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THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

TRAFFIC LAW ENFORCEMENT DECISION MAKING
BY THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL POLICE


By

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
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
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
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dedicated to those
who perform, who manage, and who make policies for
traffic law enforcement

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ABSTRACT

Most police studies deal with criminal activities and only a few relate to traffic law enforcement. Most existing traffic enforcement studies have been undertaken in developed countries, such as the U.S.A., the United Kingdom and Australia, and have dealt with drunk driving. Rarely have traffic enforcement studies focused on police decision making, nor have they been done in developing countries like Indonesia, where the seriousness of traffic problems and the poor performance of police officers pose a major challenge for the Indonesian National Police, and especially in big cities such as Jakarta.

★ An empirical study of Indonesian police traffic decisions was called for in order to provide some direction to a rational formulation of traffic enforcement policies. The purposes of this research were to discover actual patterns of traffic police decision making and to identify the factors best accounting for these decisions. Two theoretical perspectives, decision-making theory and organizational behavior theory, guided this study. The researcher utilized the field research method and the study was exploratory rather than explanatory. By combining qualitative and quantitative approaches, data were collected in a natural setting for approximately a three-month period. During that period, there were 2,444 traffic violations observed involving 882 actual stops. Semistructured

actual stops. Semistructured interviews were conducted with 230 street-level officers, 27 managerial-level officers, and 51 drivers. A number of relevant organizational documents were also examined.

This research provides detailed information on the characteristics of Jakarta's traffic police decision-making procedures. Its results may confirm and/or clarify those of previous studies or they may be specific to Indonesia itself. These findings consider selective enforcement. The decision-making process revealed relates to the offender's gender, socioeconomic status, and attitude/demeanor. The finding regarding illegal settlements known as "damai" or give-and-take solution is discussed. Various interrelated factors, including the officer's individual demographic characteristics, organizational and social environments, and situational factors, are identified.

The study concludes with several recommendations for future research and identifies important policy implications. Included in the recommendations for subsequent research are the need to extend this study to cover other smaller cities and the need to determine the effectiveness of special training programs. In order to improve the performance of the Indonesian National Police, and especially the decision-making capacity of street-level officers, several policy implications are put forth. These include the need to develop clear organizational enforcement policy and to improve supervision activities for controlling officers' discretionary decisions, the rational allocation of existing resources, and critical review of the current system of traffic law enforcement.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Traffic Problems and the Indonesian National Police¹

Early in 1994 a Canadian businessman on a flight from Denpasar, Bali, to Jakarta, Indonesia, regaled the writer with stories about his driving experiences in several large cities. He asserted that almost all large cities such as New York, Los Angeles, Mexico City, London, Tokyo, and Singapore, had similar traffic problems, but surely Bangkok, Thailand, had the worst traffic he had ever driven in. When asked his comment on Jakarta's traffic problem, he replied that he had never driven there. When asked why, surprisingly, he responded, "I am too afraid."

Similarly, Indonesian students in Oklahoma City (1994), Boston (1995), Tallahassee (1995), Atlanta (1996), and Chicago (1996), with whom the writer discussed the issue of traffic problems in Indonesia, confirmed the story reported above and related similar accounts by other foreigners who had visited Indonesia. Each of these students stated that Jakarta was thought to be in a category of its own with regard to traffic violations and congestion. These assertions relate not only to the erratic behavior of the drivers, but also to the ineffectiveness of law enforcement in controlling these actions.

¹Indonesian National Police is a translation of Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia or popularly known as Polri.

These casual observations by foreigners and Indonesian citizens alike coincide with the writer's personal experiences while living and working in Jakarta for about 10 of his 24 years of service as a police officer in Indonesia. Anyone who drives in Indonesia, particularly in Jakarta, may easily observe a number of egregious violations, such as illegally cutting into a lane, racing, speeding, entering a one-way street in the wrong direction, carrying too many passengers, etc.

Traffic violations in Indonesia are a major problem, particularly in major cities, often resulting in both seemingly interminable traffic jams and in traffic accidents. It is known that most of Indonesian traffic accidents are due to the failure of drivers to obey basic traffic laws. The Indonesian traffic fatality rate, measured in terms of the annual number of deaths per 1,000 cars² is 1.25.³ This rate is higher than those of a number of neighboring countries, such as Thailand (1.17), Malaysia (0.61), and Brunei (0.37). On the other hand, the rate of car ownership in Indonesia is relatively low, 44 per 1,000 population, while the rate for Thailand is 134; Malaysia, 304; and Brunei, 487 (Dispullahta 1992:64).

The Indonesian National Police (INP) force has been assigned the responsibility for handling Jakarta's enormous traffic problems. They perform conventional police tasks, such as maintaining order and enforcing laws, but during peak traffic hours (7 a.m. to 9

² In Indonesia, the word car translates to include all motor vehicles; therefore, in this document, car will refer to all motor vehicles, e.g., cars, trucks, motorcycles, etc.

³ Traffic fatalities in Indonesia are seldom related to drunk driving because such behavior is not only legally prohibited but is also socially condemned in accord with religious belief (see Appendix A for a discussion of the socioreligious culture of Indonesia).

a.m. weekdays⁴), the INP has to assign as many officers as possible to assist in the regulation of traffic flow. Of course, in the enforcement of these laws officers issue many citations in their efforts to deal with a plethora of traffic violations. In 1991-92, for example, there were 2,121,390 tickets issued throughout the country. During that same period, the total number of cars was 9,395,228, and the total number of valid driver's licenses issued was 10,549,387. In Jakarta that year, there were 316,322 tickets issued: the total number of cars was 1,829,687, and the total number of valid driver's licenses was 1,830,255 (Dispullahta 1992:51,52, 60).

The INP also performs tasks other than management of traffic problems. For example, they administer various programs involving other governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Specialized units are dedicated to community policing, student patrols, kid's police and the like. Further, various educational campaigns utilizing the mass media and face-to-face communications have been organized to increase public awareness of the law. In addition to these routine daily operations, the INP also conducts special operations at least two or three times a year. The latter may be either law enforcement or service-oriented or may involve some combination thereof. Service-oriented special operations are usually conducted in connection with religious holiday events, such as Idul Fitri (a Muslim celebration day following one month of fasting), Christmas, and New Year's Eve. Special police services are needed on these occasions since an unusually large number of people, particularly city residents, leave town then,

⁴ In the evenings, from 5 p.m. to 7 p.m., traffic jams are not as serious as in the mornings, because students leave their schools earlier than workers leave their jobs.

using either private cars or public transportation in order to visit their families who reside in outlying villages. Consequently, the volume of traffic violations increases dramatically.

These law enforcement-oriented special operations are conducted once or twice a year. One of the task forces, called "Operasi Zebra," is held once every year. In 1993, for example, "Operasi Zebra" was conducted nationally from January 4 to February 27.

During this operation, the number of tickets issued increased by 137% and the number of traffic accidents decreased by 56% compared with all other time periods (Direktorat Lalu Lintas 1993:20). Despite the fact that members of the INP have worked energetically to perform their jobs in both traditional and unconventional ways, it is fair to ask what the results have been.

On the day that the INP celebrated its 49th anniversary (July 1, 1995), various newspapers prepared articles about the police and their mission. With regard to citizen complaints that were aired at the time, the most frequently raised issue was traffic problems, and particularly the frequency and severity of traffic jams. A writer in the newspaper *Republika* (1995a) wrote "jams . . . jams . . . jams. Jams in Jakarta are like cancer. While no solution is offered, traffic jams tend to increase."

One interesting side effect of these persistent traffic problems is that they may have produced new employment opportunities for some of the jobless, who now offer their services for those who are in a hurry to get out of the situation and who do not mind paying someone to assist them in doing so. At some intersections, for example, unemployed persons "help" to regulate traffic flow. These persons are called "polisi cepek" (meaning "100-rupiah police" because they are paid small sums of money by

desperate drivers for services rendered). It is not unusual to see a “polisi cepek” dangerously stopping the traffic flow on a main street so as to allow his patron access from a side street or to enable the patron to pass through a line of traffic. The “polisi cepek” may earn as much as 15,000 rupiah⁵ per day (*Republika* 1995b), which is about twice as much as an average police officer’s salary.

A second issue concerns traffic accidents. Although Jakarta does not produce as many traffic fatalities as do some other major Indonesian regions, the city still accounted for more than 500⁶ deaths during each of the last three years for which statistics are available, while the total number of traffic deaths in all of Indonesia was more than 10,000 per year (Table 1). As noted above, the Indonesian traffic fatality rate is considerably higher than that found in neighboring countries.

Table 1
Traffic Fatality Rate of Indonesia and Jakarta, 1990 - 1995

Year	Indonesia	Jakarta
1990	10,887	419
1991	16,621	345
1992	9,819	444
1993	10,038	511
1994	11,004	582
1995 (June)	5,462	267

Source: Direktorat Lalu Lintas 1995:1-6.

⁵ As of April 1, 1997, one U.S. dollar was equal to about 2,350 rupiah.

⁶ This number positions Jakarta as eighth among the 17 different police regions in Indonesia.

The focus of this study, however, is not on traffic jams and traffic accidents themselves, but rather looks at the traffic violations that cause them. Simply put, there would be far fewer traffic jams and accidents if people drove as the law requires. As Bayley noted, “enforcement of traffic laws is a means to an end—maintaining order and safety—not an end in itself” (1994:29). Consequently, this study is principally concerned with the nature of traffic violations themselves. However, given that there are no available hard data detailing the absolute number of traffic violations occurring there, the question of their frequency and seriousness, other than the qualitative anecdotal evidence cited at the beginning of this chapter, cannot be answered here. The only data available regarding these concerns relate to overt police actions, that is, in the form of the number of tickets officially issued by officers (Table 2).

Table 2

Number of Tickets Issued by Police Officers in Indonesia and Jakarta, 1988/89 - 1993/94

<i>Years</i>	<i>Indonesia</i>	<i>Jakarta</i>
1988/1989*	1,583,759	248,414
1989/1990*	1,346,858	110,393
1990/1991*	1,500,815	184,797
1991/1992*	2,121,390	316,322
1992/1993**	1,667,570	230,453
1993/1994**	1,327,233	296,966

Sources: * Dispullahta 1992:52-53.

** Direktorat Lalu Lintas 1994:1-2.

These numbers only reflect the frequency of police activities rather than the absolute frequency of violations, and consequently they must be used with extreme caution when extrapolating to the larger whole.

The seriousness of Indonesian traffic problems was clearly indicated by a formal expression of President Suharto, who, on May 20, 1995, decreed a Gerakan Disiplin Nasional (national discipline movement) designed to control them (A. Rahardjo 1995). The movement, which was to be coordinated by the police, was conducted for 1 month, and employed a huge number of personnel who were requisitioned from various governmental and nongovernmental organizations. These personnel were asked to deal with traffic violations by stopping an unusually large number of cars and unofficially reprimanding the drivers and passengers for their lack of awareness or for willful misconduct.

Several factors have been identified by observers as the sources of Jakarta's traffic problems. Some have argued that environmental factors are largely responsible. They point to the imbalance created by the rapidly increasing number of cars and the inadequacy of the roads. In Jakarta, for example, according to 1992-1994 data provided by the Traffic and Road Transportation Bureau, each year the number of cars increased by more than 10% while the number of new roads increased by only 2% (*Republika* 1995a). In pointing out similar problems facing metropolitan cities throughout the Third World, such as Bangkok, Mexico City, and Manila, Mr. Karnaji (1995) added that these problems were also caused by a lack of systematic city planning. A second group of critics has argued that the problems have been caused by human factors, such as a lack of public

awareness of the law. When he was interviewed by *Republika* (1995a), Mr. Nurachman, a staff officer of Jakarta's Traffic and Road Transportation Bureau, pointed to traffic violations as the principal source of the problem. Another person, interviewed by *Merdeka* (1995b), also addressed this concern, arguing that most drivers were undisciplined, while the police were seen as incapable of handling the problem.

A host of similar critical comments reveals that Indonesian people are generally concerned with the way the police perform their duties. The police have been criticized for their apparently poor performance, as well as for various other weaknesses. The researcher's personal experience as an officer, even though it did not take place in the Jakarta Regional Police, reveals that uncertainty is a key issue affecting police job performance. This is revealed by inconsistent administration of duties and uneven enforcement of laws. For example, a traffic violation occurring in a particular place may be cited by one officer but not by another. This inconsistency may also apply to the same officer at a different time or location.

Inconsistent enforcement is typical not only of individual officers, but also of organizational units. Mr. J. Pandy (1995), a staff member of the Yayasan Lembaga Konsumen Indonesia (consumer foundation), and General Sutjipto Danukusomo (1995), a former Chief of the INP, have also expressed concern about this issue. Danukusomo pointed out that the Gerakan Disiplin Nasional (national discipline movement), mentioned earlier, was an example of such inconsistency; the results obtained by these activities were enjoyed for only a brief period of about 3 months. After that, their efforts diminished and subsequently people returned to committing more frequent violations.

Issues of unfairness are primarily associated with the practice of many officers in accepting bribes. Bribery has been an issue frequently addressed by Indonesian newspapers, both in editorials and in published letters reflecting public opinion about the police. Mr. A. Raharjo (1995), a staff officer of Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (the official government sciences bureau), wrote that the public image of the police is "babak belur" (i.e., black and blue) due to the way they handle violations. He claimed that police officers tend to give the violator a chance to resolve his violation unlawfully by providing "jurus klasik" (i.e., a classic tactic implying bribery). Traffic violators do this in order to avoid severe penalties and complicated administrative procedures involved in getting their licenses back.

The issue of unfairness is also discussed in relation to an offender's status. Mr. Pandy (1995) claimed that the police ticket only a few offenders while unfairly releasing many others. He argued that law enforcement agents tend to treat violators unevenly, depending upon each person's social status. For example, street-level officers generally tend to abdicate their duties when higher status persons such as their superiors, those who are high officials or important persons, or even wealthy persons, violate the laws (Kunarto 1995b:118). General Kunarto, the former chief of the INP, stated:

The street-level officers develop their social relationships with the lower-level class, such as drivers, maids and house boys. But when stopping a car and the driver or a passenger brusquely declares that he is a general director, a major, or a member of parliament, the officer feels as though he, the officer, has done something wrong, and he asks forgiveness. This prompts people to say that the police are unfair, preferring to enforce laws only against common people. (1995b:118)

Concerns regarding the lack of fairness by the police were also addressed by Major General Meilana, a representative of the Army (*Kompas* 1995a). Mr. Zainul (1995), a columnist, complained that the police not only lacked fairness, but that they also showed little self-discipline and frequently acted unprofessionally.

For these reasons, Mr. Zainul and other critical observers asked the police to conduct an introspective evaluation to determine those internal factors which might help to explain their poor performance. For example, Mr. A. H. Sazili, Vice-Chairman of the First Commission of the House of Representatives, asked the INP to complete such a study (*Pos Kota* 1995a). Likewise, Mr. Ali Mursalam, also a House representative, asked the police to do an internal investigation of themselves (*Media Indonesia* 1995b). General Awaloedin Djamin (1995), the former Chief of the INP and a professor of public administration at the University of Indonesia, suggested that the police should objectively reevaluate themselves and their performance. Dr. Djamin also suggested that the INP should conduct an internal evaluation to achieve a thorough understanding of the factors influencing their poor performance.

Another scholar, Dr. Sarlito W. Sarwono (1995), a professor of psychology at the University of Indonesia, has argued that poor performance of the police is due to a lack of professionalism. Others have agreed with him. Mr. Pandey (1995), for example, argued that the source of performance problems was the lack of professionalism by the police. This was also recognized by Dr. Satjipto Rahardjo, a professor of the sociology of law at the Diponegoro University (1995a), as well as by the Chief of the INP (*Pos Kota* 1995b).

The most significant claim was made by the Commander of the Armed Forces,⁷ who was quoted by Mr. M. Khoidin (1995), a professor of law at the University of Jember. The Commander pointed out several internal weaknesses in the INP, and particularly the organization's lack of professionalism. On the INP's anniversary, the Commander also stressed other weaknesses in the organization, e.g., poor performance in its provision of public service (especially traffic control), low rates of crime clearance, and inadequate crowd control (Jayakarta 1995).

As a result of these negative perceptions, people have often come to view the police as actually contributing to—rather than alleviating—the seriousness of traffic problems. Thus, the origins of these problems are thought to reside inside the department. As noted earlier, given the rising number of complaints about the police, observers, scholars, governmental representatives and a prominent armed forces commander have recently called for the INP to conduct *introspeksi* or “an introspective evaluation” (a self-evaluation) (e.g., Jayakarta 1995).

Asking *introspeksi* (self-evaluation) is not uncommon in this social system. Indonesian social values teach people to be *teposliro* or *tengang rasa* (to be wise and considerate, and not to cause bad feelings in others) in social relationships. The value says to people: “Look for the cause of your problems within yourself first before you blame others and before others find it for you from yourself.” In this case, people believe that the poor performance of the INP may result from several internal factors, so it would be

⁷ Indonesian National Police is an integrated part of Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI) or the armed forces.

considerate to let them (the department) conduct an introspective evaluation rather than allow outsiders to interfere with the department.

Despite these calls for self-evaluation, there has been little clarification of the specific nature of the problems found in the INP. For example, it is unclear what factors have produced the related phenomena of poor performance and a lack of professionalism among the officers. In order to improve these conditions, it will first be necessary to determine the elements that foster them. While there has been considerable speculation regarding these problems and their potential resolution, no systematic study has been conducted before so that our understanding of these problems might be informed by empirical research.

Before formulating problems to be studied, it is necessary to present the main tasks of the INP and traffic police in general, and the duties of individual traffic officers in particular. According to Indonesian governmental regulations, the INP must function as traffic police whose main tasks are to handle problems, such as traffic violations, traffic jams, and traffic accidents, in order to assure the safety, security, and smoothness of traffic on the roads (Polri 1991). These functions are the main task of the Indonesian Traffic Police Directorate and, especially within the Jakarta Police Region (JRP),⁸ of the Jakarta Traffic Police Directorate (JTPD).

In order to accomplish its main task, the JTPD performs several duties, and especially traffic law enforcement duties.⁹ These special duties are the responsibility of

⁸ In Indonesia it is popularly called Polda Metrojaya.

⁹ For more information about the INP, the JRP, and the JTPD, see Appendix A.

general traffic enforcement units, both at the regional and district levels. A member of this unit, called a general traffic officer, is required to perform such jobs as patrolling, regulating traffic flow, handling traffic jams and enforcing traffic laws. With regard to how officers ought to prepare for and perform their jobs in traffic law enforcement, the operational guidelines provide the following standards:

1. An officer is required to promptly and properly stop a car when he finds or suspects that a violation has occurred.
2. He is required to approach the driver with a smile, a greeting and a salute (known as 3Ss procedure) and to explain to the offender the type of violation that he has committed, and to take action regarding this violation.
3. An officer may issue a ticket if the violation is serious,¹⁰ but may choose to only reprimand the driver if he has committed a minor violation. (Polri 1993)

The guidelines do not regulate the type of action to be taken toward common violations, as it is assumed that, depending on the circumstances involved, either a ticket or a reprimand may be given.

In his comparative studies of police work in the United States, Great Britain, Australia, Canada, and Japan, Bayley summarized the traffic officer's job as:

¹⁰ According to these guidelines, traffic violations, including several criminal acts related to traffic accidents, are classified into three categories:

- a) **Serious violations** consist of those actions resulting in death or serious bodily injuries, driving while intoxicated (DWI)/driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), hit and runs, careless driving, speeding, driving with an invalid tag or driver's license, running traffic lights, etc.
- b) **Common violations** consist of not obeying traffic signs, tag or driver's license expirations, carrying too many passengers, etc.
- c) **Light violations** include other violations such as violating traffic lines, leaving a car without turning off the engine, as well as improperly using a street.

... patrolling major roads for the purpose of preventing motor-vehicle accidents. They do this by enforcing laws against dangerous driving as well as against defective vehicles and by controlling traffic flow in potentially hazardous situations, such as those associated with accidents, spillage of toxic substances, parades, sporting events, and construction sites. Their work is more self-initiated than that of patrol officers or criminal investigators. They go where the traffic problems are, often guided by detailed analyses of the incidence of serious accidents. A collateral benefit of their patrolling is the assistance they give to motorists whose cars have broken down. Traffic officers also conduct investigations of the causes of motor-vehicle accidents. (1994:29)

Of course it is well known that the actual enforcement of traffic (and other) codes is not always conducted according to law. Bittner, for example, argued:

... policemen are inevitably involved in activities that cannot be fully brought under the rule of law. Only a limited set of legal restrictions can be conditionally imposed on the police which, however, still do not make it impossible for the police to proceed as they see fit. (1980:34)

Reiss, in a study of the transactions between police and citizens in Boston, Chicago and Washington, D.C., noted:

... much of the work of the [traffic] division is to control the flow of traffic, an activity that is a reaction to predictable patterns of vehicle movement. Indeed, to control traffic often entails ignoring violations or shouting at violators rather than impeding vehicle movement by making an arrest. (1972:89)

The latter phenomenon is one important aspect of police decision making in traffic enforcement practices.

Problem Formulation

International police scholars have long argued that when performing their jobs, individual officers must make many of their own decisions without guidance in the form of official rules or a clearly defined policy (Skolnick 1975:14; Smith 1996:1). If this is so, it

is essential for us to begin our investigation with a description of the actual patterns of officers' street-level decision making. Accompanying this would be the development of an understanding of the reasons underlying particular actions. When police stop a car, for example, what is their initial reason for doing so? Once a stop is made, why do they apprehend and issue a citation to one driver while releasing another? What factors contribute to police officers' behavior in the exercise of their discretion? More importantly, if a particular police activity is viewed as either good or bad, what organizational and/or environmental factors may account for this performance? Each of these queries deals with assessment of the behavior of people in their daily lives within an organizational setting. To date, there has been a dearth of scientific research on police practices in Indonesia. More to the point, there has been no research regarding the characteristic behaviors involved in traffic law enforcement. The lack of empirical and theoretical studies of Indonesian enforcement practices has allowed for little grounded guidance regarding appropriate policy reform.

