operational Art

It has been mentioned earlier that JI and its affiliates radical group's operational art is conducted through non-violent and violent activities. These include of socio-political, ideological activities, building alliances, recruitment, indoctrination, and terror attack; thereby the Gol must counter this enemy's operational art in a similar way. This can be done through soft and hard approach measures by employing all elements of national power, MIDLIFE, within interagency operation.

⁴⁴ Tim Lindsey, *Indonesia's New Anti-Terrorism Laws*, October 30, 2002, in <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew65.php>.

⁴⁵ Indonesia, "Fifth Report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) of the United Nations Security Council Pursuant to Paragraph 6 Security Council Resolution 1373", 2001, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/362/67/PDF/N0636267.pdf?OpenElement>, accessed March 29, 2011.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

Military Campaign

Military is a powerful tool in combating terrorism, particularly in kinetic and intelligence operation; however it must be used in appropriate manner and authorized by the national law and regulation. Article 7, Law No. 34/2004 on Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) says that *mengatasi terorisme*,⁴⁸ loosely translated “combating terrorism” is a part of TNI’s main task. Additionally, in accordance to an article 23 of the President Decree No. 46/2010 on the establishment of the Indonesian National Counter Terrorism Agency, TNI is requested to contribute anti-terrorism task force to this agency,⁴⁹ meaning that TNI has the legal basis to fight terrorism kinetically when it is needed. Nevertheless, TNI must avoid Machiavellian and Clausewitzian way, over the use of military forces which might impact or cause a collateral damage, even unintended target. The use of force should be appropriate and proportionate to specific target and condition which need military operation. In this case, although military forces still play important role in combating terrorism, but should be calibrated in a proper way. For example, combating terrorism on the sea, in the air, and like Mumbai style terrorism.

In the case of countering JI strategy, there are several roles that TNI can play to strengthen the government effort in combating terrorism. First, securing the land and sea border is a part of strategy to contain JI’s interstate movement. Since Indonesia has porous border, it makes easy for JI member and its affiliate radical to freely making interstate traveling. Jihadist needs a free interstate movement to conduct their terrorism activities such as training, finding safe haven, and carrying an attack. For example, two of Indonesian terrorist committed to Bali bomb attack, Dulmatin and Umar Patek, run to Mindanao after carrying an attack in Bali. Therefore, Indonesia needs to strengthen its land and sea border control to contain terrorist movement. Securing a sea border between The Southern part of the Philippine and Northern part of Sulawesi is very important to disrupt link and movement of terrorist from the Philippine to Indonesia or vice versa. It is noted that during the sectarian conflict in Ambon and Poso 1999-2001, this sea route was identified as a potential main passage for terrorist movement to the conflict area. While securing land border between Malaysia and Indonesia is just similar

⁴⁸ Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 34 Tahun 2004 Tentang Tentara Nasional Indonesia, loosely translated as TNI Law No. 34, 2004 about Indonesian Armed Forces, <http://www.kpu.go.id/dmdocuments/UU%20TNI.pdf>

⁴⁹ Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 46 Tahun 2010 tentang Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, loosely translated as Indonesian President Regulation on National Counter Terrorism Agency.

important as the sea borders is because this border is a vital route for terrorist movement from Indonesia to Malaysia or vice versa. In this sense, TNI must use its significant role to prevent the border from being used by terrorist to conduct their activities—training, recruiting, funding, seeking sanctuary, and conducting an attack.

Second is protecting human and asset security. In the simple term, Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs defines that human security is “safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats.”⁵⁰ In broadest interpretation, this definition touches on the right of individuals to live, work and participates without fear in the social, political, and economic structures that affect their lives and livelihoods.⁵¹ Since the terrorist threat is looming, human security is threatened. Consequently individuals live in fear. This condition cannot be neglected. TNI can use its anti-terror forces to neutralize targeted terrorist and its regular forces to protect a critical infrastructure from any kind of terrorist attack. However, the use of kinetic operation by TNI must be placed as subsidize for a police kinetic operation since the Indonesian policy in combating terrorism prioritizing on law enforcement. Additionally, TNI should encourage community to strengthen religious tolerance, promote human right, uphold the law and regulation, and strengthen the social and cultural bonds among community by taking the lead to do those activities through its territorial command.

Third, TNI must use its intelligence networking to help Indonesian Police operation in the Law Enforcement strategy. TNI territorial intelligence networking which is deployed in every district command can play a significant role in identifying, mapping, and tracking terrorist movement. By using its structural command, TNI can work with each district community leader to strengthen the community resistance against radicalism. As Chinese strategist, Sun Tzu advised that those who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be lost in hundreds of battles, meaning that intelligence is of a critical important in fighting terrorism. In this sense, TNI has to work hand in hand with the police to provide intelligence for law enforcement against terrorist. By doing this, it will not only strengthen inter agency cooperation but also erode the rivalry between two institutions which has been under people scrutiny since for almost a decade.

⁵⁰ Dan Smith and Rachel Stohl, *The Evolving Role of Military Forces in Human Security*, Center for Defense Information, April 2000, <http://www.cdi.org/issues/failedstates/april2000.html>, accessed April 27, 2011

⁵¹ Ibid.

Information Campaign

In the area of strategic communication, the government of Indonesia must exploit the weakness of JI's salafi jihadism ideology. The GoI, the Ministry of Information and Communication, must invest strong effort to erode the legitimacy and credibility of JI ideology. As an ideology that justifies the killing of innocent, whether Muslim or Non-Muslim, salafi jihadism is an alien's ideology and threat to Islam.⁵² Rosenau describes that this ideology is an al-Qaeda's worldview that has borrowed liberally from European extremism, most notably Marxism-Leninism. This ideology has an appeal throughout the Muslim world; however, it is well outside Islam's mainstream Sunni, Shiite, and Sufi traditions. In fact, this ideology is inhuman because advocate the killing of innocent. This weakness should be constructed in the government narrative then propagated through media to erode its legitimacy and credibility among the Muslim community. For example, GoI can construct narrative for the strategic communications that says: *Jl's ideology which advocates suicide attack, incites hatred, and accuses other Muslim takfir is a Satan ideology.* This message must be propagated systematically to reach all level of Muslim community in order to influence their heart and mind. The Ministry must have a strategic integrated communications campaign by using government and private media such as TV, radio, and newspapers to broadcast a special program that promotes pluralism and secularism in a society. Additionally, this Ministry must also be aware of the publication material from radical movement that propagates hatred messages which might incite tension within community and create ethnic and religious conflict. To confront this tactic, the Ministry must impose strict rule to limit or even ban this kind of publication material.⁵³

Diplomatic Campaign

Since JI is a regional terrorist organization which operates in several counties such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippine, and also Pakistan, therefore fighting against JI and its affiliate terrorist needs bilateral and/or regional cooperation. It means need diplomacy. As David Litt and Mary Ann Peters put it:

⁵² William Rosenau, "Waging the War of Idea", *Rand National Security Research Division*, section 13 Politics and Accountability, 1140.

⁵³ Ibid.

“Bilateral diplomacy is the appropriate vehicle for seeking to influence a country to take action against terrorist on its soil, or against those elements inside one country that support terrorist and terrorist organizations somewhere else. Through bilateral diplomacy, countries negotiate extradition agreements and other arrangement to enable law enforcement agencies to act against international terrorist”.⁵⁴

As diplomacy can be a powerful tool in combating radical jihadist like JI and its affiliate group, then, the Department of Foreign Affairs should take a lead in a bilateral or regional cooperation, particularly in the process of legalization. However interstate agency cooperation is very important to deal with specific issue such as intelligence, financial, and information in accordance with terrorism. The government needs to build a constructive engagement with neighboring countries such as the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore. This is very important because JI activities are within these countries. The existing cooperation on intelligence exchange, sea and land border patrol and anti-terror exercise must be strengthened. Additionally, the existence of bilateral cooperation with developed countries such as Australia and the United State must be strengthened and broadened not only to fight against terrorist but also to establish a program to prevent radicalism.