The need for an empirical-theoretical study of Indonesian police traffic decisions designed to provide some direction for the rational formulation of police traffic enforcement policies was the primary motivation for this study. The location for the study was the Jakarta Regional Police territory. One reason for selecting Jakarta as the location of the study was that the city experiences severe traffic problems. It is also the capital city of Indonesia and a special province. Consequently, it serves as a barometer for other Indonesian cities and also conveys a stereotypical image of Indonesia to foreign visitors. The purposes of the proposed research were: (a) to study actual police traffic decision

making in Jakarta in order to detect general patterns; (b) to identify and assess factors accounting for particular decisions; (c) to discern any specific patterns that might emerge; and (d) to analyze the implications of the findings for the purposes of public policy development in order to resolve some of these problems.

The study relied on field research methods and was intended to be exploratory rather than explanatory. Although qualitative methods in the form of observations and open-ended interviews were the primary data collection tools, relevant quantitative data such as numbers of violations and numbers of motor vehicles stopped and ticketed were also collected in order to support the analysis.

Significance of the Study

The significance of the present study is that it deals with a very practical set of concerns. As described above, traffic violations pose a major problem in Indonesia. Moreover, this enigma has been seen as crucial, to the extent that it indicates a national problem—as has been previously expressed by Indonesia's head of state—which damages the nation's building efforts and inhibits the growth of tourism and international business activities.

Despite these issues, traffic problems themselves were not the author's primary concern. Rather, the investigator began by looking for an explanation of street-level activities, observing what organizational theorists refer to as line performance. Line performance served as the basic point of departure because it is thought to determine the

effectiveness of an organization in producing desired outcomes (Leonard & More 1993:60).

It is believed that the data collected in this field research project can provide vital knowledge to public officials that may be utilized in the development of appropriate policing policies regarding force development as well as pertaining to the selection of specific strategies to control traffic and curtail the commission of dangerous moving violations. According to Barlow, a useful policy should include a substantial commitment to scientific exploration within its domain, and “a healthy field is a theoretically active field, where new ideas and new explanations build upon past thinking and research and encompass new facts relevant to the field” (1995:11). Briefly, this study is an attempt to understand the nature of Jakarta’s traffic police performance, i.e., the decision-making process, which is thought to contribute inadvertently to the now-legendary traffic problems of Jakarta, and perhaps to those of all of Indonesia. By obtaining information that describes how traffic police perform their duties, and discussing those factors that best explain their performance, we may ultimately be able to improve the INP’s future handling of traffic problems in Indonesia.

From a theoretical viewpoint the present study may contribute new understanding to the development of both police decision-making theory and organizational behavior theory. This research took place in a setting where these theories have only rarely been tested as they have usually been developed for, and applied to, modern countries. Thus, the study was conducted in a different arena, a developing country where the social systems—cultural, political and economic—are very different from those in other, highly

developed, nations. This study is related to organizational behavior in the sense that there was an effort to understand and predict the behavior of people in their daily lives and job performance (Evans 1986:203). This research may well contribute to the body of police decision-making theory as well, since it deals with how the officers, as street-level bureaucrats, make choices in performing their governmental service to the public.

Organization of the Study

This manuscript is organized into seven chapters. Chapter 1 has provided a brief introduction of the problem being studied, and also explained the purpose and significance of the study. In order for readers to obtain more information about Indonesia, a brief description of the research setting is provided in Appendix A. This includes details about the location of the study and the police department being evaluated, along with a general description of Indonesia and the historical background of the INP itself.

Chapter 2 provides a review of the relevant literature. This includes both theoretical material related to the pattern of street-level officers' decisions and the reasons behind them, based on decision-making theory and organizational behavior theory, and empirical knowledge, as revealed in media coverage and general publications.

The third chapter, Theoretical Framework, utilizes information described in the previous chapter and that derived from professional and personal experiences as background materials. These provide a general framework and aid in the development of theoretical sensitivity.

Chapter 4 describes the research design and data collection techniques as well as the data analysis procedures that were employed in this study. This account delineates the strategy for obtaining and analyzing the needed information.

Chapter 5 provides a general review of Jakarta's traffic problems, including traffic jams and traffic accidents in relation to traffic violations and police actions. It also describes the research findings regarding patterns of violations and police decisions. This chapter also pays attention to those situational factors that may help to explain the decision making of traffic officers.

The sixth chapter includes an in-depth discussion of police decision making. This analyzes the characteristics of traffic officers' decision-making behaviors as well as the characteristics of individual officers. These findings are reviewed from organizational and social environmental perspectives.

Finally, the concluding chapter summarizes the findings that have been discovered through this research. The implications of these findings for public policy development and future research are also discussed.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter describes the literature related to police decision making. It includes accounts concerned with identifying both the specific unique patterns of such decisions, as well as the significance of different factors that impact them. It must be noted that most of the literature on police decision making has been developed to explain police behaviors observed only in advanced, industrialized nations. To date, there have been literally no similar studies completed in Indonesia or other developing nations. Consequently, the available literature was used to establish general bench marks guiding the development of this research, rather than to provide direct, testable propositions.

This review includes literature that specifically addresses police decision making as well as general organizational behavioral studies concerning performance as an outcome of a specific decision-making process. Appropriate information gleaned from general publications dealing with unique aspects of the Indonesian situation are also included. Strauss and Corbin (1990:98) have referred to the first type of literature as “technical,” whereas the second one is generally referred to as “nontechnical literature.” Finally, a brief summary appears at the end of the chapter. Not all of this information is directly associated with the specific subject of this research, yet it proved helpful in developing the theoretical framework that will be discussed in the next chapter.

Police Decision Making

This study did not attempt to determine how a particular decision ought to be made, but rather sought to gain an understanding of how street-level officers actually make choices relating to their job of enforcing traffic laws. This section discusses the characteristics of police decision making. This is followed by a discussion of the pattern of these decisions. Finally, the reasons for these decisions and the factors that best account for them are identified.

Police decision making, and more specifically street-level officers' decision making in the enforcement of traffic laws, involves the consideration of many mundane issues. These may include, for example, the determination of whether to stop a driver who is obviously breaking the law, whether merely to reprimand an offender or issue a ticket for the offense, and finally, whether to cancel the ticket at some later time or to send it on to the court for further processing. These types of everyday officer actions have been of interest to police scholars for some time. Nearly 50 years ago Frank Remington noted that "to a large extent, the administration of criminal justice can be characterized as a series of important decisions from the time a crime is committed until the offender is finally released from supervision" (as quoted in Walker 1993:6). More recently, Klockars and Mastrofski wrote, "traffic law is sometimes written so vaguely or in such abstract terms (e.g., 'reckless' or 'inattentive' driving) that by its very nature it must be heavily interpreted to be enforced" (1991:329). It is clear, then, that the vagueness of the definition of many traffic-related offenses forces the individual police officer to play an active role in the decision-making process.

Although these traffic officers' decisions may be viewed as relatively simple, their actions can dramatically impact the lives of the citizens with whom they come into contact. In fact, in the United States there have been countless examples of occasions where a simple traffic stop or response to a seemingly insignificant domestic dispute have escalated into life-threatening events, in some cases even triggering full-blown riots. The officer's authority to use coercive force against the citizenry may also offend the personal dignity and violate the individual rights of those they stop. Walker noted that "what we call the criminal justice 'system' is nothing more than the sum total of a series of discretionary decisions by innumerable officials. Decisions about whether to arrest, to prosecute, or to imprison annually affect the liberty of millions of Americans" (1993:4).

Traffic police are also inevitably presented with various defensive arguments by violators in their efforts to escape punishment. As noted by Klockars and Mastrofski:

every police officer knows that, if doing so will allow them [violators] to escape punishment, most people are prepared to lie through their teeth. Thus the police officer's problem of decision-making is not simply to decide when to temper an enforcement decision with sensitive leniency, but to avoid being played the fool while doing so. (1991:331)

As the preceding example demonstrates, many officer decisions involve what is often referred to as police discretion. Klockars and Mastrofski, who referred to Kenneth C. Davis, define police discretion as follows: "A police officer or police agency may be said to exercise discretion whenever effective limits on his, or her, or its power leave the officer or agency free to make choices among possible courses of action or inaction" (1991:328). The exercise of discretion is not limited to a single decision-making point or event, however, nor does it call for a simple either/or response. Police officers routinely

exercise discretion in making a broad range of decisions, and ultimately they must choose one course of action from several possible alternatives (Walker 1993:23). For example, when an officer sees a driver violate a traffic signal, followed by one or two other drivers who do the same thing, he is placed in a complicated situation which requires discretionary decision making. If he is going to do anything about the violations observed, he must determine which car should be stopped or pursued, as he cannot deal with all of the offenders. Regardless of which offender he stops, he must avoid blocking the flow of traffic. Once the initial stop has been made, what action should he take if the driver then complains about his unfairness in pursuing him rather than the others? And if, after stopping the car, he also finds that the driver is unable to produce a valid driver's license, or that there are obvious equipment violations as well, what violation(s) should then be written up?

Despite the desirability of doing so, the control and regulation of this discretionary decision making is not easily accomplished. On the one hand, some have argued that police work fulfills all of the elements necessary to qualify as a profession. These include a technical knowledge base; a systematic body of theory and practice that is gained through lengthy, prescribed training; a set of professional norms called a code of ethics; and the power of coercive authority, through which these professionals control the fate of their "clients." On the other hand, a police organization is also a bureaucracy. It seems evident that these organizations have an interest in somehow bringing a semblance of order to this apparent chaos by regularizing, routinizing and making more predictable these individual officer-citizen interactions. Yet, as stressed by Reiss (1971), the police

must be able to exercise discretion in the application of standards, particularly to meet the requirements of a particular case. A command organization (bureaucracy) threatens professional status, because it expects people to follow orders regardless of their personal judgment. Reiss argued that the professional ideal, however, holds that orders are antithetical to the exercise of discretion (1971:124).

Regarding the pattern of police decision making, one prominent police scholar, Skolnick (1975:73) distinguished between what he called “delegated” and “unauthorized” discretionary decisions. In his view the former is a simpler form, although still complex, and includes such events as the enforcement of parking-meter violations, the automated processing of traffic tickets, and the decision to arrest by the warrant officer when a defendant cannot post bail. The latter and more complex form includes those cases arising out of the creation of discretionary opportunities for the purpose of satisfying personal or institutional motives, such as when officers face cases of moving violations, narcotics offenses and other serious criminal charges. Based on his study of the Westville Police (1962-1963), Skolnick reported that one could believe that the more discretion offered the policeman, the more his personal biases will be injected into the action taken. Upon examining the work of the traffic policeman, however, he found the contrary to be true. When followed on his rounds, the warrant policeman seemed to use relatively objective criteria in his ticket-writing behavior. Thus, under conditions of clearly delegated discretion, he found that the warrant policeman appears to develop fairly evenhanded standards for the administration of criminal justice (Skolnick 1975:89).

Skolnick's categories of police decisional types refer to the source of authority for the action rather than the outcome of the choice that is made. He did not further explain the pattern of the decision making itself. He did, however, criticize the tendency of the police "expert" to adopt a philosophy of professionalism based primarily upon managerial efficiency (utilizing the advances of technology). He found:

First of all, in those areas where violations of the rule of law occur, advanced technology often results in greater violation. Technology advances in the form of wiretaps, polygraphs, stronger binoculars, and so forth only make the police more competent to interfere with individual liberty. Secondly, the model of efficiency based on bureaucracy simply does not work out in practice. (Skolnick 1975:243)

The types of traffic enforcement decision making have been studied by Bayley (1986). He found that officers generally had to choose from among five different courses of action: (a) 43.3% of the time they simply issued a citation; (b) in 20.7% of the cases, they released the driver with a warning; (c) in 9.8% of the stops they arrested the driver for being intoxicated or for another crime (made out "contact cards"); (d) in 13.4% of the cases they simply let the driver go; and (e) in 12.8% of these stops they issued a citation while also giving a stern lecture (Bayley 1986:337).

Bayley's (1986) research was based on his systematic observation of patrol activities in Denver, Colorado, during the summer of 1982. In this study he focused on the tactical choices made by police patrol officers when faced with either domestic disputes or traffic stops. Concerning traffic stops, Bayley recorded various activities performed by the officers.

When we searched for a way to describe the tactics employed by patrol officers in encounters with the public, it quickly became apparent that time

affected decisions. That is, the tactical choices officers face change during the course of an encounter. . . . Different kinds of choices are appropriate at different stages of police involvement. (Bayley 1986:331)

For descriptive purposes, he disassembled encounters into three stages: (a) Contact--initial interventions; (b) Processing--encounters between initial interventions and the next stage; (c) Exit--termination of or concluding action.

Bayley's research provides a clear picture of police tactical decision making, which may be of assistance in better understanding the phenomena under study here. Certain qualifications must be considered with regard to that research, however. The observations used to generate these generalizations covered only 85 evening tours of duty and were conducted by five graduate students. Thus, the study included very few days of observation; the observations also dealt with only 164 traffic stops. As recognized by the author, "the study is not, therefore, representative of patrol work in Denver. It would be a misuse of the data to draw general conclusions about the performance of the Denver Police Department" (Bayley 1986:331).

The various types of street-level officers' decision making have also been studied by Smith (1996:2), who distinguished among such decisions based on the perspective or rationale underlying them. He identified three normative types of decisions that were based on different guiding motivations--self-interest, organizational or policy objectives, and fairness--and argued that street-level workers were motivated primarily by their own interests. Musheno, Palumbo and Levine (1976) also found that self-interest is the driving force underlying much street-level decision making. They argued that criminal justice policies cannot be successfully implemented if the interests of personnel are ignored.

Smith also referred to Brintnal's study of a local prosecutor's office in dealing with white-collar crime, in which self-interest proved to be the main factor motivating the prosecutors in dealing with crime (Smith 1996:3).

Smith found that a second normative type was that street-level policemen use their judgment to implement policy objectives and to meet organizational requirements. Smith referred to Herbert Simon's 1945 classic, *Administrative Behavior*, in which Simon rejected the notion that bureaucrats depend on an internal normative structure to make decisions. Instead, since the bureaucrats work in the context of organizational environments, their decisions were said to reflect the objectives of the organization. Smith also cited Handler, who emphasized that the power of managers is significant when directing the activities of subordinates within organizations. Given the influence of this power at the top, street-level bureaucrats find their individual discretion severely curtailed. Consequently, organizational practices become institutionalized and the subordinates are trained to act in accordance with organizational rules (Smith 1996:4).

Smith's last rationale was that police decisions may rely on the officers' sense of fairness, without being affected by either the organizational objectives or those of self-interest. For this type of decision making, he referred to Littrell, who, in his study of criminal arrest and police charging decisions, also identified fairness as a motivating factor. According to Littrell, "officials usually tried to be fair in the amount of suffering they imposed. They charged offenses in order to obtain what they believed to be a fair punishment, and in this sense they produced principled charges" (quoted in Smith 1996:7).

A number of organizational factors, and their association with other concerns, have

also been described as accounting for police decision making. Klockars and Mastrofski, for example, insisted that discretion is not simply a matter of a free personal choice by an officer on the street, but that it is also “a matter of decision and policies made by police administrators that influence officer’s behavior and allocate agency resources and efforts into one type of activity as opposed to another” (1991:329). Lundman found that “police exercise of discretion is a function of relations between organizational norms and employee concerns with autonomy” (1979:160). Here, Lundman pointed to the policy of establishing a formal quota of traffic citations for each officer’s shift as an example of an organizational norm. He argued further that “organizational norms may be at least as important as the individualistic and situational contingencies . . . as important in the context of police exercise of discretion” (1979:169).

★ According to Mastrofski, Ritti, and Hoffmaster, “empirical research consistently has shown that the key decisions remain with the low-ranking personnel, who generally give top priority to their ‘intuitive grasp of situational exigencies’ instead of administrative policies” (1991:364). This finding is consistent with Bittner’s:

[T]hough police departments are highly bureaucratized and patrolmen are enmeshed in a scheme of strict internal regulation, they are, paradoxically, quite alone and independent in their dealings with citizens. Accordingly, the obligation to do something when a patrolman confronts problems--that is, when he does police work--is something he does not share with anyone. He may call for help when there is a risk that he might be overwhelmed, and will receive it; short of such risks, however, he is on his own. (1980:135)

In the context of organizational effort to control them, Bittner further said:

He receives very little guidance and almost no supervision; he gets advice when he asks for it, but since policemen do not share information, asking

for and giving advice is not built into their relations; his decisions are reviewed only when there are special reasons for review, and records are kept of what he does only when he makes arrests. Thus, in most cases, problems and needs are seen in relationship to the response capacity of an individual patrolman or teams of two patrolmen, and not of the police as an organized enterprise. (1980:135-136)

This discussion has made note of the fact that discretionary decisions are involved in all transactions between citizens and the police. A major concern in any scholarly study of this issue must be with how these decisions are made, identifying those factors that impact or determine a particular outcome. According to Reiss (1971:53), the way an officer treats the offender is often affected by the offender's demeanor. Sykes and Clark (1975) affirmed that police officers are sensitive to the attitudes and preferences of those involved in an encounter (quoted in Lundman 1979:160). This means that the way officers treat the offender may depend on his demeanor. "[A] disproportionate amount of 'unprofessional' or 'negative' police conduct is directed toward citizens who refuse to defer to their authority," and those who "behave antagonistically toward the police are more likely to be treated in a hostile, authoritarian or belittling manner by the police than citizens who behave with civility or who extend deference" (Reiss 1971:53). Wilson pointed out that traffic violators who are polite and respectful are treated differently than are those who are disrespectful (1968:37).

It is apparent too that demeanor is a sufficient but not a necessary cause for explaining a particular outcome in a traffic stop. Many other factors, such as racial background, ethnic characteristics, temperament, etc., may be involved and have an impact on the particular decision that is reached. For example, a polite motorist may well be cited

if the officer is being held by his superior to a departmentally imposed quota and he has not yet met it. Conversely, a belligerent motorist may not be issued a citation if the officer feels sympathetic or is unconcerned.

Many encounters and transactions between police officers and citizens may actually generate a “good deal” for the violators. Traffic violators often want to get away with a simple warning and expect special consideration. It is evident too that some groups may be virtually exempt from traffic tickets. On some occasions, illegal solutions are used, for instance, paying an officer a bribe to get him to ignore the violation. Reiss found:

The likelihood of an officer accepting illegal exchanges is increased when such practices are institutionalized and legitimated by the police subculture and organization. We found that traffic bribes were most common in the city where they had long been an institutionalized form of exchange between police and citizens. (1971:170)

Factors Influencing Decision Making

Motivation is seen as an extremely important factor in the decision-making process, including street-level decisions; it also strongly affects job performance. The issue of job performance has been extensively explored by organizational theorists. Szilagy and Wallace (1990) defined organizational behavior as the study of the behavior, attitudes and performance of workers in an organizational setting; the organization's and group's effect on the worker's perceptions, feelings and actions; the environmental effect on the organization and its human resources and goals; and the effect of the workers on the organization and its effectiveness (1990:4). Typically, organizational research has

been conducted either at a micro level focusing on individual or group behavior, or at a macro level focusing on organization-wide actions and events (Steers & Black 1994:24).

Most organizational behavior theorists have treated motivation as a significant factor in determining situational outcomes. According to Rainey, “many organizational behavior researchers treat motivation as an internal organizational matter, influenced by such factors as supervisory practices, pay, and the nature of work” (1991:119). Campbell and Pritchard pointed out that motivation

increasingly serves as a general label for determinants of the choice and direction of work efforts and their amount and persistence . . . [and] as one among many determinants of performance, which also depends on ability, leadership, work-group influences, knowledge of the task, and other factors. (quoted in Rainey 1991:122)

In their attempts to understand motivation many researchers have referred to Maslow’s theory of needs. In this theory, as quoted by Rainey (1991:124), Maslow proposed five hierarchical categories of needs ranging from low to high in terms of the priority of their fulfillment. He suggested that certain low-level needs must be met before satisfying higher-level ones. Physiological needs have been viewed as an individual’s most basic requirement, including the need for relief from hunger, thirst and sleepiness. Operating at the second level are safety needs, which concern a person’s desire for security or protection and freedom from the threat of bodily harm. The third level, social needs, refers to the social aspects of both work and nonwork situations, including love, affection and a sense of belonging. At the fourth level, esteem needs include the need for a sense of achievement, accomplishment, confidence, reputation/recognition and prestige. The highest-order needs, self-actualization needs, reflect an individual’s desire to become

everything that he or she is capable of becoming, to achieve self-fulfillment. However, Pinder and Lawler found that “the evidence indicates a two-step hierarchy: lower-level employees show more concern with material and security rewards, while higher-level employees place more emphasis on achievement and challenge” (quoted in Rainey 1991:124).

In a similar vein, Frederick Herzberg, as quoted by Gordon (1987), identified a two-factor theory of worker motivation: “motivators” and “hygiene factors.” Hygiene factors are aspects of work that satisfy lower-order needs and which can contribute to dissatisfaction with the job if not adequately provided. These factors do not motivate individuals to exert more effort, however. In Maslow’s terms, they include those factors that fulfill physiological, security, or social needs, such as company policies and practices, supervision, working conditions, salary, status and security. On the other hand, motivators produce high levels of satisfaction, including responsibility, autonomy, self-esteem, or self-actualization opportunities. While motivators can actually stimulate people to achieve satisfaction, hygiene factors can only prevent dissatisfaction. “Thus, for Herzberg two independent outcome dimensions exist: (1) no satisfaction--satisfaction, and (2) dissatisfaction--no dissatisfaction, rather than a single dissatisfaction-satisfaction dimension” (Gordon 1987:101).

The investigation of officer motivation may be particularly difficult to study in police organizations, however. Conser (1979), based on his study of motivation theory as it applies to law enforcement agencies, argued that “motivation is difficult in police organizations because the opportunities for advancement and promotion are limited”

(1979:286). Likewise, Klofas, Stojkovic and Kalinich, who referred to Bennett, suggested that because of the structuring of the police role, it is difficult for some needs to be met. Specifically, Bennett suggested that many lower-order needs, such as physiological ones, cannot be adequately met because of the long hours and waiting associated with the job. Of greater significance is the police organization's ability to deal with the self-esteem needs of officers (quoted in Klofas et al. 1990:83).

In his study of eight police agencies, Slovak measured officers' levels of satisfaction regarding 10 elements of policing, such as salaries, fringe benefits, promotional opportunities, facilities, equipment, policies and procedures, supervision, internal communications, training and executive leadership. He found that neither Maslow's theory of needs nor Herzberg's contention of job satisfaction were supported by this research (quoted in Leonard & More 1993:138).

In their study of two Connecticut police departments, Gaines, Van Tubergen and Paiva (1984:273-274), discovered that social needs were viewed as the most important for all officers, and security needs were the least. They explained that these findings were understandable since most officers were protected from arbitrary personnel practices by civil service, unions or local government, so that their security needs were generally satisfied, and that as a result of work-group peer pressure, the socialization process, as noted by Reiss (1971), became important in police culture. Hochstedler and Dunning (1983:63), in their study of the Dallas Police Department, found that communication among peers was only weakly related to most other aspects of job satisfaction. Yet they

found that, consistent with Wilson (1967), “lower level supervisors have a high potential for influencing patrol officers and determining morale” (1983:66).

Another relevant approach to organizational behavior that incorporates both personal and environmental characteristics has been offered by Evans (1986). He proposed that the variables affecting organizational behavior fall into three categories:

(a) skill and ability to do the job; (b) motivation to do the job; and (c) external factors that facilitate or constrain one in doing the job. He argued that the importance of skills and abilities must be viewed as a continuing subtext to the motivational and external factors.

The second variable includes:

the intrapersonal concepts of intention, cognition (sense of efficacy and performance-reward expectancies), and values. This set of variables also includes factors expected to have an impact on motivation, such as leadership behavior, feedback of performance, the design of jobs, and organizational and group norms” (Evans 1986:204).

The last set of variables consists of: extrinsic factors that either limit a person’s behavioral choices or make it difficult or impossible for him to achieve desired goals (e.g., lack of resources). Where these limits are well known to the individual, they may be incorporated into cognition about self-efficacy. However, in the early stages of employment the individual may be unaware of these constraints, and performance will therefore be a function of whether these constraints are present as well as being a function of ability and motivation (Evans 1986:204).

In relation to the issue of a lack of resources, such as personnel, materials and finances, Michael Lipsky, as quoted by Smith (1996), noted that street-level officers “are confronted with the unwinnable situation of having too few resources to distribute to too

many people” (1996:2). This may lead them to a circumstance of what is usually called “discriminative” treatment, or what Bittner called “the ecological distribution of police work” (1980:9). However, Bayley (1994:55) argued that the failure of the police to prevent crime is due not to a lack of resources, but to the irrational use of those they do have. “By and large police managers do not use resources to achieve desired ends; instead, they supervise expenditure according to inflexible rules and traditions. Senior police officers have the mindsets of accountants rather than problem solvers” (Bayley 1994:50).

A great deal of available evidence suggests that educational background may play a significant role in determining the adequacy of an officer’s job performance. Since what people do is what they choose to do, the officer’s job performance is a reflection of his decision. This means that educational background may affect the officer’s job performance, as an expression of decision-making process. According to Swanson, Territo and Taylor (1993:251), studies of police departments conducted on the West Coast by Geary, in New York City by Cohen and Chaiken, and in Chicago by Baehr, Furcon and Froemel revealed that a great deal of improvement took place after those departments instituted at least a one-year college education as an entry requirement for their police officers. Smith, Locke and Walker (1968:442) found that college-educated officers were significantly less authoritarian than noncollege-educated officers. According to Swanson et al., law enforcement administrators, along with social and political leaders, supported by findings of the 1931 Wickersman Commission, the 1967 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, and the 1973

National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, all agreed that the once-satisfactory entry standard of a high-school education is no longer acceptable in law enforcement (1993:250-251).

With regard to organizational policy, it is necessary to review the typical quasi-military organization of the police, in which a police agency is governed by a large number of standardized operating procedures. Wilson (1968:79) and Bittner (1980:52) have questioned the advisability of organizing the police along military lines. An important reason/justification given for organizing the police in a quasi-military style is the demand for securing internal discipline. Yet this does not necessarily mean that when employing a nonmilitary model, internal discipline cannot be secured. Bittner argued:

The police is the only large institution in our society that has not benefitted from advances in management science. In the absence of lateral recruitment into supervisory positions and developed technical staff skills, changes had to be achieved mainly by means of rigid enforcement of regulations of internal procedure and by emphasizing external trappings of discipline. (1980:54)

In reality, unlike military work, police work cannot be fully controlled. Police superiors cannot be expected to properly direct the activities of their subordinates. Bittner said:

Not only are they not actually available to give help, advice, and direction in the handling of difficult work problems, but such a role cannot even be projected for them. Contrary to the army officer who is expected to lead his men into battle--even though he may never have a chance to do it--the analogously ranked police official is someone who can only do a great deal to his subordinates and very little for them. For this reason supervisory personnel are often viewed by the line personnel with distrust and even contempt. (1980:59)

Likewise, Wilson (1968) affirmed that officers feel that regulations are so framed that they do not instruct but "give the brass plenty of rope with which to hang us"

(1968:279). On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, police work is considered a professional occupation in which autonomy is seen as an important factor that is essential for an employee to adequately perform the job. Moreover, police officers “are sworn to duty at all times and must discharge this duty with honor to themselves and others. . . . Policing is one of the few ‘moral call’ occupations” (Reiss 1971:123). Therefore, “as long as policemen [are] treated like soldier-bureaucrats, they cannot be expected to develop professional acumen, nor value its possession” (Bittner 1980:61).

Nontechnical Literature on Indonesian Traffic Police Performance and Decision Making

The initial chapter provided an overview of the performance of the Indonesian traffic police. As noted, many people view them as lacking professionalism, since they often perform their jobs inconsistently and unfairly and sometimes unabashedly accept bribes. To date there has been no scientific research conducted there that identifies the patterns of police decision making. Information that may help us better understand Indonesian police job performance has been provided by General Kunarto, a former Chief of the INP, in *Meremungi Kritik Terhadap POLRI [Pondering Critiques of the INP]* (1995b:117). The General reveals his experience of one day observing how three traffic officers performed their jobs at the Bunderan Senayan crossroads (this is a major intersection in the city of Jakarta) for a one-hour period. During that brief period he observed the officers accept bribes on three occasions, reprimand offenders six times, ignore 48 obvious violations, and take breaks on three occasions. Based on this one observation, the writer concluded that the police are not properly controlling traffic

violations. Of course this account was not based on any systematic study. Moreover, the author failed to describe his specific method of observation. Knowing this would help this researcher to determine whether the observed violations were actually being ignored or simply had not been detected by the officers (due to different points of observation).

The following paragraphs discuss what Indonesian people feel are relevant factors influencing the job performance of the police. These include budget constraints, the status of officers as soldiers and the officers' educational level.

A number of Indonesian police observers have argued that the budgets provided by the state for developing and running the organization are too limited. For example, most officers must, at their own expense, use either private cars, motorcycles or public transportation to reach their duty posts. They also use their private motorcycles for conducting patrols, or at their own expense purchase walkie-talkies for communicating with one another. Only a few police officers are equipped by the department with proper communication devices. Dr. Singadilaga, a professor of public administration interviewed by *Jayakarta* (1995), argued that budget constraints explain why the police perform their jobs poorly. He urged an increase in the police budget so that in the future police would not be forced to pursue criminals by bicycle while the criminals drove cars.

Mr. Khoidin (1995), a professor of law at the University of Jember, also pointed to inadequate operational costs and the low salaries of officers as factors explaining their often slipshod performance. He noted that the then-current allotment of two liters of gasoline per officer per day was not sufficient to support police motorcycle patrols. He also referred to the results of a survey conducted by *Asiaweek* in 1994, which compared

the current salaries of the Indonesian police with those of neighboring countries: the salary of a beginning Indonesian officer was U.S. \$63 per month, while those in Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Japan and Hong Kong were respectively U.S. \$513, U.S. \$156, U.S. \$147, U.S. \$1,708 and U.S. \$1,323. (Khoidin 1995). Using the same data, Mr. Korry (1995) also argued that operational costs and salaries were very significant factors affecting police performance.

Despite these concerns, other commentators have not agreed that the small salary of the police should be included as an explanatory factor with regard to their job performance. For example, Mr. Tjipta Lesmana (1995), a professor of social sciences at the University of Indonesia, insisted that low police salaries could not adequately explain their unprofessional performance. He pointed out that ethical improprieties may occur in various professions, even in those which provide a much higher income than that earned by the police. Judges, attorneys, lawyers, notaries, public accountants and physicians are all examples of such professions; and each group has members who are involved in ethical improprieties. Moreover, Mr. Lesmana pointed out that the practice of police bribery also occurs in other countries such as Poland, the Philippines and Thailand, where salaries are higher. He argued that exceptions could be found in some other countries, however, such as England and Singapore, where police are generally respected (or feared--the writer) by citizens. Consequently, even if Indonesian police salaries were increased to 2-10 times their present levels, this would not guarantee that the now rampant bribery would be eliminated (Lesmana 1995). Mr. Lesmana failed to explain, however, why he felt English and Singapore police were so well respected by citizens. He also failed to take into

account how well both of these countries, as well as other developed countries, pay their police officers in contrast to Indonesia. Also, the perceived seriousness of bribery in both countries was not addressed.

Another group of critics have focused on the position of the police as members of the armed forces, arguing that this affects them in the performance of their duties. Dr. Sarlito W. Sarwono, when interviewed by *Merdeka* (1995a), argued that although they have different tasks, the organizational structure of the INP was designed to be almost identical to that of other armed forces units, including the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. Further, he felt that structure may negatively affect the police in their handling of specific tasks. However, Dr. Harsya W. Bachtiar, a professor of sociology at the University of Indonesia and the former dean of the Police Sciences College, did not see the organizational structure as the source of difficulties related to professionalism, but blamed the educational system (*Media Indonesia* 1995a). This point is reasonable since organizations themselves do not act, but their members do. Organizations are simply collections of individuals who act, although it must be admitted that to some extent “organizations act in that their influence extends beyond that of individual members” (Klofas, Stojkovic, & Kalinich 1989:6). As noted in Appendix A, education and training programs are administered by employing a military approach. Discipline, hierarchy and honor are principles which are taught and which must be respected, not only during training programs, but also in everyday life, both in formal and informal relationships. Showing respect to one’s superiors, primarily between the lower and middle levels and the higher level, is a regulation that is enforced. It often happens that when a higher-level

officer asks someone of a lower rank about the improper performance of his or her job, the answer is either “yes, sir, I am wrong,” or “yes, sir, there has not yet been an order,” or “yes, sir, I am waiting an order.” These statements reflect the status of police as soldiers, rather than as professionals.

A common concern that has been raised regarding the Indonesian police is related to their education. General Drs. Kunarto, M.B.A., (1995b:118), for example, asserted that there is a correlation between educational level and officer performance. He also affirmed that police officers tend to be afraid of those who are of higher status than themselves and often abdicate their duties when higher-status persons violate the laws. Despite this, General Kunarto contended that based on his experience and observation, those officers who had a college education tended to be stricter than those with a lower level of education. In his book, General Kunarto told an interesting story. A sergeant was directing traffic in a parking lot. The cars were transporting very important persons (VIPs) who would be attending a ceremony with the President of Indonesia. A car without a VIP decal attempted to park in the VIP parking area. The sergeant asked the driver to park elsewhere, but the passenger refused and argued that he was a former minister. The sergeant remained adamant, saying “Mohon maaf, bapak bekas menteri koq susah diatur?” (I beg your pardon, but why is a former minister so hard to control?). It turned out that this sergeant, who had acted firmly even against a man of much higher status, had a two-year college education. Kunarto recognized that this was an unusual event, and one that ordinarily would have been handled very differently.

In sum, due to the nature of police work generally, and more specifically to the enforcement of traffic laws, street-level officers' decision making involves discretionary choices. It is quite clear that police discretion is not limited to a single decision-making point or event and that it does not call for a simple either/or response. Police officers routinely exercise discretion in making a broad range of decisions, and in doing so they ultimately must select one option from among several possible alternatives. Thus, police decision making may be viewed as a complicated phenomenon. Since these decisions can dramatically impact the lives of citizens, better understanding of this process must be developed.


Based on the literature reviewed above, street-level officers' decision making may be categorized according to several prominent themes. When viewed from the perspective of authority, a decision may be either delegated or unauthorized. Viewed from the perspective of outcome, a decision may take the form of simply releasing an offender, releasing an offender with a warning, simply issuing a citation, issuing a citation with a stern lecture, or arresting the offender for driving while intoxicated or for another crime. Several scholars have distinguished among decisions based on the rationale underlying them. These include decisions based on self-interest, organizational or policy objectives, and fairness. Some have argued that free personal choice is dominant in police work, while others have seen administrative policy as more significant. Still others have argued that street-level officers' decisions are affected by an offender's demeanor or the possibility of an illegal exchange. All of this information can be utilized as background material for the purposes of this study.

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soldier and the officers' educational levels, are all viewed as general determinants of police performance, i.e., decision-making. Each of the nontechnical evaluations has been based on a single individual's anecdotal experiences, however, and thus this literature consists of only cursory, unstructured observations. The officers themselves have not been asked about their own perceptions of the nature of these problems, or for their assessment of their causes or solutions. Until now there has been no systematic study in Indonesia directly examining how the police make decisions when performing their duties, why they act as they do and what factors may account for these practices.

Overall, the literature cited above cannot answer the question this dissertation raises regarding the routine traffic decisions made by Indonesian police, nor can it identify the factors accounting for those everyday decisions. Nevertheless, this material does provide guidance regarding interesting areas for future study and illuminates helpful techniques that might be used to answer the specific question raised here.



CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The previous chapter explored the technical and nontechnical literature relating to the study subject. Although this material could not be directly applied to this inquiry concerning Indonesian street-level traffic officers' decision making, it did provide guidance regarding interesting areas for study and it did suggest techniques that might be used to answer the specific questions raised. Before describing the research design and data collection techniques, the writer will develop a general framework for this field project that is based on the literature reviewed along with the researcher's personal and professional experiences. This chapter first describes the theoretical framework and then discusses the need for maintaining a balance between creativity and science.

General Framework

It is clear that grounding theory in the everyday reality of a substantive area requires the researcher to have theoretical sensitivity. "Theoretical sensitivity refers to the attribute of having insight, the ability to give meaning to data, the capacity to understand, and capability to separate the pertinent from that which isn't" (Strauss & Corbin 1990:42). It has long been recognized that theoretical sensitivity must be developed prior to the initiation of any research. Strauss and Corbin have noted that, "one can come to the

research situation with varying degrees of sensitivity depending upon previous reading and experience with or relevant to an area” (1990:41). These insights may be derived from a number of sources, such as relevant literature and professional and personal experiences.

The previous chapter explored both the technical and nontechnical literature concerned with police decision making. Here the author blended this information with his professional and personal experiences, particularly those of an officer who has served for more than 20 years at all levels within the INP organization. These materials were used as background information to sensitize the researcher while he was continually interacting with the data. This information was also to be compared with actual findings as the data were being collected. As noted by Strauss and Corbin, theoretical sensitivity “enables the analyst to see the research situation and its associated data in new ways, and to explore the data’s potential for developing theory” (1990:44). Moreover, the insights provided by these background materials also provided the researcher with a general framework, directing the study’s point of departure, without ignoring the probability of expanding the investigation to include other sources of information.

Decision making, the focus of the present study, is defined here as “a process of specifying the nature of a particular problem and selecting among available alternatives in order to solve it” (Steers & Black 1995:474). We have noted before that the police decision-making process offers complex alternatives from which an officer must choose a course of action. Often these decisions must be made in a split second, offering little time for reflective contemplation. With regard to traffic law enforcement practices, as a first

step these decisions may be simplified as making a choice between only two forms of action: stopping or not stopping a car.

Police performance, i.e., stopping or not stopping a car, must be discussed within the context of general traffic problems, and particularly violations of traffic laws, since their enforcement is the main task of the traffic police. "Traffic violation," as used here, refers to any violation of traffic laws. The occurrence of traffic violations may determine whether or not an officer makes an initial stop of a car. We noted earlier that Indonesian police regulations categorize traffic violations into several types, each calling for a different type of police action. This means that different types of violations may require a variety of actions. Indeed, this researcher's experience teaches that such mundane issues as a vehicle's type or condition may be considered by officers when they decide whether or not to stop the car for a violation. Occasionally a group of officers carry out a surprise inspection (*razzia*) in order to check equipment and assure that administrative requirements (registration papers, driver's license, etc.) have been met, even in the absence of a traffic violation. It is also possible for an officer to stop a car even though no violation has occurred. Other circumstantial factors, such as the existence of a traffic jam, may affect an officer's decision not to stop a car, even though an obvious violation has occurred.

A second type of decision made by street-level traffic officers is based on what they do to follow up their initial action of stopping a car. For example, if they have ordered a vehicle to stop and it does not, a decision must be made whether to pursue it, to dispatch the information through the communication network, or simply to let it go

without taking any further action. In the event that the driver stopped, a decision must be made regarding how to deal with the offender. Bayley (1986:337) in his study of tactical choices of police patrol officers in Denver, Colorado, found five different possible courses of action: (a) simply releasing the driver; (b) releasing the offender with a warning; (c) issuing a citation; (d) issuing a ticket while also giving a stern lecture; and (e) arresting the offender. It has been the author's observation that other courses of action are also possible in Indonesia. These may include releasing the offender with a condition, issuing a citation while also seizing the car, etc.

Besides the factors mentioned above, the offender's gender, attitude, demeanor, and social status may also influence the officer's decision. It has been our experience that police decisions in Indonesia are sometimes affected by the gender of either or both the officer and the offender. Female traffic violators are sometimes treated more leniently than are male offenders. The influence of officer gender will be discussed below.

The next factors that might affect an officer's decision are the offender's attitude and demeanor. Attitude may be defined as:

a predisposition to respond in a favorable or unfavorable way to objects or persons in one's environment. When we like or dislike something, we are, in effect, expressing our attitude toward the person or object. An attitude reflects our feelings toward other objects and people. (Whisenand & Ferguson 1996:34)

In Indonesia attitude may be seen as relating to the familiarity principle, according to which Indonesians tend to forgive each other easily if someone asks them to do so, and to

sympathize with and help those who are poor and needy.¹ As distinguished from attitude, demeanor may be defined in terms of the manner a person outwardly manifests toward an officer who stops him. As discussed earlier, several American studies have revealed that police officers are sensitive to the demeanor and preferences of those involved in encounters with them. The offender's demeanor may range from cooperative to antagonistic. It is cooperative if he admits to the offense of which he is accused and does not challenge the officer's explanation of it. It is antagonistic if the offender shows hostility toward the officer.

With regard to social status, we have noted several generic characteristics of Indonesian people that reveal their tendency to be reluctant to criticize openly those of higher status (see Appendix A). Therefore, social status here relates to the issue of whether or not officers, too, treat offenders differently according to their social status. It is commonly believed that officers tend to enforce traffic laws more rigorously when violations are committed by those of a lower social status than when the offender is of a higher status (Kunarto 1995b). In Indonesia, those who drive old cars or cars in poor condition, or who use public transportation ("oplet," buses and trucks), are generally viewed as having a lower social status. Those who drive new cars or who are well-dressed, however, are usually seen as having a higher status (than street-level officers).

Organizational managerial factors are also viewed as influencing police job performance. These may include the availability or lack of resources, organizational

¹See Appendix A for a discussion of this phenomenon.

policy and control mechanisms. Resources here refer to material and financial assets provided by the organization to support job performance. The material resources include patrol cars or motorcycles and communications equipment, two tools which are vital to the mobility and success of police work, particularly as it relates to traffic problems. Financial support is a necessary condition for successful job performance since it relates to officers' job-related needs, such as buying gasoline and batteries as well as other operational costs. It has been this author's experience, as chief of two different police forces over a 5-year period, that increasing the number of communication units and budgeting an adequate amount of funds leads to improvement in officers' job performances.

Another critical factor is organizational policy. Policy here refers to principles adopted by the organization to guide its members in properly performing their duties. An important concern is the policy regarding the autonomy of a police officer in performing his job. Autonomy is "the degree to which a job provides substantial freedom, independence, and discretion to an individual for the purposes of scheduling work and determining the procedures to be used in carrying it out" (Steers & Black 1994:287). Since police work involves a great deal of discretion, the specifics of the policy regarding autonomy directly influence police job performance. In this instance, organizational policy can be found, for example, in the *Petunjuk Lapangan* (operational guidelines), mentioned earlier (Polri 1993). This policy implies that the Chief of Police may allow his officers the freedom to determine whether or not to ticket or merely reprimand those who are involved in common violations. Another aspect of organizational policy deals with the

criteria which aid officers in making decisions regarding the handling of their jobs, such as stopping cars, reprimanding offenders and issuing tickets.

The next organizational factor that may influence performance is control mechanisms. "Control is the ingredient that moves organizations in the desired fashion and without which they are likely to become fragmented" (Whisenend & Ferguson 1989:140). Swanson et al. (1993) distinguished between organizational control and organizational controls. Referring to a 1973 study by Peter F. Drucker, they stated:

Organizational control is synonymous with organizational direction and is normative, dealing with the future. In contrast, organizational controls consists of measurements of, information about, and analysis of what was and is. Stated more simply, controls pertain to the means, control pertains to an end. (1993:192)

Here, a distinction should be made among control mechanisms. These are thought to have three components: (a) regulation, by which an organization determines standards of performance, including planning; (b) supervision, in which the manager of an organization observes job performance; and (c) corrective action.

Based on information obtained through supervision, a corrective action may be taken when the performance of duties deviates from the standards regulated. This means that supervision may play an important role in determining whether or not a job is performed in compliance with accepted regulations. The frequency and quality of supervision seems likely to influence police decision making. Here frequency of supervision refers to how often a supervisor oversees his subordinates, while the quality of supervision deals with the way a supervisor performs his duties. As part of an evaluation

process, supervision generates information regarding whether an officer's performance is acceptable, and also on the degree of its success or failure.

Ideally, if an officer performs his job perfectly he should be immediately rewarded, because, according to the behaviorist model, this reinforcement will increase the likelihood of similar behaviors in the future (Mallot, Whaley & Mallot 1993:6). Reward represents "the feedback [that] individuals receive as a result of actions" (Steers & Black 1994:104). Rewards may be further differentiated in terms of intrinsic rewards—those which are directly received from work—and extrinsic rewards—those that come from others. Here we are concerned with the latter form, since the former relates to subjective data which are difficult to observe directly. Ultimately, extrinsic rewards may reflect organizational recognition of desired behavior or outstanding achievement and may take the form of performance evaluations, awards, or promotions.