Law Enforcement Campaign

Law enforcement plays key role in countering terrorist strategy. In the case of fighting JI and its affiliate radical group, the aim is to restore justice. Therefore the fight is not merely targetting terrorist but also targeting underlying terrorist grivances such as corruption. In apprehending terrorist, police should avoid the use of exesive force. Using disproportionate force might cause a hatred and a further terrorist acts. Killing terrorists is important, nevertheless capturing them is much better. The police will be perceived more civilized when they can capture suspected militants alive. Additionally, they will be free from extrajudicial killing accusation. Capturing terrorist alive gives added value in combating terrorism. From the captive, police can get more intelligence material which

⁵⁴ David Litt and Mary Ann Peters, “Diplomacy: The First Weapon Against Terrorist”, on *Toward Grand Strategy Against Terrorism*, Christopher C. Harmon, Andrew N. Pratt, Sebastian Gorka (eds.), (New York: McGraw Hill, 2011), p.155-156

might be useful to disrupt and destroy JI structure. For example, the capture of Ubeid and Abdurachman, participants at terrorist training camp in Aceh, lead to the police raid targetting Dulmatin in outskirts of Jakarta in March 2010.

It is the nature of terrorist to travel interstate by using forged document. For example, within the period 1996-1998, Faturachman Al-Ghozi, Indonesian terrorist, traveled in and out of the Philippines with the Philippine passport in the name of Randy Andam Alib.⁵⁵ In the 1990s Abubakar Baasyir made eleven visits to Australia in the name of Abu Somad.⁵⁶ Again, when the police killed Dulmatin and seized his passport, it was in the name of Yahya Ibrahim.⁵⁷ From these events, we see that there is weakness in the immigration system, either lack of capability or corruption. To confront this kind of threat, the immigration official must tighten its control for the interstate people movement, increase its capability and credibility. Identification checking is very important to ensure the authenticity of travel documents to prevent any terrorist suspect using forged documents. In addition, control must be tightened in issuing passports. The person who needs a passport must present himself with credible references. For example, letters from the village leader and identification.

Corruption is underlying JI grievances which can be a powerful tool to erode government legitimacy. The law enforcer must seriously address this problem. Unable to address this problem, law enforcers will lose their credibility. Consequently, the support from the people to fight terrorism might be put in a risk. Finally, the law enforcement agencies such as police, judiciary, prosecutor, customs and immigration must work hand in hand to disrupt JI and its affiliate Islamist radical group structure. The police, judiciary and prosecutor must work professionally to bring justice to terrorist trials. They must avoid corruption, nepotism, and taking sides with any party. Trials must be fair, transparent and open to the public in order to be widely known whether the trial is fair enough.

Intelligence Campaign

To destroy JI infrastructure, intelligence plays a key role in this regard. As I have mentioned earlier, that JI is not a giant revolutionary military front, instead it is clandestine

⁵⁵ Zachary Abuza, *op.cit.*, 137

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 136.

⁵⁷ ICG, "Indonesia Jihadi Surprise in Aceh", *Asia Report*, No.189, 20 April 2010.

movement which uses terror to attain its goal. Therefore, confronting this type of threat can not be won through military might alone. As John J. Le Beau put it:

“It has often been asserted in recent times that terrorism, at its core, is not primarily military phenomenon, and that seeking to apply purely or even mainly military means and technique to fight terrorism is unlikely to enjoy real or lasting success.... Simply put, conventional military means can often be the wrong tool drawn from the counterterrorism box. Military force can be and has been highly effective in eliminating a known, observe enemy.....however, is essentially useless against a foe it cannot “fix” or even identify, such as an anonymous, invisible of small, dispersed moving part’.⁵⁸

It is very obvious that conventional military might alone will not be able to win the war against terrorist. Terrorist is a species which is clandestinely hiding amongst the people. It needs additional tool to observe, identify, track and point it. This tool is very important in making successful counter terrorism, particularly in law enforcement and kinetic operation. In the case of fighting JI and its affiliate radical jihadist group, Gol needs integrated intelligence operation. Under the coordination of the Head of National Intelligence, Indonesian intelligence community must work together to strengthen their capacity. Penetrating JI network is very important to track the hardcore terrorist for kinetic operation or law enforcement. Empowering all level of intelligence is crucial in combating terrorism. In nature, terrorists work clandestinely, therefore intelligence apparatus must be able to penetrate terrorist network in order to success on their anti-terror operations.

Additionally, intelligence agency must work together with foreign partner either bilaterally or regionally. Terrorism is a transnational crime which operates not only intra state but also interstate, therefore cooperation with foreign partner is necessity. Counterintelligence training and other support activities with regional partners is also required, including preparing and maintaining an effective database of terrorists, insurgents, criminals and other underground activists.