Conversely, if an officer violates a norm, a punishment should be immediately imposed in order to minimize the likelihood of future undesirable behavior (Mallot, Whaley & Mallot 1993:36). Punishment is "the administration of negative rewards, contingent on poor performance, that acts to eliminate undesired behavior in the future" (Szilagyi & Wallace 1990:KT-8). Depending on the kind of violation or improper behavior involved, punishments may be differentiated as administrative penalties, ranging from suspended promotions to terminations; disciplinary actions, ranging from an oral warning to placing the offender in jail; and criminal penalties, ranging from a fine to a term of imprisonment. On the other hand, it is also possible that a deviation in job performance

is due to the inappropriateness of regulation or planning. In this case a corrective action should be taken by revising the regulation or planning.

The remaining factors that usually may be viewed as influencing police job performance come from the individual officer himself. Certain factors discussed in the previous chapter, such as personal motivations, needs and job satisfaction, are difficult, if not impossible, to observe directly, so they were not investigated except for confirmation. Yet, according to INP policy, other factors, such as gender, status, age, years in service, education and training, are all viewed as influencing the way officers perform their jobs. With regard to the influence of an officer's gender, it is quite possible that an officer's gender may affect his or her decisions. Since the mid-1980s the INP has dramatically increased the number of female officers hired and assigned to perform general traffic police duties. These women are generally viewed as being stricter than their male counterparts.

Furthermore, the paramilitary nature of the Indonesian police system suggests that the social status of an officer can also affect job performance, i.e., decision making. Status is "a social ranking within a group assigned on the basis of position in the group or individual characteristics" (Szilagyi & Wallace 1990:KT-10). As discussed earlier, the status of INP police officers is reflected by the ranking of soldiers in the armed forces, ranging from the Bhayangkara Dua to the General. But street-level officers operate within a range of nine ranks, from the Bhayangkara Dua to the Sergeant Major. The status of an officer is based not only on his performance appraisal, but also on his age and years in service. Those who are older and who have more experience in service generally have

higher status than do those who are younger and who have less experience in service at the same level. This means that age and years in service are also viewed as factors that might influence decision making.

Likewise, the educational background and the training experience of an officer might also affect the decision-making process. Educational levels consist of elementary school, middle school, high school, and college. Clearly, specific police training, both pre-service and in-service, is not considered in the classification of educational experience. Here training is limited to in-service activities, since pre-service training must be undertaken by all officers. According to departmental policy all officers, including general traffic police officers, should be specifically trained in order to improve their job performance. This indicates that the police policy makers believe that in-service training can influence on-the-job decision making.

Overall, the rationales underlying street-level officers' decision making can be categorized into three normative types of decisions. They may be guided by self-interest, organizational objectives and fairness. Some American studies have argued that self-interest is the primary motivation of street-level officers' decision making (Smith 1996), or at least that the officers are quite alone and independent in their dealings with citizens (Bittner 1980). Others have argued that policies made by police administrators can influence the officers' decision-making process (Klockars & Mastrofski 1991; Lundman 1979). Still others have emphasized that a police decision relies heavily on an officer's sense of fairness (Littrel as quoted in Smith 1996).

Maintaining Balance Between Creativity and Science

In the preceding discussion, the author's prior knowledge derived from technical and nontechnical literature and from his professional and personal experiences were described. As noted, this was intended to provide background information and to aid the researcher in the development of a general framework for the study. In turn this framework then was used to sensitize the researcher when interacting with the data that were collected.

This study was also designed to explore empirical data in order to build a theory that might contribute to the body of theoretical knowledge. An intrinsic problem with this grounded-theory approach is the question of how the researcher can be both scientific and creative at the same time. In other words, the researcher should be able to maintain a balance between creativity and science so as to become sufficiently free of biases and unexplored assumptions.

Strauss and Corbin (1990:44-46) offered the following suggestions for keeping a balance between creativity and science.

1. Periodically step back and ask; this means that when we find that data gathered do not fit the prior knowledge, we have to go back to the field to see the reality of data and ask why the discrepancy occurred. For example, prior knowledge reveals that female officers are often viewed as being stricter than their male counterparts, or in other words officer's gender may affect his or her decision. If the data collected did not support this notion, the researcher must question why it happened. In order to answer this question he

must go back to the field to see what is going on there. Was there a data collection mistake, or otherwise, specific information that may help explain the reality of the data?

2. Maintain an attitude of skepticism; all previous knowledge must be regarded as provisional—it needs to be checked out, played against the actual data, and never simply accepted as fact. For example, if the background information suggested that self-interest is the primary motivation underlying street-level officer's decision making, it should not be accepted as a fact. This generalization must be considered provisional until it is supported by actual data.

3. The authors also suggested that in order to keep balance between that which is created by the researcher and that which is real, we have to follow a particular research procedure. This may help researchers to break through biases, and lead them to reexamine at least some of the assumptions that might otherwise induce an unrealistic reading of the data.

Finally, in this chapter we have developed a general framework for this project based on information in the previous chapter along with the writer's personal professional experience. A general description of the traffic officers' decision-making process and the rationales underlying it have been presented along with that of traffic violations about which decisions must be made. We have also noted several factors generated from offenders, organizational concerns and individual officers that might relate to the street-level officers' decision making. This framework would be used as background information to sensitize the researcher to look for particular concerns while conducting the

study. The study design and data collection techniques will be discussed in the following chapter.



CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES

The previous chapter explored a theoretical framework based on the relevant literature in combination with the researcher's personal and professional experiences. These were used as background materials in order to sensitize the researcher and to help direct the focus of the present study. This chapter describes the research design and data collection techniques that were implemented in this study. We will first address the methods that were selected for implementation in this study, as well as the rationale for their inclusion. This will be followed by a discussion of specific data collection techniques and a description of the study's sampling procedures. Issues of validity and reliability as they impacted this research project will also be discussed. This will be followed by a description of the process of data analysis since—in qualitative research—this occurs simultaneously with the data collection. Finally, the administrative plan for carrying out the project will be described.

Research Design

An enduring social-science discussion and debate has focused on the most appropriate choices for a research design to use in the conduct of a study. The quandary faced by all potential investigators is the selection of a design that can lead to answers to

the central research questions. Trow has nicely summarized this dilemma: "What kinds of problems are best studied through what kinds of methods; what kinds of insights and understandings seem to arise out of the analysis of different kinds of data" (1957:33).¹ Implicit in this observation is the notion that both the research problem and the kinds of information that are being sought will ultimately determine the actual research methods that are employed. Thus, there is no single "best" method for gathering data dealing with all sociological problems under all circumstances, and "different kinds of information about man and society are gathered most fully and economically in different ways, and that the problem under investigation properly dictates the methods of investigation" (Becker & Geer 1957:39).

In the present case, for example, we know that traffic law enforcement practices, and particularly the officers' decision-making processes, are not static social facts. Rather, they consist of ongoing social actions involving police officers whose duty is to enforce laws. This subject calls for a study of officers' attitudes and behaviors that can be best understood within their natural setting. By taking the study to the streets, the researcher can directly observe what the officers do in their natural setting, ask why they do it and

¹This comment by Trow is in direct contradiction to the opinion of Becker and Geer, who stated that "participant observation is a very useful way of collecting data, and here are some illustrations to show how useful we found it in one study" (Trow 1957:33). Becker and Geer replied that they did not say that, but "we did say, and now reiterate, that participant observation gives us the most complete information about social events and can thus be used as a yardstick to suggest what kinds of data escape us when we use other methods. This means, simply, that, if we see an event occur, see the events preceding and following it, and talk to various participants about it, we have more information than if we only have the description which one or more persons could give us" (1957:39).

find pertinent evidence of the circumstances that surround them when they perform their jobs.

Here we were primarily concerned with the motivations and actions of police officers engaged in traffic law enforcement practices. This information could not be obtained solely by asking the subjects what they were doing and why they were doing it, because their responses might only have represented what they thought about their actions and motivations. In order to obtain a full understanding we had to conduct the study by going directly to the places where those actions take place and observing them as completely as possible (Babbie 1995: 280).

Additionally, the author did not have any clear picture about the nature of these enforcement practices, except for hunches based on earlier cursory observations and sporadic first-hand experiences. Given the exploratory nature of this project, hypotheses were not prepared, although their generation was one of the anticipated products of the investigation. Note that this exploratory study was not aimed at validating any particular theoretical perspective, but rather was an attempt to develop theory inductively and to ground it in the empirical observations and data collected on Indonesian traffic police decision making.

It is also important to note that this subject has never before been scientifically studied in Indonesia or any other developing nation. In order to answer the research questions that were posed, there was a need to "get close to the data," an effort that required the researcher to place himself in a position to observe the day-to-day operations

of traffic law enforcement. Given these considerations, a field research strategy was chosen for studying Indonesian traffic enforcement patterns.

This study was informed by a variety of types of information, and multiple methods and measurements were implemented to exploit them. The nature of the subject matter required that the study be approached both qualitatively and quantitatively. Qualitative data were implemented whenever feasible. According to Strauss and Corbin,

Qualitative methods can be used to uncover and understand what lies behind any phenomenon about which little is yet known. It can be used to gain novel and fresh slants on things about which quite a bit is already known. Also, qualitative methods can give the intricate details of phenomena that are difficult to convey with quantitative methods. (1990:19)

One noted benefit of this type of investigation is that it assesses the subject's perspective when viewing events, actions, norms, values, etc. In this way, it represents an attempt to reflect precisely the reality of everyday social life.

This is not to suggest that the researcher omitted any appropriate quantitative sources of data, however. In order to determine which type of violation is most frequently committed by drivers, which type of offender is most often ticketed by officers, which type of decision is most commonly made by the officers, etc., a quantitative approach had to be used. These questions could not be answered completely by employing a qualitative approach alone. So, by combining the two types of data, the present study was an attempt to counterbalance the unique weaknesses each approach presents when used independently. "The two types of methods can be used effectively in the same research project" (Strauss & Corbin 1990:18).

Data Collection Techniques

In the narrative that follows we describe the data collection techniques that were used. These included direct observation of traffic enforcement in a natural setting, semistructured interviews conducted with a variety of respondents, and document evaluations. Each of these methods is discussed below, followed by descriptions of our sampling procedures, discussions of validity and reliability, data analysis, and administrative preparations.

Observation

The direct observation of social phenomena in natural settings is perhaps the most natural form of data collection used by social scientists. In the present study several distinct forms of observation were employed in order to obtain a more intimate view and fuller understanding of the traffic enforcement phenomenon. According to Gold (1969), observations may be conducted utilizing four distinct roles. The first is that of the complete participant, in which the field worker naturally interacts with informants while his or her true identity and the purposes of the study are not known by the subject. The second, the participant-as-observer, occurs when both the field worker and the subject are aware that they are in a field-research relationship; also, more of the researcher's time and energy is spent in participating than in observing. The third role is that of the observer-as-participant, in which the field worker takes on a more formal observational role, identifying himself as a researcher and interacting with the participants in the social process while making no pretense of actually being a participant; this includes one-visit interviews. The last role is that of the complete observer, where the researcher observes a

social process without becoming a part of it in any way. For example, an observer investigates a police officer who is performing his job without the subject's being aware that he is being observed.

One relevant question about observational methods concerns which of these roles may be most useful and appropriate in the conduct of a particular study. The answer to this query depends on the types of information that are needed. Some studies may require that the observer play one specific role, while others may demand an entirely different one. Many situations may call for some combination of these roles. According to Gold,

Experienced field workers recognize limitations in their ability to develop relationships in various roles and situations. They have also discovered that they can maximize their take of information by selecting a field role which permits them to adjust their own role-repertoires to research objectives. (1958:222)

Moreover, when utilizing observational methods, the observer "participates in the daily life of the people under study, either [overtly] in the role of researcher or covertly in some disguised role, observing things that happen, listening to what is said, and questioning people, over some length of time" (Becker & Geer 1957:28). This definition suggests that three essential types of activities are involved: observing, listening, and questioning. The typical duties of a general traffic law enforcement officer include patrols, regulating traffic flows, handling traffic jams, early handling of traffic accidents, and enforcing traffic laws. This study focused on decision-making processes, primarily as they related to traffic law enforcement. Of course, the decision making itself was not directly observable. Consequently, the researcher focused on the outcome of decisions, as reflected in officer job performance.

We know that while enforcing traffic laws, an officer must decide whether or not to stop a car after he observes the driver commit a violation. In this study, the researcher had first to observe traffic flow in order to determine the level of obvious traffic violations. Obviously, only clearly visible violations could be included. They might involve speeding, reckless driving, following too closely, carrying too many passengers, equipment violations, parking in a prohibited place and similar offenses. Other violations that were not directly observable, such as those related to licensing and registration, were also accounted for if these were discovered by the officer after successfully stopping the vehicle. This investigator also attempted to determine the frequency and type of traffic violations that occur during particular time periods in the city of Jakarta.

Another concern of the observer was the ability to identify the types and conditions of vehicles that were involved in obvious violations (the offender's social status was assumed to be related to the vehicle type). The observer also had to record the circumstances where the observation was being conducted, including weather (ranging from clear to cloudy to rainy) and traffic flow (ranging from jammed to heavy to light traffic). This information was used by the researcher to interpret the data, as these circumstances may have affected the ways officers handled traffic violations.

When the researcher discovered that a violation had occurred, he had to record what the officer's reaction was. In those cases where the officer did not stop the car, the observer still had to record the violation as completely as possible (time, direction, type of violation, type/condition of the car, what the officer was doing, etc.). It was also possible for officers to make traffic stops even when no violation had occurred. This occurred

during special operations known as *razia* (where vehicles and drivers are checked for safety, licenses, etc.) and also in situations when an officer stopped a car without any apparent reason. If the officer attempted to make drivers stop, but they did not, what would the officer then do? His choices might have included pursuit of the car, dispatching the information to headquarters, or letting it go without any further action. Whatever the officer's reaction, it was recorded by the observer. Later the observer would talk directly to the officer in order to attempt to clarify his understanding of the meaning and rationale for the officer's actions in particular situations. In all instances, when the driver who was instructed to stop did so, the field worker would concentrate his observations on the officer's subsequent actions and treatment of the offender.

The observations included attempts by the researchers to identify several relevant offender characteristics, such as gender and apparent socioeconomic status, as well as to observe the offender's interaction with the officer and listen in on their conversation. Without neglecting other relevant factors, particular attention was to be directed toward assessing the offender's attitude and demeanor as well as the officer's actions and/or reactions. The offender's attitude could be revealed in expressions of regret over having committed the violation, by requesting forgiveness, bowing his head, and/or even asking to resolve the case unofficially. We were especially interested in how the officers handled offenders who exhibited each of these attitudes. On the other hand, the offender's demeanor here related to the particular form of expression of his acceptance of the violation, ranging from very cooperative to antagonistic responses. The former was likely to reflect an intentional attempt by the offender to influence the officer's decision so that

the violation would be handled unofficially. Hostile reactions, on the other hand, may have unintentionally influenced the officer to proceed with a formal complaint.

Finally, the researcher focused on the resolution of the problem in the form of the officer's dispositional actions. The available options ranged from simply releasing the offender to issuing a citation or even making an arrest. The officer's decision might also include seizure of the offender's driver's license or other identification cards. After an observational period was completed, the officer being watched would be approached and asked questions related to the activities and decisions that had just occurred. Typical questions, for example, included why the officer stopped the car in the first place, why he did not pursue a driver who ignored instructions to stop, why he released the offender or issued a ticket, etc. The circumstances and locations where the observations took place often prevented the researcher from asking the subject many detailed questions. All of these inquiries were limited to those things that were especially pertinent to the activities just concluded. On such occasions the researcher simply conducted an informal interview. Other questions were asked of the officers at a later time when a formal interview was conducted.

Particular attention was also directed to the officers' equipment and rest breaks. For example, an officer may or may not have had equipment, such as a motor vehicle and communications device. If he had a vehicle, whose was it: the department's or his own? In the latter case, did the officer have any communications equipment? If not, how did he handle fleeing vehicles?

Ultimately, the investigation was addressed to observations and questions related to any event, incident, or history² that occurred while the officer was performing his job. All of these events and interactions would be recorded by the observer as they occurred. In the field these were generally taken in the form of brief notes, although later they had to be written out in considerable detail. This written record had to include the type of violations that had occurred and other relevant details (such as the type of car involved).

It is necessary to recognize the possibility that the study subjects might have attempted to deceive the researchers by relating something that was untrue, or by acting unnaturally and not doing something that they usually would. The probability that such behaviors will occur increases when a study (such as this one) addresses stigmatized behaviors such as bribery. For example, how the officers performed their duties sometimes contrasted with the expectations set out in organizational rules. In certain circumstances, officers might have behaved naturally even though other persons were systematically observing their behavior. In other circumstances, the same officers may have changed their performance because they were aware of being observed. We believe that the probability of "reactivity" occurring became greater if the observed behavior was seen as undesirable.

The first strategy employed in the study setting was the development of field relations. Field relations, that is, the relationship between the field worker and the subject,

²Zelditch described three types of information. A simple event predicts "a single property of a single object at a particular time and in a particular place." An incident is described as "a configuration of many properties of the same object at the same time in the same place." A history is a sequence of incidents (1962:567).

had to be carefully established. It is known, for example, that particularly sensitive information will be given freely only to those who are liked and trusted. For these reasons, Wax (1952:36) suggested that the researcher establish reciprocity, that both parties participate in the project. After all, "sophistication in field observation requires manipulating informants to help them play their role effectively" (Gold 1958:222). In these exchanges, each field worker would clearly explain his identity and the aims of the study. As mentioned earlier, one potential benefit of this study could be the improvement of the INP by exposing the command staff to the concerns of lower-level personnel. The researcher then had to attempt to hear from the subjects about their concerns, and particularly to ascertain their perspectives on how the department treats field personnel. However, the most influential tactic specifically implemented by field workers was the showing of respect, honor and sympathy to them.

On the other hand, according to Miller (1952), a salient issue relevant to establishing and maintaining field relations is "over-rapport." Over-rapport may occur if the observer becomes too closely tied to the observed. As this research occurred over a very short time period, however, this concern was minimized here.

Another strategy implemented in this study was conducting covert observations. Using Gold's term, this could take the form of a complete observer role, that is, a systematic "eavesdropping, or by reconnaissance of any kind of social setting as preparation for more intensive study in another field role" (1958:222). It was a part of the study design that the researcher would first covertly observe the subject for a brief period

of time (for about one hour). Following this, he would approach the officer in order to ask the questions described above.

Ethical issues are of special concern with regard to all forms of covert observation due to the fact that the subjects are unaware that they are being studied. Sanders, for example, has reminded us that:

sociologists should avoid lying, cheating, and stealing as resources for gathering data. Often it may seem that the only way to get information is by using techniques that are unethical and rationalizing their use in the name of sociology. Not only is such behavior unethical, but if sociologists began to engage regularly in these practices, they would soon lose their position of trust and would find it difficult to persuade informants to reveal information. (1976:9)

Erikson addressed this issue by stating that it is “unethical for a sociologist to deliberately misrepresent his identity for the purpose of entering a private domain to which he is not otherwise eligible; and . . . to deliberately misrepresent the character of the research in which he is engaged” (1967:373).

Fortunately, this study did not require practices such as lying, cheating, stealing, or deliberate misrepresentation. Instead field workers merely observed (in a covert way) traffic law enforcement practices as they were usually performed by officers in public places. In this instance, the researcher’s adoption of a covert role did not call for deceiving the subjects, who generally were unaware of their presence. The study also did not involve the researcher in any illegal activity, either in terms of breaking the law or asking other people to do so. Despite this, observers may have been placed in the position of making “guilty observations,” by witnessing the occurrence of a misuse of power by an officer, without subsequently notifying the authorities about the event.

Covert observations in this study did not violate the privacy rights of officers, however, since their duties were imposed by the state, are public and are regularly performed. The project also required that their involvement had to be agreed upon, evidenced by their signing an informed consent form. Additionally the study assured the subjects of their complete anonymity (Berg 1995:213). For frontline workers, it was necessary to emphasize that anonymity and confidentiality would be maintained in the study. The researcher had to assure the subjects that they would remain nameless and guarantee that any reference that might reveal their identities would be removed from the research records. This required changing each subject's real name to a pseudonym or case number when reporting the data, as well as, if necessary, changing place names in relation to description of certain characteristics of an individual.

Another difficulty with covert observation is that it may lead to misunderstanding the actual reasons for a specific action, because the field worker cannot sort out ambiguities while remaining undercover (R. Gold 1958:222). However, here an undercover practice was applied only for a short period of time, as each observational period was scheduled for approximately 1 to 2 hours. There was no specific reason for this length of time, except for considering the ability of the officers to perform their jobs in a regular manner. Two hours is generally a maximum time for officers to stand on the street; after that they may take a rest or drive around to control their blocks. This would be followed by an informal interview.

Other issues relevant to the participant observation approach are the social role of the observer and the image the respondents hold of him. The role of the observer

becomes crucial, since what he sees is determined by the respondent's images and will rely heavily on the observer's position in a network of relationships (Vidich 1940:354).

Therefore, for the purposes of this research, it was not possible for the author of this study to go directly into the field himself, since he holds a high position in the department and would have been easily recognized by street-level officers. Their otherwise "normal" behavior would then have been adjusted in line with what they believed was expected of them. However, this study was also simultaneously conducted in many locations and in a limited time period. Therefore, several field workers were required to assist the researcher. The field workers had to be recruited from social groups that would be comparable to the officers in terms of socioeconomic status (this procedure will be detailed later).

Document Analysis

Ultimately it would be extremely difficult for the researcher to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon under study if he were to depend solely on the observational procedure. One of these additional sources was provided by archival/document analysis. Document analysis refers to existing sources of information dealing with a past event and an ongoing event. "If his concern is with ongoing events, he can often supplement his knowledge by collecting current documents prepared by or about the people he is studying" (Fitzgerald & Cox 1994:104). In this study the examination of written documents was conducted to clarify ambiguous information obtained through the observational techniques and/or to gather new information which was not available from those sources. This included biographical data on the subjects, particularly regarding

rewards/promotions and punishment/disciplinary actions. This information was obtained by the writer in the Personnel Bureau of the JTPD. This made the information more accurate than it might have been if it had been obtained only from the individual officers. Other biographical data, such as each officer's age, years in service both within the police department and within the traffic directorate, educational level, and training experience, were obtained through formal interview procedures.

Other useful information included written organizational policies and citation files. The written organizational policy was examined in order to clarify information concerning the delegation of authority, and the guidelines and criteria provided to assist the officers in handling their duties. This information was expected to reveal how the organization expected the officers to handle their duties, and whether or not these policies were considered by the officers when making actual decisions. The citations file was examined to establish the patterns of violations and offenders who had previously been ticketed. This file also provided information about the types of cars that had been ticketed and the frequencies of officers' official actions, i.e., issuing tickets, associated with the patterns of violations and social status of offenders.

Interview

The last major data gathering technique consisted of a series of formal interviews conducted with individual traffic officers, their superiors and the command structure of the police organization. Personal interviews were conducted with traffic officers in order to ascertain their perspectives on various aspects of their jobs. The author used these interviews to explore officers' perceptions regarding traffic decision making, departmental

traffic control policies, and personal satisfaction with their jobs and superiors. Thus, as suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1990), armed with such information, we were able to clarify the data already obtained, and to resolve vague or ambiguous observations.

Before interviewing the street-level officers, however, the author first interviewed those who work at the managerial level in order to clarify information on organizational factors, particularly that obtained from written documents. The information sought related to whether or not a policy existed that determined ticket quotas. This included information such as the reason for establishing the policy, the achievement of quotas, as well as the benefits and shortcomings of the policy. Other information we looked for related to enforcement policies and/or criteria provided by the department for handling traffic violations. This included any restrictions related to stopping cars and taking actions against particular offenders. The researcher also talked with the managerial-level officers about the administration of supervision, rewards and punishments and their understanding of the factors affecting a street-level officer's decision making. This information, along with that obtained from the previously mentioned sources, was used to shape the interview questions that were later posed to the study subjects.

In relation to the officer subjects, the study made use of formal interviews in addition to the informal ones that were associated with the participant observation activities. Here, a semistructured interview format was implemented, containing a standardized set of general questions designed to elicit the informant's perspective. The actual interview questions were shaped in response to earlier findings based on the author's observations and document analysis. The information we sought related to the

officers' criteria for making specific tactical choices, their perception of the adequacy of their supervisors' management style, the relevance of organizational guidelines, and other concerns that the subjects thought had an effect on their decision-making.

As noted, interviews were addressed to those street-level officers who were subjects of the field observations. At the outset, however, the author was especially concerned that these street-level officers might fear their superiors and that this might lead them to answer the questions posed either vaguely or with a solicitous, but false, response. Becker's (1954) suggestion, in "A Note on Interviewing Tactics," was of some help in developing an appropriate strategy for proceeding. Becker suggested that inquiries should begin with broad, general, nonthreatening questions, and then gradually move on to present more pointed and specific queries.³

Sampling Procedures

The resolution of the question of what is an appropriate sampling strategy is crucial in any research project. Some scholars have argued, however, that this issue is not really applicable to criminal justice field research. "Because of the very nature of most participant observational studies in criminal justice, particularly of sensitive subjects, the

³ Becker (1954:31-32) suggested several techniques for dealing with those who are afraid to make statements about their superiors and colleagues. First: start with questions at a high level of generality. When the conversation has been well initiated and some relevant statements have been made, we can ask the interviewee to give any examples from his own experience as evidence. Then by shifting conversation to personal experience, we may play dumb and pretend not to understand certain relationships and attitudes which were implicit in the statements but not stated openly. By doing so, we are able to force the interviewee into being more frank than before. This may lead us to be quite aggressive, by expressing open disbelief in the face of statements that seemed evasive, implausible, or inconsistent with what has already been said or with our general knowledge of the particular topic.

use of standard sampling procedures is inappropriate” (Hagan, 1993:198). This does not necessarily mean that we do not need to talk about sampling procedures in a field research project, however. As noted by Babbie, “field researchers attempt to observe everything within their field of study; thus, in a sense, they do not sample at all. In reality, of course, it is impossible to observe everything” (1995:286). He further argued that the field researchers do observe a de facto sample among all possible observations.

Although they can later be modified, Strauss and Corbin (1990) suggested that a grounded theory researcher must initially determine three things. These include: (a) the kinds of data that are sought; (b) a site or group to study; and (c) if studying an evolving process, we may observe the same persons over time, or different persons at varying points in time. In applying these questions to the traffic enforcement decision making study, the first has been answered earlier. In response to the second suggestion, when studying decision making by street-level officers, we must go directly to those places where these choices are being made. Here, observers went to the streets throughout the JRP territory where street-level traffic officers were making traffic enforcement decisions. In this case, the researcher preferred first to select places to conduct observations, rather than officers to be observed. There were two reasons for this preference. First, the observation would focus on what was happening on the streets (violation and enforcement activities) rather than on who the officer was. Second, the persons who were making traffic enforcement decisions might constantly be moved from one place to another.

In response to those issues, the author initially had to decide which parts of the city should be chosen for study, since it would be impossible to observe all parts of the city

during the brief research period. The Jakarta police territory consists of eight districts, five of which lie in the City of Jakarta special territory (DKI Jakarta), besides the special district of Tanjung Priok seaport. Although they have similar geographical and demographic characteristics, each also has unique features. For example, North Jakarta is known as a recreation center and a port city. East Jakarta is identified as an industrial center. West Jakarta is known as a business and trade center. South Jakarta is known as the residential part of the city. In addition, Central Jakarta is characterized by governmental sites. In this study it would be necessary to include all of these districts in the field observations but to select only several subdistricts in each district as samples.

Each subdistrict consists of hundreds of blocks of streets, each or some combinations of which would be a traffic police post. A traffic police post could be a permanent, temporary, or mobile post. All traffic posts (permanent, temporary and mobile) in each selected subdistrict would be listed. The researcher would then randomly select a number of posts in each selected subdistrict. The number of posts selected was determined by the availability of resources, i.e., funds and field workers. There were to be 10 field workers, each of whom would work for 8 weeks to assist the researcher in the conduct of this study. The plan was to assign each field worker to observe one post every day. To ensure the accuracy of data, each post would be observed at least at two different times by different field workers. In the end, every field worker would have observed 28 posts during the observation period, resulting in 280 observed posts, each of which would have been observed two times by different field workers. Consequently, the sampling procedures employed here referred to the selection of sites where various traffic officers

make their decisions; these would be chosen by applying the multistage cluster sampling method (Babbie 1995:213).

As indicated earlier, the patterns of traffic enforcement decisions can vary greatly due to the time. For this reason the 2-hour observation periods would be rotated. For example, the first day was 7 to 9 a.m. and 1 to 3 p.m. The next day was 8 to 10 a.m. and 2 to 4 p.m. This way, the observations could cover all duty periods. Likewise, the patterns of those activities may also vary between weekdays and weekend days. Therefore, such a difference should be taken into account when conducting observation with regard to daily schedule.

The decision was made to observe different persons at varying places rather than attempting to follow the same persons over time. It was possible that the observations would include different persons who were present at the same location (several officers working at one place), as well as the same person at several observational sites. The latter was made possible in accordance with the personnel plotting plan made weekly for each unit in which the officers are assigned a different post and/or shift every week. Ultimately this meant that whoever performed traffic duties at selected places would be the subjects of the study. They might be officers from subdistrict, district, or regional levels.

If the officer being observed left his post and was replaced by another officer before the end of the 2-hour period, the observation would continue until the time limit was reached. In those cases when no one else assumed the officer's position and he was taking a rest however, the observation was ended. If he was driving around, then the field worker would follow him until approximately 2 hours had elapsed. This means that the

observation would take place not only at static points, but could also be mobile, as the officers moved from place to place in order to control traffic in their blocks.

With regard to the other techniques of data collection, document analysis and interview, the sampling procedure was determined by the field observation. As presented above, the biographical documents that were examined and the respondents that were interviewed were those related to or who were the subjects of the observations. Other documents concerning organizational policies did not have to be sampled because they all had to be taken into account as long as the policies were in effect. The selection of citation files would be conducted in accordance with the availability of the data. Of course we needed to sample them, as it would have been impossible to examine all archival copies of the citations (approximately 300,000 tickets per year).

Finally, it is necessary to emphasize that this study's procedures called for an open-sampling framework. This means that "the sampling is open to those persons, places, situations that will provide the greatest opportunity to gather the most relevant data about the phenomenon under investigation" (Strauss & Corbin 1990:181). Therefore, when necessary, the sampling procedures in this study were open to modification in order to allow the researcher to gather the most relevant data without sacrificing the principle of consistency.

Issues of Validity and Reliability

Issues of validity and reliability are crucial and serve as important criteria for judging the adequacy of any research project. Simply stated, validity refers to the

correspondence between data collected by the researcher and the real world (Sanders 1976:7). Hammersley defined validity as “the extent to which an account accurately represents the social phenomena to which it refers” (quoted in Silverman 1993:149). There are two central aspects of validity: internal validity, which refers to the context of measurement, and external validity, which refers to the generalizability of findings (Sanders 1976:7-8).

Internal validity relies heavily on the accuracy of data provided by subjects and this, in turn, may hinge on the way field workers obtain that data. As already discussed, several strategies were established here to build confidence in the internal validity of the findings. The present study employed multiple data collection methods. These tactics allowed the researcher to cross-check data obtained from one source with that collected from another (triangulation). Field workers would be trained not only individually, in order to improve their skills, but also as a group, in order to ensure that the same methods would be consistently applied. Guidelines were provided, directing the field workers in the performance of their jobs. For example, these guidelines set forth instructions on how to question officers, how to count traffic violations, etc. In addition, the field workers would be regularly supervised in their work, and would also be required to submit their reports each night to the researcher. At this time the researcher might discuss any particular potential problems, and correct any mistakes or inconsistencies in submitted materials.

As noted, external validity refers to the generalizability of study results. It is necessary to note that generalizability in the context of qualitative research means

generalizability under specified conditions. This means that “we specify the conditions under which our phenomena exist, the action/interaction that pertains to them, and the associated outcomes or consequences” (Strauss & Corbin 1990:191). Consequently, even though a sampling procedure has been applied in order to fulfill the interest of generalization, it must be emphasized that findings from this study can be generalized only if certain conditions are met. Included in these conditions are the characteristics of the research setting, i.e., the Jakarta Regional Police Territory. So the generalizability of these findings may hold only in that setting. In order for these findings to be generalized to a larger population, we need to conduct a further study, rather than this exploratory study.

Reliability is generally defined as “the ability of a method to replicate results when it is used by different researchers” (Sanders 1976:8). According to Silverman, the issue of reliability is brought up only by positivists, who see no difference between the natural and social worlds, whereas those who treat social reality as always in a state of flux are not concerned about whether research instruments measure accurately (1993:146). Silverman referred to Marshall and Rossman, who argued that

positivist notions of reliability assume an underlying universe where inquiry could, quite logically, be replicated. This assumption of an unchanging social world is in direct contrast to the qualitative/interpretative assumption that the social world is always changing and the concept of replication is itself problematic. (Silverman 1993:146)

Moreover, Silverman argued that qualitative research often concerns authenticity rather than reliability. “The aim is usually to gather an ‘authentic’ understanding of people’s experience” (1993:10).

The author of the present study attempted to control for the reliability of the findings to the extent possible. As noted above, field workers were required to maintain brief on-site field notes (made at the time of the event) and expanded notes (completed as soon as possible after each field session was finished). The other information obtained from written documents and interviews was also recorded as completely as possible. The issue of reliability may best be explained in the following section, where the researcher discusses the coding of this information.

Data Analysis

This segment discusses how the study data were interpreted and analyzed. Perhaps it is important to note that, unlike quantitative research in which data analysis can be conducted only after it has been collected, this qualitative study required that the analysis process be conducted simultaneously with data gathering. In reality, the researcher moved back and forth between data analysis and data collection.

The first step consisted of conceptualizing the data. The information obtained through observations, document review, and interviews was taken apart or broken down into discrete incidents, ideas, or events. Each of these was then given a conceptual name representing the respective phenomenon. Concepts are “conceptual labels placed on discrete happenings, events, and other instances of phenomena” (Strauss & Corbin 1990: 61). One example of how the conceptualization was conducted is described below in a simulated observational report:

Observational Report

Coding Number: 001

I first saw three officers standing there. Officer X was standing in the middle of the intersection regulating traffic. Officer Y, who was standing at one corner of the intersection, was helping officer X by giving instructions to drivers, who had entered Jl.⁴ Fatmawati from Jl. Abdul Majid, to stop or proceed. Officer Z was standing on Jl. Fatmawati (about 25 meters from the intersection) watching traffic flows heading for and passing the intersection. I was standing about five meters behind officer Z and focusing my observation on him.

I saw a taxi (minibus) running on Jl. Fatmawati stop about thirty-five meters before the intersection to unload and load passengers. This blocked the traffic flow behind the taxi. A traffic sign, prohibiting cars to stop around there, was located between officer Z and the place where the taxi stopped. I saw that officer Z did not take any action.

Five minutes later, another taxi did the same as the first one. Again, I did not see officer Z take any action. About ten minutes after that, another taxi stopped at the same location. This time a car passed the taxi by suddenly taking the opposing lane, causing another car coming from the opposite direction to stop abruptly. I saw that officer Z did not take any action against the taxi, but he was surprised when hearing the sound made by the car that was suddenly forced to stop. He moved from his place to see what was happening, but the cars had already left.

After that, again I saw that a bus carrying many passengers, some of whom were hanging from the door, passed down the street. Officer Z blew his whistle and instructed the driver to stop. He then approached the driver, gave a salute, and asked the driver about her administrative requirements (registration and driver's license). He took the documents and while examining them he went to a safe place, followed by the driver. With anger, he then pointed to the driver and said: "Do you know your mistake?" The driver responded: "Yes, sir. I ask your forgiveness. You know, actually, I already asked them not to get on but they still did." "Why did you still bring them?" he asked. "I just sympathized with those guys, because they might miss school," the driver replied. He stated: "You know, if an accident happens, you could kill them." "Yes, sir. I am sorry. I promise, I will not do it again," he replied. "Ah, you are kidding. I will issue a citation for you," he stated. "Please sympathize with me, sir. I do not have enough money to pay a fine. You know, I have to first collect money for my boss. I do not know whether I can get some money for

⁴ Jl. Is the Indonesian acronym of "Jalan" which means "Street."

feeding my family today or not. So, please sir, sympathize with me.” He then said: “Well, here (while giving the documents back to him). Remember, do not do it again.” “Thanks a lot, sir,” the driver said.

I approached officer Z, said hello and introduced myself. I showed my identification card,⁵ explained the research and asked his cooperation. As he agreed to participate, I asked him several questions. First, I asked him about the latest case, the car that passed the taxi. He expressed his irritation about that car. I asked him why he did not take any action. He answered: “You know, the car had immediately gone when I wanted to approach it.” I then asked why he did not try to pursue it. He smiled and said: “You know, how could I do so? I do not have a car or even a walkie-talkie” (I saw that he did not have any.) Then I asked him about the taxis that had stopped close to the prohibiting sign. He responded that it was usual that taxis stop at that place to unload and load passengers. He stated: “You see (while pointing to that place), there are a lot of people who are waiting for public transportation.” I asked him whether it was a violation or not. He said: “Yes, but in such a case we have to see the circumstance where a violation happened.”

To facilitate analysis, this observation report should be disassembled into discrete incidents and events, each of which should be given a relevant name. The method of disassembly of the report into discrete events is exemplified by the following:

1. Day was clear (Weather).
2. Traffic flow was heavy (Traffic Flow).
3. A taxi stopped at a prohibited place (Traffic Violation).
4. Officer Z did not take an action (Police Action).
5. A car passed a taxi by suddenly taking opposing lane (Traffic Violation).
6. Officer Z reacted to the car passing the taxi by taking opposing lane (Police Action Attempted).

⁵ An identification card was issued for the purpose of this project (see section “Administrative Preparation,” below).

7. Officer Z expressed his irritation about the car passing the taxi by taking opposing lane (Police Reaction to Fleeing Vehicle).
8. Officer Z was not equipped with a car or a communications tool (Resource Availability).
9. Officer Z argued that it was usual for taxis stop at that place, there are a lot of people who are awaiting public transportation, and in such a case we have to see the circumstance where a violation happened (Officer's Consideration).
10. A bus carried too many passengers (Traffic Violation).
11. Officer Z stopped the bus, approached the driver (with a salute), and explained the case (Police Approach).
12. A driver urged the officer to forgive and sympathize with him (Offender Attitude).
13. Officer Z released the offender with a warning (Police Disposition).

These specific incidents, ideas, and events may be expanded when the data obtained through documents and interviews are completed. They may include concepts such as educational levels of the officers, their training experiences, delegation of officer authority to a superior, etc. In addition, as mentioned earlier, throughout the observations the author also collected data on types of cars. These included, for example, motorcycles, commercial cars, luxury cars, governmental cars, etc.

The second phase of the data analysis was to develop groupings of the concepts. This process is called categorizing. Here concepts that dealt with the same phenomena were grouped into common categories. A category is "a classification of concepts. This

classification is discovered when concepts are compared one against another and appear to pertain to a similar phenomenon. Thus the concepts are grouped together under a higher order, a more abstract concept called a category” (Strauss & Corbin 1990:61). Each category was then given a conceptual name that is more abstract than the original conceptual label. This process was expected to stimulate the discovery of categories as well as of their properties and dimensions. Property is here defined as the characteristics or attributes relating to a category, while dimension is a location of properties along a continuum (Strauss & Corbin 1990:61). Assume, for example, that we have already collected a number of observational reports. They have been grouped into the following categories. Each category is followed by examples of an appropriate dimension.

1. Weather: clear, cloudy, rainy.
2. Traffic Flow: jammed, heavy, medium, light.
3. Traffic Violation: serious, common, light.
4. Police Initial Action: ignoring, attempt, stopping a car.
5. Resource Availability: unavailable, available.
6. Offense Seriousness: more serious, less serious.
7. Offender Attitude: sympathizing, regretful, hostile.
8. Police Disposition: simply releasing, releasing with warning, simply ticketing, ticketing with a warning, etc.

The third phase of data analysis included making connections between categories. Here we are talking about grouping categories into major headings based on their sequence (“causal-order”) process. In relation to this study, categories could be initially

to the conditions, incidents, ideas, or events that impacted the officers' decision making. This might include factors such as individual officer's characteristics and managerial aspects of the organization. Occasions are the main grounds where decisions are made, that is, the traffic activities, and particularly the traffic violations. Circumstances refer to the surrounding conditions that occur at the time of the decision-making process, such as traffic flow, resource availability, and offender-officer interactions.⁶ Finally, police actions refer to how the officers handle the problem; these are the practical consequences of decision making. These can be subdivided into at least initial actions, such as stopping cars, and final action or disposition, such as releasing the driver, ticketing the offender, etc. Clearly, we should not see them rigidly in terms of absolute linear sequences, however, since police actions can be separated into initial actions (between occasions and circumstances) and disposition.

The last step in analyzing the data involved integrating categories to form a set of hypotheses or grounded theory. This phase involved a more abstract level of analysis than the preceding steps. The first substage included explicating the core category of the data. Here the core category consisted of the strategies used by officers to handle traffic problems, that is, the decisions of the traffic police officers. This primarily pertained to the general patterns of decisions. Explicating the core category means that it must be conceptually explained by being given a name, as it must be related to other categories. For example, police initial action (the other category is police final action/disposition)

⁶ Both occasional and circumstantial factors will also be called situational factors, and these are also viewed as influencing factors in broader terms.

conceptually explained by being given a name, as it must be related to other categories. For example, police initial action (the other category is police final action/disposition) refers to an officer's action or reaction to a driver which relates to a traffic violation or lack thereof. This may include no action at all, failing to take any action (due to the circumstances), attempting to take action (but failing), and stopping a car.

The next substage of integration calls for relating other categories to the core category. This means that we have to relate the patterns of traffic police decisions to the other categories by means of the paradigm—the influencing factors, occasions (traffic violations), and circumstances. The relating process varies according to the range of dimensions possessed by each category. For example, the dimensions of ticketing (a pattern of traffic enforcement decision) range from frequently to never, while the dimensions of status range from lower to higher ranks. Here the researcher associated issuing a ticket, for instance, with an officer's status by relating their dimensions. Issuing tickets might frequently be performed by the officers who held a lower status, for example. This process was the key to ordering the categories in a meaningful fashion. When this process was finished, hypothetical statements could be prepared concerning the relationships among the categories. For example, tickets were more likely to be issued by those officers who held lower ranks than by those of higher ranks. Another example is that street-level officers tended to ignore violations when the traffic flow was heavy.

The third substage calls for validation of the relationships. This required a return to the field in order to validate the hypothetical statements. The question that had to be answered was: Does the statement hold true in a broad sense for each individual decision

maker? Or does it hold true only under certain conditions? Upon carefully examining the data, it turned out, for example, that the relationship between issuing tickets and officers' status did not hold true for female officers. Regardless of status, they tended to issue tickets whenever it was required. In validating relationships, a combination of inductive and deductive thinking was involved, although the inductive approach has been emphasized in this study.

The last substage of this final step of data analysis was filling in categories. Actually, when validating the relationships against the data, we completed the process of grounding theory. Here, we laid out the theory in narrative statements. For example, a decision to issue a ticket against an offender was best explained by the type of violation rather than by other factors. Another example is that educational level was the most significant factor accounting for traffic enforcement decisions; the higher the educational level of an officer, the more strict his decision to enforce traffic laws. Finally, this last process of data analysis also included the need for further refinement and/or development and the implications of the findings for the development of public policy. For example, it is necessary to suggest to the policy-makers that educational level should be strongly considered in hiring and assigning people to perform duties related to traffic law enforcement.

Administrative Preparations

In order to complete this study, some administrative preparations had to be undertaken. First, the researcher was obliged to obtain permits from the Chief of the INP,

whose institution was to be researched, and—according to government regulation—from the Governor of the Special Province of Jakarta, where the study was to be conducted. Once the study had been approved by the Chief of the INP, coordination with competent officers in the JTPD was needed to implement the research.

Funding approval for the project had to be obtained from the Chief of the INP, who was sponsoring the writer's program of education and this particular research project. Even though this research was not directly related to policy analysis and evaluation, concerns could have arisen since the study results could potentially damage the reputation of the funding agency. Wilson (1973) suggested that two patterns have evolved with such research. First, "all policy interventions in social problems produce the intended effect—if the research is carried out by those implementing the policy or their friends," and conversely, "no policy intervention in social problems produces the intended effect—if the research is carried out by independent third parties, especially those skeptical of the policy" (Hagan 1993:386). Despite these concerns, Wilson's criticisms do not apply to this study. There are two reasons for this. First, the Chief of the INP had already been sent a proposal emphasizing, among other things, the importance of gathering such objective data, as the agency might then be able to use the study results for the purpose of improving the INP. Second, it is this researcher's personal belief that whatever the result, it must be disclosed, because this might be the only way to promote the development of useful policy. Moreover, the writer's position in the agency may guarantee that such an interest could be secured.