⁵⁸ John J. Le Beau, *op.cit.*, p. 195

Financial Campaign

JI collects the money from different kind of resources. From inside the country, JI collects donation, receive member charity, and also from criminal activities which is done by armed militant wing. JI also receives the money from abroad such as from Saudi Arabia and Al-Qaeda and Islamic NGO from the Middle East clandestinely.⁵⁹ Additionally, JI members also run their own private business to secretly fund terrorist activities. To disrupt JI financial resources government must increase the size and capacity of the Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre. This effort will strengthen the capability and capacity of this agency to track down suspected financial transaction. This agency must provide financial intelligence to law enforcement and provide an inter-agency cooperation to prevent and combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

Additionally, the Financial Intelligence Unit (FUI) must strengthen its capacity to track down terrorist funding. This unit must work together with Indonesian central bank and the center of financial transaction system to analyze any suspicious transaction which might be own by the terrorist organization link to JI or radical Islamist group in Indonesia. Asset freezing is necessary for suspected individual who support terrorism activities. Soliciting and charity funding collection method should be closely watched because this method of fund collection is very vulnerable to be diverted for terrorist activities. Government must be able to make charity donation to be accountable. It is critical for the government to propagate the messages that make the people be aware of contributing their money for terrorist activities through solicitor or charity organization.

Economic Campaign

The economic campaign is to develop national economy to promote welfare and prosperity for the Indonesian people. The government must be able to address economic grievances that JI resonates to rally supporter. Unless the government of Indonesia is able to create more job opportunities, eradicate poverty and corruption, JI and its affiliate Islamist radical group will exploit these grievances for their own benefit.

⁵⁹ JTIC, "Jemaah Islamiyah Key Fact",

http://www8.janes.com/JDIC/JTIC/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/binder/jwit/jwito490.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=&backPath=http://jtic.janes.com/JDIC/JTIC&Prod_Name=JWIT&activeNav=http://www8.janes.com/JDIC/JTIC, accessed December 3, 2010.

In this economic campaign, the Coordinating Minister of Economy will take the lead to implement the national comprehensive economic plan. This includes important pillars of Indonesia's economic projection to promote people welfare. For example, government must prioritize its effort on building food security, improving infrastructure related to public services, and reducing the economic disparities among regions to bolster regional economic competitiveness.⁶⁰ The critical point in this campaign is to address economic grievances, such as poverty, unemployment, economic disparities between the rich and the poor and economic opportunity for the poor.

Conclusion

After a decade of fighting against terrorism, the government of Indonesia might claim that it has successfully defeated JI and its affiliates because hundreds of terrorist have been captured, jailed or killed; however, terrorism is still looming in Indonesia. JI and its affiliates are still exist and pose a serious threat to the nation. Fighting against terrorism is not simple one. It is not just killing, apprehending, capturing and jailing terrorist. It needs comprehensive strategy that can neutralize the enemy's strategy.

JI and its affiliates employ double strategy which are counter society and counter states. They use Islamic Boarding School, Madrasas, and Mosques to recruit cadre and propagate its radical ideology overtly and covertly. Additionally, they also use ESP grievances to de-legitimate government and to attract followers.

To counter JI double strategy, government must employs combination of soft and hard approaches which incorporate all instruments of national power: Military, Information, Diplomacy, Law Enforcement, Intelligence, Financial, and Economy. These are intended to achieve the following objectives:

- to undermine JI's ideology and eradicate ESP grievances so as JI will not be able to influence and radicalize Muslim community;
- to strengthen the Indonesian and its asset security so as JI will not be able to carry out any terrorist attack;

⁶⁰ Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Nasional, <http://bappenas.go.id/node/26/1914/buku-pegangan-2009-penyelenggaraan-pemerintahan-dan-pembangunan-daerah/>, accessed March 29, 2011.

- to disrupt JI's secure of funding, recruiting, training, and linking with other radical groups so as JI will no longer be able to regenerate new terrorist actors;
- and to destroy JI infrastructure so as JI has no longer be able to exist.

All of the instruments of national power should be operated within interagency operations. The military campaign, information campaign, diplomatic campaign, law enforcement campaign, intelligence campaign, financial campaign, and economic campaign must be used in appropriate manner and authorized by the national law and regulation to counter JI and its affiliates operational art. Preventing people from being infected by infectious jihadist ideology is the core of Indonesia's counterterrorism strategy that will prevent JI and its affiliates radical jihadist group recruit new terrorist actors.

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