The researcher was especially concerned that officers in the field fear their superiors, and consequently might change their usual behaviors if they know they were being observed. They might also say something that was untrue when being questioned about their actions in both informal and formal interview situations. In anticipation of this, studying Becker's interview strategies (1954) proved useful, although officer resistance was still likely to pose a significant handicap when one was conducting an observation. For this reason, in addition to those strategies previously stressed, the researcher obtained a written statement from the Chief of the INP ensuring that any information, and especially that regarding misbehavior or the misuse of power that might be discovered by the researcher, would not result in any disciplinary actions.

After the necessary permits were acquired, the recruitment and training of field workers began. The field workers were recruited from two sources: one was the roster of police officers, and especially those who were students either at the police college or at a common university; the second consisted of graduate students, particularly those who were already experienced in conducting research. The field workers were then trained in both simulated and real situations.

Before going into the field, each field worker was equipped with an identification card. The cards were issued by the department, stating the identity of the holder and of the study project. It also contained a statement ensuring the anonymity and confidentiality of the subjects as well as the freedom of the subjects to choose not to be involved in the study.

CHAPTER 5

FINDINGS:

PATTERNS OF VIOLATIONS AND POLICE DECISIONS

In the previous chapter, research design and data collection techniques were discussed. This chapter reports the research findings of the study. We begin with a general overview of Jakarta's traffic jams and accidents in relation to traffic violations. Following this, particular traffic violations will be associated with a range of police actions to illustrate how they are related. For the purposes of this analysis, street-level officers' decisions have been subdivided into three phases: (a) **initial action**, such as stopping or not stopping vehicles; (b) **interaction** between offenders and the police officers; and (c) **final action/disposition**, such as ticketing or not ticketing offenders.

An attempt will be made to reveal the reasoning behind the actions taken in order to help explain these choices. We will focus on the reasons given by subjects and on those conditions that are related to the subjects' choice of actions as they were discovered during the field investigation. It will be helpful, however, to begin by providing the reader with a thorough description of how this project was actually undertaken in the field. The description covers modifications that were necessarily made regarding the implementation of the data collection techniques and sampling procedures.

Research Implementation

Before initiating the data collection process, necessary preparations were made. These included obtaining required permits (to conduct research) from the Human Subjects Committee of Florida State University (FSU), the Chief of the INP and the Governor of Jakarta Special Territory, as well as the Chief of JRP. Also, coordination was effected with the Chief of Jakarta Traffic Police Directorate (JTDP) and his staff in order to secure support for this project. This enabled the researcher to establish sample selection, train field workers, conduct observations and proceed with the project.

The traffic decision-making project utilized the field research method by employing observations, semistructured interviews and document evaluations as essential data collection techniques. The research setting was the Jakarta Regional Police (JRP) territory. The initial plan had been to limit research to the City of Jakarta special territory (DKI Jakarta). However, traffic patterns in the JRP area have been so centralized that the city limits are transparent. Consequently, the department implements a centralized approach to traffic control in all their jurisdictional regions. Thus it became necessary for the purpose of this study to cover other districts in the Jakarta metropolitan area as well, such as Depok, Bekasi and Tangerang districts (a map of the JRP territory appears in Appendix B). Depok is known as a universities center, Bekasi as a heavy industrial center, Tangerang as a light/medium industrial center, and all of them are also residential areas where most of Jakarta's workers live. Each district consists of several subdistricts.

Sampling Procedures

As noted earlier, the focus of this study was primarily the traffic law enforcement units, called general traffic police units, at both the regional and district levels. There are two types of units performing general traffic enforcement duties. The first is comprised of observation and regulation units which perform their duties at immobile, stationary, posts.¹ It was apparent that the number of these posts was so limited that it was inappropriate to select them randomly within subdistrict level. A second form of traffic enforcement consists of mobile posts, which include patrol units. These functions are also organized at regional and district levels. Unlike the observation and regulation units, patrol units at the regional level put more emphasis on guard duties, such as escorting VIPs, parades, and the like, than they do on law enforcement duties. At the district level, however, patrol units are assigned to stationary posts, so their duties do not vary much from those of the observation and regulation units. In this instance, sampling selection of the patrol units at the district level was treated in a manner similar to that of the observation and regulation units. However, sampling selection of the patrol units at the regional level would be treated differently, in accordance with their unique activities in traffic law enforcement.

¹An immobile or stationary post can be either permanent or temporary. A stationary post is staffed by general traffic officers in two shifts (morning: 6 a.m. - 2 p.m., and afternoon: 2 p.m. - 10 p.m.). Except for certain posts located on the streets that are frequented by VIPs or INP high-ranking officers, permanent posts generally are staffed only during rush hours, that is, 6 a.m. to 10 a.m. and 4 p.m. to 8 p.m. Temporary posts are usually attended by staffers assigned for operational duties during the 7 - 9 a.m. rush hour. (Because they are only temporary, this type of police post was not included in this research.)

In lieu of using multistage procedures, posts were chosen through simple random sampling. From a total of 130 permanent posts in the JRP area, 97 were selected as the sample (Krejcie & Morgan 1970). Due to limited funding, the researcher could not afford to observe all of the immobile officers (a total of 910 people), so it was necessary to restrict the number of officers chosen for direct observation. According to Krejcie and Morgan (1970), the appropriate sample size for this population would be 270 people. Random selection was not utilized to select individual officers, however, because of the probability that some of those selected would not be on duty at the selected posts. For this reason, we employed a quota-system procedure to select officers from each unit. In accordance with the desired relationship between sample size and population suggested by Krejcie and Morgan, the quota for each unit should be 30% of all of the officers assigned to it. For example, the sample size for the Central Jakarta Observation and Regulation unit was 30% of 84 officers, or 25 officers.

In the next stage of the study, within-post sample subjects were selected by observers from among the on-duty officers. We quickly discovered that for several reasons the quota system described above could not be utilized. First, the number of officers manning the posts ranged from 1 to 10 in each shift. Thus, in the case of a post attended by only 1 or 2 officers, a 30% quota would have been impossible. Second, as was noted earlier, the time schedules for manning the posts vary considerably. Some function full-time, while others do not. This indicates that the activity of posts in traffic law enforcement varies, so our direct observations had to be conducted according to those

activities. Consequently, subject choices were limited to those officers whose duties concerned traffic observation.

Due to the different tasks they performed, the sample for patrol units differed from that utilized for observation and regulations units. As mentioned earlier, patrol units prioritize guard service duties, so that they perform traffic enforcement duties less frequently than do observation and regulation units. This was also reflected by their ticketing productivity. Patrol units produced fewer tickets, that is, 23% of those produced by observation and regulation units. Therefore, the sample size for patrol units was determined by considering this difference in ticketing productivity. In this instance, it was appropriate to select only 30% (similar to the sample size that was required for the observation and regulation units) of the 23% (the percentage of enforcement activities, i.e., ticketing productivity, of patrol units compared to the observation and regulation units) of the patrol units population. This means that we needed to select only 6.9% of the population of the patrol units (420 officers), resulting in 29 mobile patrolmen as sample subjects. Sample subjects were selected by judgment based on the representation of subunits and vehicle types (sedan, jeep and motorcycle).

The total number of sample subjects selected was 299 officers representing a population of 1,330 general traffic officers. This number was slightly greater than the 30% projected sample size for this population (Krejcie & Morgan 1970). See Appendix C for the sample allocation table.

Observation

The researchers began collecting data by conducting general observations of the selected post sample. During this early observation period, emphasis was placed on traffic flow, traffic violations, and police actions in general rather than on the individual officers who took the actions. In other words, subject sampling had not yet been applied. The observations focused on discovering patterns of traffic violations and officers' decisions by keeping in mind those regularities which were discussed in the previous chapters as background knowledge.

Observations were initially conducted as covert actions (a complete-observer role). The researcher visited the assigned post and observed an officer whose duties called for traffic surveillance. To facilitate these observations, the field worker would position himself so as to be able have a clear view of traffic and of any violation that occurred, as well as the subject's reaction to that violation. Each observer was instructed to behave as any passerby usually does, so that his presence and activity would not arouse the suspicions of the subject. For example, a field worker sat on the sidewalk and watched the passing traffic, occasionally looking at his watch as if he were waiting for a friend, all the while keeping an eye on the subject and traffic flow.

There were three kinds of subject reaction to being observed. First, in most cases (59%) subjects did not show any reaction to the activity until the observation period was completed. The second kind of reaction was that a subject might realize that he was being observed and would then question the field worker (24%). If during the observation period the presence of the field worker was noticed by the subject, however, the

researcher would introduce himself to that person and show him his credentials. At that point the field worker would explain the aims of the study. While doing so he would assure the subject that the results of this study could help to improve the INP and that they also might work for the benefit of lower-level personnel. Following this explanation the observer would ask for the cooperation of the subject. If the subject agreed to participate in this project, including follow-up interviews, the field worker would continue observation overtly, in an observer-as-participant role. Perhaps surprisingly, 84% of the subjects approached in this way responded in a very positive manner and welcomed the implementation of the research. Most did not object to being involved in the research and also agreed to be interviewed by the field worker after the observation period ended.

The third kind of reaction was indirect. Occasionally it was suspected that a subject was aware of being observed before the observation period was ended (17%). In these situations the subject never approached the observer (or in reverse, the observer was not able to approach the subject). Thus, perhaps because he was aware of being observed, the subject would suddenly act passively (would not respond to a violation) and/or even leave his post. These reactions were often directed at officer-observers who might unintentionally exhibit a militaristic style.² In such cases the subject perceived the observer as being an internal affairs agent who was spying on him. Following example is an excerpt from a report made by a participant observer who interviewed an officer:

² It was the researcher's concern to avoid such indications as military bearing and hairstyle when recruiting the field workers, primarily those who were policemen. They were also asked to leave their hair long during the field investigation period.

Observer: For a long time I saw that you only regulated traffic while right in front of you a number of public minibuses were being parked in a forbidden place. What is your reason, Sir?

Officer: From the beginning I suspected that you were observing me, so I was unwilling to take any action.

It was decided that following a subject who left his post by riding a vehicle should not be done, because it might endanger the observer. However, observation of mobile officers in patrol units was still necessary. The researcher, assisted by a staff member of those units, identified a number of patrolmen who were committed to the project and capable of acting as participant observers. Their work schedule was arranged in such a way that once a week they were paired with one of the operators of a patrol vehicle that had been selected for the sample. In this way, observations were made by utilizing the complete participant method. The participant observers agreed that they might eventually tell their subjects that they were conducting research related to traffic violations in general—not specifically associated with the officers' decisions. Later when the formal interviews were conducted, the subjects would be given an explanation about the purpose of the study and asked for their agreement to participate in this project.

The writer discussed all observation reports with the observers (individually or collectively) twice a week. As a result of knowledge gained from a review of the literature and empirical data gathered during general observations, a format was developed for recording data in relation to the variables of traffic violation patterns and the officers' performance.

Having conducted general trial observations, the writer now directed the field investigation toward the selected subject sample. Here, observations were focused on the decision-making process itself; that is, what kind of action was taken by a subject toward a particular type of violation. For example, an officer might ignore a stop-line violation, give a casual warning for a helmet violation, or stop a vehicle for violating a traffic sign or signal. These observations also included the identification of type of vehicles involved, as well as the level of traffic fluidity at the time. For example, an officer might ignore a luxury car violating a traffic sign or signal when traffic was not congested, but might stop and ticket a common vehicle committing a similar violation when traffic was heavy. Once a violating vehicle had been stopped, the field worker continually observed the interaction between offender and officer until a final decision had been made. For example, the field worker would observe whether the offender was simply released, released with a warning or after a bribe had been paid, or was ticketed. All of these events were recorded on the data-recording form mentioned above, which has been standardized and attached as Appendix D.

As proposed, one purpose of this study was to examine the influence of individual officers' characteristics on their decision-making patterns. This required collecting additional data pertaining to different conditions (time and post) to improve our understanding of the phenomenon. Moreover, to ensure the accuracy of data, each subject was observed at least two different times by different observers. For these reasons, having completed observation of all subject samples, the field investigation was followed up by conducting a second round of observations.

In order to schedule these observations, the researcher referred to the personnel plotting plan made weekly for each unit. From this list, it could be determined at which post and on what shift a subject would be on duty for that particular week. When it was put into practice, however, following this plan did not always lead to satisfactory results. There were several reasons for this.

One problem was that during the initial observation there were some subjects whose names remained unknown to the observer. This occurred in circumstances when the observer failed to approach the subject before he left his post or when a jacket covered his nametag.

A second difficulty was that during this follow-up observation, subjects occasionally could not be located at their assigned posts as described in the plotting plan. For example, Sergeant A was supposed to be at post X, but was actually on duty at post Z, a location which may not have been a sample post.

A third problem was that some of the subjects who had been previously observed were not listed in the later plotting plan, and were unknown even to the unit covering the assigned post. There were two explanations for how this could happen. It could be that the subject (who was on duty at the observed post during the previous stage) had actually been assigned there from another unit. Or, the subject's name as it was observed on his nametag did not match the list provided by his unit. For example, R. Hutagaol was written as Richard, or Suradi was written as S. Adi. Because of these difficulties, 20 officers observed in the initial stage could not be seen again.

During the 10th week of the field investigation, the researcher identified a changing pattern in the subjects' behaviors. Based on the field workers' reports, the subject officers were neglecting traffic violations with greater frequency than they had during previous weeks. At first it was thought that the observers might have been at fault, in the sense of not performing their tasks diligently. Later it was discovered, however, that a few days earlier a high-ranking Polri official had caught and punished a police officer who was suspected of accepting bribes on the street. Following this incident, a rumor circulated among street-level officers that some of them were going to be assigned to some remote, undesirable areas.

Given this unique situation it was decided that we would extend the observational period for one week. This additional observation involved a total of only 18 subjects, each of whom had been observed at least twice before. The results of the observations of these subjects were then compared with the data on their previously recorded performances, in order to see their relationship with the corrective action of the high-ranking Polri official.

In conducting the field observations, the researcher was assisted by a number of field workers. Eight student observers were selected from among applicants who were senior undergraduate students from the University of Indonesia, Atmajaya University, and Krisna Dwipayana University; two of them were females. Twelve officer observers were selected from among traffic officers who had previous college experience. Three of them held undergraduate degrees in economic and public administration; the others had some college experience. Additionally, seven patrolmen were chosen to observe their

colleagues from patrol units, and three female officers observed their peers when performing patrol.

Bias was difficult to avoid in this type of data recording. In order to minimize these difficulties, several strategies were implemented, however. The field workers were asked to follow several guidelines and for this they were trained both in a classroom and then in the field. They were asked to read carefully the written guidelines that were provided and to discuss them. They were then brought to nonsample posts in order to study actual examples, such as violation types, vehicle types and police actions, as well as the way they should perform their observational duties. For example, they had first to take an observation position opposite the direction of traffic flow and to situate themselves on the roadside in such a way that the traffic had to pass the officer being observed before passing them. Then, after witnessing a violation where the driver subsequently passed the officer, the observers had to change their position so as to be in line with the latter's observational vantage point. Doing this allowed them to determine whether the violation had actually been seen by the subject. Oftentimes, for example, public transportation vehicles were observed making illegal stops close to the police post. If the officer was directing traffic at the time this violation occurred, it could not be assured that he actually saw it. However, if he had only been monitoring the flow of traffic rather than actively directing it, he should have been able to see the violation, since it occurred nearby and in plain view.

It should be noted that during this study period, the researcher consistently observed what was going on in the field, either openly or covertly. This supervisory

activity was done to ensure the presence of the observers at their assigned posts. Each observer was personally questioned about every report submitted in order that the researcher might obtain a clear understanding of the report and to make sure that the data presented were accurate. For example, each observer would be asked about the characteristics of the vehicle involved in a reported violation, the exact violation involved, and why a particular violation resulted in a ticket being issued, even after the offender had asked the officers to settle the case informally.

During the study several observers had to be replaced by reserve observers.³ Two officers were unable to continue participating in the project due to job rotation and attending a training program. Four students voluntarily terminated their participation because of involvement in their campus activities at the beginning of the new academic year. Another two officers and one student, however, had to be dismissed due to false reporting.

Early on it was discovered that some reports were clearly questionable (those data were subsequently eliminated from the report). In one instance the researcher found two cases of false reporting. The first involved two observers who made reports as if they had been present at an assigned observation post, although when this was checked up on, it was learned that they were never there. The second instance involved a report that simply could not be accepted as truthful. This person reported that during the 2-hour observation

³ When recruiting the field workers, the researcher had already prepared five officers and two students as reserve observers. Another three students had to be re-recruited.

period, his observed subject made 23 stops. The final actions listed included 1 warning, 14 cases of accepting bribes, and 8 unknown resolutions. If this had been accurate, during that 2-hour period the subject would have to have made a stop and resolution of the situation every 5.22 minutes. Yet in practice it is known that it generally takes at least 5 minutes just to accomplish a pull-over, much less resolve the violation. Moreover, these alleged stops were said to have occurred during periods of heavy traffic at a post where there is no safe place to park a stopped car. As a result of discovering these fraudulent observation reports, these observers were dismissed and all of their reports, which involved 9 subjects have been omitted from this paper.

Altogether, the 11-week field investigation involved observations of 270 subjects. All of them agreed to participate in this project and signed the informed consent forms that were provided. Observational data regarding the other 29 subjects have been removed from this report due to doubtful identities (20 officers) and some cases of false reporting (9 officers). This field investigation involved a total of 505 observations. One hundred fifty-five (155) subjects were observed twice, 72 were observed three times, and 8 subjects four times.

Document Analysis

As mentioned earlier, this project also utilized an additional source of data, that is, written documents. The examination of these documents was used as a cross-check on data obtained through observational techniques as well as to gather new information which had not been available from other sources. The first to be examined were the data on traffic accidents. However, due to incompleteness of the existing records, we could

only locate data pertaining to factors thought to have caused the accident. Another data source was provided by the organization's citation files. Fortunately, the administrative section of JTPD has a complete compilation of the tickets that were issued. They routinely compile and process the data relating to traffic tickets issued by JRP. This made it relatively easy to learn about traffic citations. These figures were used to cross-check observational data, such as the relationship between ticketing and violation and vehicle types. Information on judicial disposition, however, was not provided in the citation files. This led the researcher to seek this information in the original citation files, which were available only at district courts. Three of the eight district courts were selected as a sample (Central Jakarta, West Jakarta, and Bekasi). Because of an incredibly disorganized filing system, it was only possible to examine the previous month's tickets file, which included about 7,000 citations. From this number, 365 files were randomly selected as a sample. An attempt to identify the offenders' socioeconomic status, as had been proposed, failed, however, as the files do not provide such information.

Files on car registrations and driver's license holders from the Bureau of Registration and Identification of the JTPD were also accessed. Data on car registrations were used to determine the aggregate proportions of each type of vehicle in order to compare this figure with that vehicle type's contribution to the observed traffic violation patterns. Similarly, general data on driver's license holders were used to compare that population with the pattern of offender gender.

This study also questioned the relationship between the measurable characteristics of police job performance and officers' experiences of being rewarded and/or punished.

This necessitated access to personnel files regarding rewards and punishments. To assure the completeness and correctness of the information, these data were received directly from the respective units and through the Personnel Bureau at the regional level.

Interviews

The implementation of study interviews was basically completed as planned. Interviews were conducted with 27 managerial officers including field supervisors,⁴ unit leaders, and directorate level leaders or staff. The interviews with observational subjects involved 230 street-level officers or 85.2% of the 270 subjects who had been included in the final sample. Among the remaining subjects, several could not be present during the interview period because they had been rotated to another police region, were attending a training program, taking leave time, or were involved in preparations for the Indonesian Armed Force (ABRI) Anniversary Day. The questionnaire utilized for these interviews is included as an enclosure in Appendix E.

Finally, several informal interviews were conducted with vehicle drivers to cross-check the information regarding informal settlements of traffic violation cases. These interviews were focused on those who were involved in an observed unofficial clearance. In these interviews, an attempt was made to find out whether the initiative for the unofficial clearance had been made by the drivers or by the officers themselves. These informal interviews included 42 public transportation drivers and 9 private drivers who agreed to be interviewed.

⁴ The term supervisor does not necessarily mean a particular job. Here it reflects the lowest level of operational management, such as head of subunit and platoon commander.

When conducting the formal interviews, the researcher was assisted by 10 others. Half of these were civilians who held master's degrees in economics and anthropology, or were graduate students of public administration and social sciences. Others were police officers who held master's degrees in environmental study and management, and bachelor's degrees in economic and police studies. Before being selected, the interviewers were given an opportunity to perform trial interviews with officer-observers and to conduct general observations in the field so as to gain insight about the real world of street-level officers. Among the 10 persons selected, 3 were females and 7 were males.

Data Analysis

It was suggested earlier that this study employed three techniques of data collection: (a) direct observations of traffic enforcement in a natural setting; (b) semistructured interviews with a variety of respondents; and (c) document analysis. These techniques allowed the researcher to obtain both qualitative and quantitative data. As proposed, this project required that the researcher move back and forth between data collection and data analysis. In analyzing the data the researcher employed several steps, beginning with grouping the data and finishing with description of the relationships among categories. In some instances, we discovered the relationship by applying a quantitative approach. In analyzing the quantitative data, SPSS software was used. The complete findings of this research will be presented in the following sections of this chapter.

Before presenting these findings, however, it is necessary to note our concerns regarding the influences of the observers' and interviewers' status and gender on their reports. Initially, it was found that certain officer-observers tended to report data

indicating only good performances of traffic officers. This can be easily explained: they probably did not want to jeopardize their colleagues. However, since the researcher regularly supervised their work on the streets and personally discussed their reports with them, this potential problem was minimized. During the early weeks of observation, it was learned that female observers seldom reported behavior that might be perceived as undesirable. Eventually we realized that their presence at certain posts and times (where women are not normally present) might have inadvertently attracted the officer's attention. Following this discovery, we stopped assigning them at such places and times. With regard to interview results, we found no gender or status differences.

Traffic Jams, Accidents, and Violations: Police Reactions

Like nearly all large cities around the world, Jakarta has a huge problem with traffic jams. In addition to local traffic jams, this city experiences almost total gridlock during rush hours (7 - 9 a.m. and 5 - 7 p.m.) on all of the main streets that connect its business area to residential areas and suburbs. Examples include streets connecting Pasar Rebo to Tanjung Priok, Kebon Jeruk to Pulo Gadung, Ciputat to Tanah Abang, Depok to Gambir, and Pondok Labu to Kota. Even on toll roads and protocol streets⁵ (parade routes), where "Three in One"⁶ regulations are in effect, one cannot escape omnipresent traffic jams. Even in the Kota area, the heart of the business district in Jakarta, heavy

⁵That is, main streets usually used officially to route state guests, parades, and the like.

⁶The city government has established a regulation requiring any vehicle using those streets to carry no fewer than three passengers in order to enhance traffic fluidity. A driver who carries fewer than two passengers may be stopped by an officer.

traffic occurs at all hours from dawn to midnight. It is no wonder that during a children's show on one of Jakarta's local TV stations, one child asked the Chief of JRP, "Why is Jakarta always jammed even to the toll roads?"

Having observed these problems for some time, the writer can identify the characteristics of those areas where the traffic is heaviest:

1. On the toll roads in town and on the main streets that connect the business areas with residential areas and where the number of alternative roads is very limited (rush hours).
2. At the shopping centers and establishments where parking space is limited (mainly from 3-8 p.m. weekdays, and 10 a.m. - 1 p.m. weekends and holidays).
3. At the bus terminal and where small roads or toll roads meet main streets (rush hours).
4. At the business center areas and the intersections of big streets where heavy vehicle traffic from all directions forces long waits for drivers to make turns or to pass (almost all day except when it is nearly midnight).
5. At the entrance and exit areas of recreational facilities (especially during holidays) and at the interchanges of toll roads with big streets linking downtown (beginnings/ends of holidays).
6. At the entrance and exit areas of meeting halls (if there is a party or ceremony and especially around 7 - 9 p.m.).

Several factors may account for these phenomena. First, based on the frequency of these traffic problems, it is readily apparent that there is a major imbalance between the number of vehicles and the established road system in Jakarta. According to JRP, the number of registered vehicles in Jakarta in August 1997 was 2,477,088⁷ while the total length of load roads is 7,500 km. Thus, at any given time, if all of the vehicles in Jakarta were put together in a continuous line, they would exceed the available road space.

Second, violations of traffic codes can also cause problems or make a traffic jam worse. Based on field observations and interviews, it is apparent that one reason for traffic jams is that when public transportation vehicles stop to unload and load passengers, they often do so at illegal places. In Jakarta passengers can stop a bus or other public transportation vehicle at any place, without even going to a designated bus stop. In many cases passengers even ask a bus to stop at a letter S sign (no stopping sign). These illegal actions often result in traffic jams, and since there are many public transportation vehicles, the problem occurs citywide.

These difficulties are exacerbated due to the fact that many of the bus stops are built directly on the side of the road, rather than outside the regular traffic lanes. Thus, when a public transportation vehicle makes a stop during heavy traffic, the vehicles following it have to stop as well. As a result, and especially on narrow roads with short distances between bus stops, frequent traffic jams are precipitated. One can find this

⁷ The real number of vehicles registered at the JRP office is 2,522,918. This figure includes about 45,830 tractors and forklifts. These two vehicle types are not included in the data because they almost never operate routinely on Jakarta's main streets.

happening, for example, at streets like Jl. Fatmawati, Jl. Petamburan, Jl. Raya Cililitan, and Jl. Raya Cilincing. However, along the parade routes (protocol streets) this problem is rare, since these streets are wide and the bus stops are located in the slow lane ("jalur lambat").

Third, in heavy traffic many drivers cut into a lane very suddenly and surprise those who are driving straight ahead, creating havoc in already chaotic traffic. This is the reason drivers in Jakarta must always be ready to apply the brakes, not for the car ahead, but rather for vehicles cutting into their lane from the side. The writer is quite familiar with this type of situation. Once he drove from Senayan Circle to Harmoni (about a three-mile distance) during rush hour (8:30 a.m.); it took about 33 minutes. In normal traffic, the same trip takes 10 minutes. On this occasion he counted 17 times when vehicles suddenly cut into the lane in front of his car.

Acts of incivility and lawlessness can also be found at traffic lights. Some drivers are eager to take advantage of a small available space right after the light has changed, but before the traffic from the other direction has had a chance to move. As a consequence, when the traffic is heavy, these drivers will block crossroads and create traffic jams. Mr. Bambang Garjito, the Chief of South Jakarta Traffic and Transportation Bureau, in an interview by *Kompas* (1997c), also pointed to traffic violations at intersections as one of the significant sources of traffic jams.

The writer is not particularly interested in why some drivers behave in these ways. Rather, his interest lies in the actions taken by officers who must deal with these drivers' illegal and dangerous behaviors. It is apparent that when faced with public transportation

vehicles that make frequent illegal stops, on most occasions the officers ignore the offenses. Sometimes they issue a warning without stopping the vehicle, through the use of either a hand signal or whistle. A few give tickets to such offenders. Among 2,444 traffic violations recorded during field observations, 30.6% involved illegal stops by public transportation vehicles primarily for loading/unloading passengers. The police officers ignored about 50% of those violations. Even when violators were stopped, they were not always processed, as the law requires. We will discuss this issue in more detail in the following sections.

The reasoning for not taking action toward such illegal-stop violations has been expressed by some officers as: "We give too many citations to them already. They never stop doing what they do, so it's getting useless!" The following report was made by a researcher who observed and then interviewed an officer:

Observer: I saw many public transportation vehicles stopped at the letter S [no stopping sign], but you never took any action. What was your reasoning, Sir?

Officer: It is hard; I have only two hands, but there are thousands of public transportation vehicles. Even ticketed today, tomorrow they will do it again.

Some subjects claimed that if they stopped the offending vehicle, traffic problems would only be made worse. A few said that they wanted to create a "mutual understanding" with the public transportation drivers (apparently to establish good relations between the police officers and the drivers; this issue will be detailed later). Interestingly, others actually sympathized with public transportation drivers who seem to be frequently ticketed. A sergeant, who was observed and interviewed by a participant

observer, stated: "Actually, if we want we can ticket them every day. But if we ticket them only two times, they will not be able to feed their families for a month. So, when traffic is light, we are willing to ignore or just warn them by gesture or whistle."

Despite these claims, during heavy traffic periods the police officers tended to regulate the traffic rather than to enforce traffic laws aggressively. During those hours, they generally regulated traffic flow through "mengipas," i.e., blowing their whistle and signaling with their hands to direct the vehicles in the desired direction. These activities proved to be a very demanding job—the officers usually had to take a 10-15 minute break after only 30-45 minutes of such work. During their rest periods officers paid little attention to the traffic violations that were occurring all around them. Their rationale for overlooking those infractions was simple; they did not want to precipitate action that would back up traffic surrounding their post. If this were to occur, their superiors would be likely to accuse them of being inept at directing traffic.

Criminological deterrence theory suggests that people tend to observe police actions in order to determine for themselves whether traffic laws will be enforced. Frequent actions taken against rule violations assure the social audience that those rules are still in effect, whereas inaction signals an opposite understanding. Gibbs, a proponent of this theory, states that "the rate for a particular type of crime varies inversely with the celerity, certainty, and severity of punishment of that type of crime" (1975:5). Punishment here is not limited to formal sentencing processes, but includes the entire process of law enforcement, including verbal and written warnings, such as stopping a car and issuing a

citation.⁸ The research findings related to tests of this theory for different kinds of violations, such as traffic fatalities, drunk driving, speeding, parking, and seat-belt usage, have been mixed. Many of these studies have supported the deterrence notion (Chamblis 1966; Homel 1988; Robertson 1976; Watson 1986). For instance, Robertson (1976) found a significant relationship between the enforcement of new legislation requiring the use of motorcycle helmets and individual compliance with the law and the motorcycle accident fatality rate. Likewise, Watson (1986) in his study of seat-belt use in British Columbia discovered that the activity of police to enforce the law was significantly accountable for seat-belt usage. Others, however, have suggested that such a relationship does not exist. Campbell and Ross (1968), in their study on the 1955 Connecticut crackdown, found that the decrease in the rate of traffic fatalities there was not necessarily explained by the crackdown, but could be influenced by regression effect. Yet Glass (1968), who refuted Campbell and Ross, argued that no regression effect was found in the data and the relationship thus existed.

The Indonesian government passed a new law, Act year 1992 number 14, on Traffic and Road Transportation. This new policy replaced the old one, Act year 1965 number 3. There were a couple of policy changes established in the new act, one of which concerns increased penalties (*Republik Indonesia* 1992). Muhammad (1995), in his study on the new policy, found no effect on traffic fatality rates associated with increased

⁸ Gibbs (1975:101) separates punishment into two categories: "procedural punishments," which refers to any legal action occurring during the investigation or adjudication process; and "substantive punishments," which refers to any legal actions that occur subsequent to the investigation and adjudication process of a case.

penalties. However, the relationship did appear to be significant when traffic fatality rates were measured in conjunction with the number of tickets issued by the police, indicating that the certainty of police actions in enforcing traffic laws may lower the number of deaths on the road.

Field observations and interviews with both officers and drivers in this study suggest that a deterrent relationship does indeed exist. The data suggest that police inaction toward traffic violations primarily committed by public transportation may encourage drivers to continue their illegal actions. A few drivers may commit traffic violations even when they are passing a police post. Yet many drivers reported being afraid to commit a traffic violation if they even saw an officer present, let alone if they saw an officer stopping a vehicle and ticketing the driver for a violation.

★ For example, an observer reported his conversation with an “oplet” driver:

Observer: Why did you stop at the letter S [no stopping sign]?

Driver: You know, the passenger asked me to stop there. If I had not done it, he would have scolded me.

Observer: Don't you fear policemen?

Driver: Sure, so we have to look around. If an officer is present, we may not load/unload passengers in an illegal place. So we drivers have to play “kucing-kucingan” [cat-and-mouse] with officers.

Former Deputy Chief INP for Operations Major General Drs. Kusparmono Irsan S.H. and former Chief INP Senior Staff Major General dr. Hadiman S.H., M.B.A., have both

asserted that police nonassertiveness and inconsistency of traffic law enforcement prompts drivers to commit or repeat violations.⁹ Of course, they did not expect officers to perform full enforcement, but a larger proportion of observed violations should be enforced or at least stopped.

Traffic violations may also contribute to the occurrence of traffic accidents. The documents evaluated here revealed that 42% of 1,260 traffic accidents occurring between January and August 1997 were caused by drivers' traffic violations. The remaining 58% were caused by road conditions and bad weather. According to a traffic accident data analyst, however, drivers also play an important role in the occurrence of traffic accidents caused by these nonhuman factors. Based on the evidence examined here, it may be fair to say that traffic violations increase traffic congestion and are the major cause of traffic accidents. We begin our analysis of traffic violations patterns below.

Patterns of Traffic Violations

A field worker had first to observe the flow of traffic surrounding an observed subject in order to see if a violation actually occurred before observing the officer's reaction on the offense. In this study the judgment as to whether a violation had occurred was based upon direct observation of an infraction as identified and defined in the traffic

⁹ Both retired officers, who are now respectively Rector and Rector's 3rd Assistant of Bhayangkara University (a public university managed by the Police Foundation) expressed this claim during a conference with the writer at the Rector's office on August 1, 1997.

police field guidelines.¹⁰ The observer also had to ascertain whether or not the subject could have seen the violation.¹¹

The easily observable violations included illegal stops, running through red lights, and zigzag (reckless) driving. In addition to these infractions, other more subtle types of violations were observed in the field, such as the violation of maximum load limits, which included the carrying of passengers or goods which exceeded the maximum limit allowed under the law. The maximum passenger limit violation was easy to monitor since the observer could see the standard seats available in the vehicle. For example, if observers saw passengers standing while all the seats were occupied, they could consider this a violation of the rule regarding the maximum number of passengers. Field workers were asked not to be too rigid in their documentation of this violation, however. Rather, they were told they should only take action if the number of standing passengers exceeded 25% of the number of seated passengers, or if they saw some passengers standing in the entrance door of the vehicle. This relates to an official departmental policy which permits officers to tolerate exceeding the maximum limit by up to 10%.¹²

During the observation period, exceeding the maximum load of goods was seldom considered a traffic violation. This was due to the probability of differing interpretations of the subject officer and the field worker when they applied the standard measurement of

¹⁰The field workers were briefed on the relevant laws and were given a chance to go to the street to see for themselves examples of violations found in the field.

¹¹Observation could not be conducted if the subject was not present at the observation post.

¹²In the U.S. officers also often tolerate, for example, exceeding speed limit up to 10%.

weight and volume to the vehicle that had just passed them. A vehicle could be classified as violating this law only if the volume of goods carried filled the container such that the height doubled that of the container; others were not.

Another type of violation concerned illegal crossing of traffic lines (pavement markings). This type of violation can only be observed when the traffic flow is stopped at a crossroad while the traffic light is red. Under the traffic codes a vehicle is involved in a violation if it crosses the stop line at the crossroad. Again, observers were asked not to be very strict on this rule, however. Here, a vehicle was classified as violating the traffic lines ordinance only when half or more of the vehicle's body had crossed the stop line.

Other frequent violations monitored by field workers concerned traffic signs, the wearing of helmets, and speed limits. In addition to those offenses already mentioned, violating traffic signs included ignoring no-entrance signs during specified hours, using roads that were restricted to use by specific vehicle types, and failing to use turn signals or other required directional signs. Helmet violations concerned motorcycle riders and their passengers who were not wearing helmets. Speed-limit violations were monitored only on the toll roads where the field worker accompanied the subject in his patrol vehicle during the observation period. A speed-limit violation here means that the vehicle's speed exceeded the maximum speed allowed or was below the minimum speed acceptable by law. In order to measure the speed of the monitored vehicle, the officer-observer used the patrol vehicle's speedometer as a reference.

Those violations which did not fit into the categories identified above were placed in an "other" category. These infractions included, for example, leaving a car door open

while the vehicle motor was running; equipment violations, such as when the vehicle's hardware was not up to the required standards (a leaking muffler which caused excessive noise, lights and signals that did not function, or unsafe tires); and improperly carrying passengers.

Table 3 below identifies the actual infractions monitored during the observation period. The data in this table reveal that stopping vehicles in illegal locations comprised the greatest number of violations monitored (30.6%). Violations of the speed limit associated for the fewest violations (1%). This offense type may be underrepresented here, since it could be monitored only on toll roads.

Table 3
The Number of Violations per Type

<i>Violation Type</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
1. Maximum load limit	247	10.1
2. No stopping	467	19.1
3. Stop outside loading zone	282	11.5
4. Lane/Zigzag/Road marks	394	16.1
5. Traffic light	319	13.1
6. Traffic sign	294	12.0
7. Helmet	313	12.8
8. Speed limit	25	1.0
9. Others	103	4.3
Totals	2,444	100.0

While observing each of these violations, the field workers were asked to identify the types of vehicles that were involved. In Indonesia all vehicles are classified into one of three types, and each is identifiable by the color of the license tag. The first type includes

government-owned vehicles, both civil (red plates) and military (ABRI plates). These consist of transportation vehicles for passengers and goods, and motorcycles. A second type is comprised of privately owned vehicles, and includes both motorcycles and cars. These vehicles are issued black plates. The third type consists of public transportation vehicles (yellow plates), including taxis, public buses, "oplets" or minibuses (including three-wheeled vehicles), and trucks and other commercial vehicles, including privately owned goods transportation (black plates). There are also motorcycles that have been commercialized for carrying passengers; these are popularly known as "ojek." But because the number of these cycles that were monitored was so small (1% of all vehicles) and because there are no separate data regarding them available at the police office, they have been placed in the ordinary motorcycles category. The data related to vehicle types and violations for each type are displayed in Table 4 below.

It is necessary to emphasize that these data represent merely offenses occurring in the observed areas, not throughout the city. Certain types of vehicle are rarely seen in the areas observed during this study. For example, most "oplets" are used at the periphery of the city and on small streets, and consequently they rarely pass police posts. Also, motorcycle riders are known to try to avoid main streets where many police posts are located, and especially if they are not wearing safety helmets as required.

It is interesting to note that the violations committed by those driving government-owned vehicles (2.1%) are fewer than one would expect based on the percentage of all vehicles that are of this type (11.2%). These results could be due to strict internal disciplinary measures exercised by the government institutions, especially the military

Table 4
Number of Violations per Vehicle Types

<i>Type</i>	<i>Population</i>		<i>Violations</i>	
	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
1. Government	277,686	11.2	52	2.1
2. Private				
a. Motorcycles	1,103,009	44.5	573	23.4
b. Passenger cars	<u>622,917</u>	<u>25.2</u>	<u>512</u>	<u>21.0</u>
Subtotal	1,725,926	69.7	1,085	44.4
3. Public/Commercial				
a. Taxis	48,107	1.9	106	4.4
b. Buses	152,022	6.1	487	19.9
c. "Oplets"	73,544	3.0	442	18.1
d. Trucks	<u>199,803</u>	<u>8.1</u>	<u>272</u>	<u>11.1</u>
Subtotal	473,476	19.1	1,307	53.5
Totals	2,477,088	100.0	2,444	100.0

police among ABRI. Also, the military police initiate a special operation twice a year to maintain traffic discipline among ABRI members.

Table 4 also reveals that public transportation vehicles are involved in more traffic violations (53.5%) than are government and privately owned vehicles combined (46.5%). This finding may be explained by the fact that the public transportation vehicles operate on the roads more frequently than do these other vehicles.

With regard to public transportation, the above data are especially meaningful. All public transportation vehicles (473,476) committed 1,307 violations. This illustrates that about one out of every 362 public vehicles committed one offense during the study

period. In other words, the violation ratio of each public transportation vehicle averaged 0.0028 (0.28 %). Trucks, which committed 272 violations, were underrepresented compared to their population number (199,803). This means that each truck contributed only 0.14% of violations or approximately 50% of the averaged violation ratio of public transportation violations (0.28%). Taxies contributed 0.22% or 80% of the average, whereas buses contributed 0.33% or about 120% of the average and "oplets" (0.60%) were the highest contributor; that is, more than 200% of the average of public transportation violations.

Passengers may have played a crucial role in the reported violations data. Looking at the table, we can observe that a majority of violations by public transportation vehicles involved stopping at illegal places in order to load/unload passengers (30.6%). Goods transportation vehicles almost never carry passengers, so they are seldom found violating no stopping or no loading zone signs. Taxies carry small numbers of passengers (they average one or two at a time) from the middle or upper class of society--those who can afford to pay the fare. On the other hand, buses and "oplets" are vehicles of mass public transportation. Of course it is true that the number of passengers carried by a bus is much larger than the number carried by an "oplet." However, those who travel by bus usually go longer distances, so buses do not have to stop as frequently to load/unload passengers. Those who go by "oplet" usually travel much shorter distances, so "oplets" stop more often, loading/unloading passengers at both legal and illegal places.

Patterns of Police Initial Action

As described earlier, the actions of police officers may be characterized as a chain consisting of important decisions beginning with the initial reaction toward a violation and ending with the final action or disposition toward the offender. Bayley (1986) has grouped police-offender interactions as occurring in three stages: contact, processing, and exit. In this study police response toward traffic violations also occurred in three stages: initial action, offender-officer interaction, and final disposition.

The original research design classified police initial action into two subcategories: stopping or not stopping vehicles that were involved in infractions. In practice, it was discovered that there are actually four distinct types of police initial action possible at this stage:

1. Ignoring the violation (police officer does not react at all to a violation).
2. Reacting to the violation:
 - (a) Issuing a casual warning--Without stopping the vehicle, the officer dispatches a warning to the driver by using a hand signal and/or shouting "door . . . door" or "helmet . . . helmet."
 - (b) Seizing a document--An officer temporarily stops a vehicle and seizes one of the driver's documents (e.g., driver's license or vehicle registration) and then lets the driver go. A follow-up process is undertaken later in a police station. This procedure is often followed with public transportation vehicles that regularly cruise a particular route.

(c) Stopping and processing the violation--Police officer stops a vehicle and then takes action to resolve the matter.

The data recorded in Table 5 were gathered during the observation period and concern police initial actions.

Table 5

Police Initial Action

<i>Type</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
1. Ignoring	1,120	45.8
2. Reacting		
a. Casual warning	275	11.3
b. Seizing document	167	6.8
c. Stopping and processing	882	36.1
	1,324	54.2
Totals	2,444	100.0

The data presented in the table suggest that police generally let violations pass rather than react, and only 36.1% of violators are actually pulled over.

Police initial actions are associated with different infraction types in Table 6. In this table, vehicle infraction types have been collapsed into five categories for the sake of simplicity.

Table 6

Police Initial Actions and Types of Violations (in percentages)

<i>Police Actions</i>	<i>Load/Speed Limit</i> <i>n = 272</i>	<i>Illegal Stops</i> <i>n = 749</i>	<i>Road Marks</i> <i>n = 394</i>	<i>Traffic Lights/Signs</i> <i>n = 613</i>	<i>Helmet/Others</i> <i>n = 416</i>
Ignoring	50.4	48.8	33.5	35.7	62.3
Casual warning	12.1	17.0	11.4	6.9	6.7
Seizing document	7.0	11.7	5.6	2.4	5.5
Stopping/processing	30.5	21.5	49.5	55.0	25.5
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

These data reveal that police tend to ignore violations regarding speed limits, maximum load limit, helmet usage, and illegal stops. On the other hand, violators of road markings and traffic signals or signs are more likely to be pulled over by officers. It is apparent that traffic officers prefer to issue casual warnings, seize documents or ignore vehicles that violate “no stopping” and “loading zone” signs, even though the latter two violations comprise the largest portion of the infractions monitored and are, as mentioned earlier, the main contributor to traffic jams in Jakarta. This confirms our earlier observation that traffic jams are made worse by the occurrence of this type of violation and the unwillingness of officers to take appropriate actions.

Several factors may help to explain the nature of the officer’s initial reaction to these traffic violations. In both informal and formal interviews, subjects suggested that the traffic flow situation influenced the officer’s initial action. From the data presented in Table 7, it is apparent that the correlation between the police action and the level of traffic flow is statistically significant at the .01 level. This means that the heavier the traffic, the more likely an officer is to ignore an offense. However, the coefficient is only .110,

indicating that the correlation is not very strong. An examination of Table 7 reveals that the magnitude of the impact of traffic fluidity on police action is not too large.

Table 7

Police Initial Actions and Level Of Traffic Flow (in percentages)

<i>Police Action</i>	<i>Traffic Jammed</i> <i>n = 72</i>	<i>Heavy Traffic</i> <i>n = 1,016</i>	<i>Medium Traffic</i> <i>n = 1,275</i>	<i>Light Traffic</i> <i>n = 81</i>
Ignore violation	51.4	48.9	43.8	34.6
Give reaction	48.6	51.1	56.2	65.4
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

These data indicate that while police officers reacted to almost 50% of the violations occurring in traffic jam situations, they also ignored almost 35% of violations when the traffic flow was light. This suggests that the traffic flow does not explain much of the police action. On the other hand, in-depth interviews revealed that officers were primarily concerned with ensuring the smooth flow of traffic. Thus, an officer might pull over a violator as long as it did not affect the traffic flow, even when the traffic was heavy or jammed. However, a potential pull-over might be avoided if that action were considered to be a greater hazard to the overall traffic flow, even when the traffic was medium or light. For example, in the statement below, a participant observer questioned an officer during a medium traffic flow situation:

Observer: Sir, I have seen a number of violations. Why didn't you take any action?

Officer: If I act, there is no end, and it might even result in a traffic jam. If there is a traffic jam, I'll get into trouble with my superior.

In an identical traffic situation, responding to the observer's question as to why no action was taken against passenger-car violators, but motorcycles were stopped, another officer maintained: "If I stop just one car, a lengthy traffic jam may occur." In this instance, the officer was reluctant to stop cars due to the fact that there was no available safe stopping area. Therefore, it seems clear that officers' decisions are based primarily upon their fear of provoking a lengthy traffic jam rather than the load factor of the traffic itself. The reason they are so concerned about traffic fluidity will be discussed in the next chapter.

The availability of resources, especially human resources, was also discovered to contribute to the decision making of some police officers. During formal interviews, several respondents indicated that in addition to their fear of creating a traffic jam, co-worker availability also affected their decisions.¹³ Observers reported similar observations in the field. In response to the inquiry of a participant observer who asked why no action was being taken against traffic violators, the officer on duty replied:

Well, I am the only one here. I don't think I'm capable of handling a three-way this big. If I take action on one, the others will be angry. So I only act if I have a chance. If not, then I'll let it happen.

Another observer quoted an officer's answer to a similar question:

You know, Sir, when I walk on one side of the road, traffic on the other side will violate. When I go there, the public transport heading to Jl. Raden will stop. Look over there (pointing at the circle). That motorcycle is violating the law as we are standing here. How are we going to act while the traffic condition is heavy? If I do act, it will add to the hectic traffic

¹³ Many stationary posts are hosted only by one or two officers because of the relatively small number of personnel. The ratio of INP officers to population is about 1:1,100.

situation. If there were at least two or three other officers here, only then could we act appropriately.

Throughout the observation period it was found that selective enforcement was at least partially based on the type of vehicle that was involved in the violation. Data in Table 8 indicate that with a coefficient of .119, vehicle type is statistically and significantly related to police initial action at the .01 level. In the previous section, we discussed the tendency of officers to ignore violations by public transport drivers. We also found a similar tendency to overlook violations committed by those driving government vehicles.¹⁴ This lax treatment towards governmental vehicles can be easily rationalized, however. A fitting word to describe this behavior would be “tolerance,” because both the officer and the violator have a mutual employer, in this case the government. Some of the officers disagreed with this observation, however. They insisted that governmental vehicles were often stopped when they were involved in a violation, although this did not necessarily lead to ticketing. This was said to be especially true as long as the violation was not so serious that it would potentially endanger lives of other people.

As anticipated, the drivers of luxury cars also received privileged treatment. Here luxury cars included expensive vehicles that could have prices reaching hundreds of millions of rupiahs, such as a late-model BMW or Mercedes Benzs.¹⁵ Cars with “vanity”

¹⁴Lawfully those who have the right to stop military vehicles and regular vehicles driven by military members wearing uniform are military police.

¹⁵The Indonesian government restricts the importation of luxury cars in order to minimize the social gap between those who are rich and those who are poor, except for members of the diplomatic corps. Nonetheless, such vehicles can be found on roads in Jakarta being operated by nondiplomatic persons.

tag numbers were also classified as luxury cars.¹⁶ Table 8 below presents study data related to police action by vehicle type.

Table 8
Police Initial Action For each Vehicle Class (in percentages)

<i>Police Actions</i>	<i>Government Vehicles</i> <i>n</i> = 52	<i>Public Vehicles</i> <i>n</i> = 1,337*	<i>Luxury Vehicles</i> <i>n</i> = 48	<i>Other Private Vehicles</i> <i>n</i> = 1,007
Ignore violation	80.8	46.0	45.8	43.8
Casual warning	5.7	14.0	4.2	8.2
Seizing document	0.0	11.1	2.1	1.8
Stop	13.5	28.9	47.9	46.2
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
* including "ojek" (commercial motorcycles).				

Special attention has been paid to luxury vehicles, because the owners of such vehicles are usually those holding a high social status who have established relationships with the street-level officer's superior. One participant observer reported the result of an interview with an officer after observing the subject's performance at a police post. Responding to a question as to why a violation by the driver of a luxury car had been ignored, the officer answered, "A car like this has a 'bodyguard.' I do not want to create a problem." Then he laughed. This response implies that regardless of the reason was, if the

¹⁶The Indonesian government, i.e., traffic police directorate, does not issue a private tag number, but a plate with a favorite tag number, such as B 1 MA, and B 123 BP, which can be obtained by paying an additional tax. In practice, however, not everyone who could pay the tax is always able to obtain the number, except for those who have a personal favored position with the authority.

officer took action against the driver of such a vehicle, he would be questioned and even condemned by his superior.

When verifying observational data regarding the influence of violating vehicle types on their decisions, interviewees' response were mixed. Some rejected the argument that selective enforcement was based on a vehicle's type and maintained that they never showed favoritism to someone driving a particular type of vehicle. Others suggested that this might happen, but only in regard to minor violations. When faced with serious cases, they said, they took appropriate action. This last argument may be accurate, as Table 8 indicates that 47.9% of violations involving this type of vehicle resulted in the vehicle's being pulled over. On the other hand, it is also true that officers more frequently ignored violations involving luxury cars than they did those of regular private cars. As explained above, an interesting reason officers frequently gave was that they did "not want to create a problem" with their superior, since this enforcement action could result in their own condemnation.

Overlooking observed violations is common not only with luxury and government cars, but also occurs with cars that are affiliated with special agencies and well-known companies, and even with cars whose owners are known to have "special" relationships with the authorities. A participant observer reported the following:

10:40 p.m. A container truck passed again for which, in my opinion, both the requirements and the specifications are illegal. I asked my subject why this truck was not pulled over. "I can't," he answered. He then reminded me: "Don't bother them. Those trucks (he pointed to the logo on the door) are our authority's relations."

In other cases violations are ignored when the owner of a commercial vehicle is known to be an employer of the officer's colleagues. For example, many officers have a

part-time jobs acting as security officers for the transportation division of a company. When one participant observer questioned a sergeant as to why nothing was being done when a truck was parked in an illegal area, he answered, "What will I do, when all the handlers are our own friends, and if I do something, everything will be out of order?"

During the formal interviews, respondents were asked whether particular kinds of vehicles were immune from traffic stops. Among the 168 officers who responded to this question, only 9.5% pointed to luxury cars as being exempt from traffic stops. Other respondents pointed to government vehicles (20.2%) and vehicles with favorite tag numbers (22.3%). Most officers (47.9%) claimed that they often overlooked violations by vehicles with a special mark or logo. These responses suggest that street level officers are more concerned with the last two types of vehicles. Compared to the first two types, these vehicles more clearly indicate that the owners have connections to the officers' superiors. Why officers choose to do this will be discussed in the next chapter.

Formal interview results also suggest that the seriousness of violations might have played a significant role in an officer's decisions. It turns out that the officers' personal categorization of the seriousness of a violation, however, is not based on what the traffic law states. For example, according to Act No. 14 of 1992, the driver of a vehicle with an expired tag number shall be threatened with a 2-million-rupiah fine or 2-month incarceration, and violating road marks shall be threatened with a 1-million-rupiah fine or 1 month of incarceration (Republik Indonesia 1992). The former is more severe than the latter, of course, but officers may prefer enforcing the latter over the former because the latter is a greater hazard to traffic. Nor do traffic officers refer to operational guidelines for

their definition of a violation's seriousness (Polri 1993). As mentioned in chapter 1, violations are officially classified as serious, common, and light. Street-level officers in the field, however, interpret violations in terms of how much damage they might cause to traffic and/or to humans. For example, when traffic is light, parking a car in an illegal place may be considered as not very serious. However, doing so when traffic is heavy may be seen as a serious infraction. Similarly, running traffic lights is a serious violation when traffic is heavy, but may not be seen as so serious at night.

When asked why he did not act against both a public transport vehicle and a motorcycle that were violating traffic codes, a sergeant asserted, "One must consider the effect of a violation. On this event, I can still tolerate it." This suggests that before taking any action, an officer should determine whether the violation is likely to cause damage to traffic and/or humans. If it will, the violation should be acted upon, but if not, it may be safely ignored.

Another participant observer reported that a sergeant ignored two trucks carrying sand which were traveling below the minimum speed posted on a toll road, but he pulled over another one that was committing the same violation. When the driver complained, the officer maintained that not only was he driving below the minimum speed, as were the other two, but that the sand he was carrying was also wet and dripping. "This will endanger other drivers," the officer told the driver.

Drivers do not always react as expected when they are summoned to stop. In this study, 90.5% of 882 police orders to stop were obeyed by the drivers. In those situations where drivers intentionally or unintentionally ignored police instructions to stop, there were

four possible types of police reaction: (a) ignoring the driver's action; (b) the demonstration of frustration due to being unable to take any action if a walkie-talkie or a chase car was not available; (c) dispatching information through a walkie-talkie to a mobile unit or command center; or (d) pursuing the vehicle. Data regarding these actions are presented in Table 9.

Table 9
Fleeing Vehicles and Police Reactions

<i>Police Reaction</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Ignoring	22	26.2
Being frustrated	4	4.8
Dispatching	10	11.9
Pursuing	48	57.1
Totals	84	100.0

Interviews with officers revealed those factors that influenced their decisions with regard to how they reacted to fleeing drivers. The first was the officers' concern with ensuring the smooth flow of traffic. Officers were reluctant to disturb the ongoing traffic flow. As mentioned earlier, traffic enforcement personnel prioritize traffic flow as being more important than law enforcement. Thus, when traffic is busy they let fleeing drivers go rather than pursue them. One officer was asked by a participant observer why he did not pursue a truck in which the weight of the truck's load was in excess of legal limits. He argued, "It is a waste of time. Better to concentrate on the traffic flow."

A second predictor of the police pursuit decision was the immediate availability of resources. When making a decision as to whether to pursue a fleeing driver, officers were concerned about the availability of accompanying street-level officers, police vehicles, and communication tools. If a post was occupied by only one officer, it was unlikely that that person would pursue a violator. This factor cannot be viewed as independent of the level of traffic flow, however. This means that when traffic is heavy an action to enforce the law can almost never be undertaken if a post is attended by only one officer. In these instances officers are reluctant to leave their posts, saying that if they did they would get into trouble with their superiors, and especially if their absence resulted in a traffic jam. When asked by a participant observer why nothing was done to a taxicab that was ignoring a road sign, an officer simply answered, "I am only alone, with no handy-talky (HT) [walkie-talkie], and not even a motorcycle. Here [in the department—observer], officers with HTs buy them themselves. How could I buy one on my salary?" If an officer does not have any equipment when faced with a fleeing driver, he may express his frustration by saying, for example, "sialan," or "darn." Officers in possession of peripherals often contact the command post or the next post up the street. Officers who are supplied with vehicles generally give chase to violating drivers, although they rarely do so during heavy traffic hours.

It is true that if officers are not provided with transportation and communication equipment, they can do nothing about fleeing vehicles. Yet providing them with this equipment does not necessarily mean that they must dispatch and/or pursue fleeing vehicles. For this reason we need to see what empirical data reveal about this issue. Field

workers were asked to observe the subject's reaction whenever he confronted a fleeing vehicle and simultaneously to note whether a vehicle, belonging to the subject either privately or officially and a walkie-talkie were available. These data are set forth in Table 10. The result of statistical analysis shows that the pursuit variable is significantly related to the availability of a vehicle at the .01 level with a coefficient of .465. This suggests that officers equipped with vehicles are more likely to pursue than those who are not. However, as the data show, this does not necessarily mean that they will always give chase in these situations. This issue also relates to the condition of the vehicles, as reported by observers below.

Table 10

Pursuit and The Availability of Vehicle and Handy-Talkies (in percentages)

<i>Police Reactions</i>	<i>Vehicle</i>			<i>Handy-Talkie</i>	
	<i>Official n = 20</i>	<i>Private n = 44</i>	<i>Not Avail. n = 12</i>	<i>Available n = 60</i>	<i>Not Avail. n = 21</i>
Ignore	10.0	18.2	50.0	8.3	76.2
Being Frustrated	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	19.0
Dispatch	5.0	11.4	16.7	16.7	0.0
Pursue	85.0	70.4	0.0	75.0	4.8
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Missing data: 8 for vehicle and 3 for Handy-Talky					

Observer: I saw a motorcycle without a license tag and creating sound loudly, driven by a pair of young men who did not use helmets, just passed in front of you. Why didn't you give chase, Sir?

Officer: How [would it have been] possible? Knowing that he was being pursued, he would have entered a sidewalk. This car cannot enter a sidewalk. That means [it would have been] a useless effort.

This observer also identified another reason for such inaction when he accompanied and interviewed another sergeant. Asked why he was not pursuing a car that was speeding well above the maximum limit, the sergeant argued, "Well, if our car resembled Knight Rider, we could pursue him!" Therefore, vehicle availability refers (in the minds of the officers) not only to its presence, but also to its quality.

Similarly, a decision to react to fleeing vehicles is also statistically related to the availability of communication tools. The correlation is significant at the .01 level with a coefficient of .767. This means that communications ability is crucial to the nature of officers' reactions to fleeing vehicles. However, this correlation may also be partially spurious due to the presence of a third variable, namely, vehicle availability. Cases in which those who conducted chases perhaps should not be related to the availability of a walkie-talkie (75%) but rather to the presence of a vehicle. But the correlation still exists, since officers' tendencies to ignore violations were shown more often by those who did not have a walkie-talkie (76.2%) than by those who did have one (23.8%). Moreover, those who did not have either a vehicle or a walkie-talkie often expressed frustration due to being unable to take any effective action in these situations.

A third factor that influenced police pursuit decisions was the fear of creating an accident. One participant observer asked an officer why an automobile was not chased when the driver refused to stop. The officer explained, "I never do pursuit. I worry, if an accident happens, the department will not take care of it." Similarly, when asked why he did not give chase to a violating motorcycle, a corporal argued: "I am willing to pursue. But when we are pursuing, a pursued driver may feel so bad that he may drive faster. If an

accident occurs, we are also to blame.” A review of 48 randomly recorded police pursuits, however, revealed that none resulted in an accident. In fact no accidents due to police pursuit occurred during the period of this field investigation. One officer commented: “If it is possible, we must give chase so we will not be taken lightly. If there are signs of danger within the chase, then we should discontinue.”

To summarize, there are several factors that influence the decision-making process of street-level officers in terms of their initial action following an observed violation. The decisions to react to a violating vehicle are affected by factors such as the traffic flow situation, especially the interest in assuring the smooth flow of traffic, resource availability, vehicle ownership, and the violation’s seriousness. The fear of causing an accident is also claimed by some officers as a determinant of their pursuit decisions.

The Offender-Officer Interaction

Above we discussed the initial police reaction toward violations. In that phase the officer does not have direct contact with the offender, but focuses upon the offender’s vehicle. In this section, the discussion focuses on the interaction between the police officer and the offender once the offender has stopped his vehicle and the officer has approached him.

According to department regulations on how to approach an offender, an officer has to smile (or “senyum”), greet the person (or “sapa”), and salute (or “salaam”) whenever he approaches a citizen. These three Ss (3S) are a matter of principle in the INP and especially for the JTPD in their day-to-day encounters with citizens. In practice, these

rules are not so easy to follow. It is true that the traffic officers claim that they always approach citizens with the 3Ss in mind. However, when pushed, they acknowledge that there are times when they do not follow these guidelines, or at least do not perform the first S (smile).

In order to find out how well the 3S procedure was carried out in the field, the research workers were asked to observe the behavior of officers when they approached offenders. Four possibilities of styles of approaching offenders had been provided. An officer might approach an offender: (a) with a smile, a greeting, and a salute (3Ss); (b) with a greeting and a salute (2Ss); (c) with a greeting or a salute (1S); or (d) without any of the 3Ss procedure. It turned out that this type of data collection was very difficult to execute in the field. When checking the observers' reports, it was apparent that it was often very difficult for them to see whether the officer was in fact smiling or not. In an undercover style of observation like this one, the facial expression of the subject was hard to recognize since most of the time the observer was behind the subject or was located quite a distance from him. Given these constraints, a new procedure was developed for conducting these observations. The observation would be focused upon two categories: interactions conducted with S or without S. Out of the 572 police-citizen encounters that were monitored, 63% of the time officers approached the offenders with a smile, a greeting, and/or a salute, while 37% approached without the 3S procedure.

During the informal interviews, subjects related reasons why they sometimes did not follow the 3S procedure, identifying at least some of the factors that may have been involved. The first consideration was the physical condition of the officer. When the

officer was tired after hours of standing while regulating traffic, he found it was almost impossible to be consistent in following the 3S procedure. This situation was made worse by the high volume of noise on the street, vehicle emissions, bad weather conditions and the like.

The claim of officer fatigue was supported by differences observed between the behavior of the officers in mobile posts and those assigned to nonmobile (stationary) posts. We found that mobile post officers more often implemented the 3S requirements (91.3 % of all encounters) than did stationary post officers (58.3 %). Moreover, it was clear that officers with cars were protected from the heat on sunny days and from heavy rain in inclement weather, and those with motorcycles could stop to find a shelter, while those officers assigned to stationary posts had to work in the open. This is not to say that physical condition alone can explain the officers' differential behaviors, however.

Other factors include the nature of the offense and the demeanor of the offender. If the offense was committed purposefully, such as opening an emission filter, three persons riding on one motorcycle, loading/unloading passengers right under a "no stopping" sign, or repeated offenses, it was more likely that the officer would not use the 3S approach. On the other hand, those who obeyed the officers and stopped when they were asked to were more likely to receive the required treatment. In the worst-case scenario, if an offender tried to escape or run away from the police officer, or while being approached displayed disrespectful and antagonistic behavior or looked sarcastically at the officer, these actions were more likely to be followed by unpleasant treatment by the officers.

The study data reveal that the use of 3S approach was also influenced by the offender's gender. Female offenders were approached with 3S more often than were male offenders. Among all female offenders observed, 94.7% of the encounters involved at least one of the 3S interactions (either smile, greeting or salute), while this was true for only 60.7 % of the male offenders.

The next observational category concerned how the officer explained the driver's offense. In most cases, the officer would first ask the driver to step out of the vehicle.¹⁷ At the same time, he would ask the driver to display his driver's license and provide other documents before describing the offense that had occurred. This situation would sometimes provoke a debate between the officer and the driver. Some drivers wanted to hear an explanation of their alleged offenses before they would step out of their vehicle or give the officer their papers.

In measuring this variable regarding the manner in which officers explained about the offense, two aspects were assessed. First was how sympathetically an officer behaved when asking the driver to show his papers and to step out of the vehicle. The second aspect was how convincingly he explained the alleged offense to the offender. In order to evaluate a subject as being sympathetic or not, the observer would pay particular attention to the subject's attitude and voice pattern while asking the offender to step out of the vehicle and to show documents. If the officer showed signs of an arrogant attitude, for

¹⁷This is different from the typical practice of police officers in the United States, where the offender is not allowed to leave the vehicle while the police officer processes the violation.

example, by using command words rather than a request, put both hands on his waist, or yelled at the driver, these would be considered as nonsympathetic. The way an officer made his explanation might also be indicated by his behavior when first approaching the offender. This means that during the initial encounter, if the offender were approached in a respectful manner, it usually followed that the subject would ask the driver to step out of vehicle and to show his documents in a sympathetic manner.

An officer's explanation was categorized as nonconvincing when he stubbornly insisted that the driver was in the wrong without giving evidence or reasons to support this claim. For example, a subject might say: "Lady, you cut through the red light." If the driver insisted that she did not do what was alleged, the subject might stubbornly maintain that the driver was in the wrong without giving any clear reason for believing this. A nonconvincing explanation would also be recorded when, as many drivers have often complained, the officers tried to proactively seek out violations by closely examining the driver's documents or vehicles. On the other hand, a convincing explanation could be recognized by the officer's straight-to-the-point description of what the offense was and by his citing evidence to back up that claim. For example, the subject might say, "When you entered the intersection, traffic from the other direction was already moving," or "When other vehicles had already stopped, you kept on going."

Nonconvincing explanations often resulted in ongoing debates between officers and drivers. During the study 6% of officer-offender encounters involved extended debates. According to observers, about 64% of these were the result of nonconvincing explanations by the officers. This does not suggest, however, that such a debate was usually preceded

by a nonconvincing explanation, since it may also have been due to the driver's attitude, a result of challenging the officer's authority, or showing sarcasm.

The data regarding the officers' explanations may be distorted because of interobserver variability. The researcher was especially concerned about the accuracy of data provided by field workers. During every meeting, observers were asked to detail their experiences when monitoring such conduct. In those instances when these data were questionable, they were removed from the report. As a result of this procedure, the amount of missing data regarding this variable was quite large (31.6%).

Based on our field observations, it is apparent that the majority of the street-level officers do not proceed as is demanded by the guidelines in their explanations of offenses to drivers. According to observational data, 51.5% of all encounters were nonsympathetic and/or nonconvincing, and only 48.5% were sympathetic and convincing.

These data also revealed that the way officers explained the offenses (whether they were sympathetic or not) slightly differed based upon the offender's gender. Explanations given to female drivers were more often sympathetic than those given to male drivers (56.4% for female drivers and 47.9% for male drivers). During the entire observation period, we never found an explanation that was nonsympathetic and nonconvincing given to a female driver, while for male drivers these accounted for 5.9% of all encounters.

The driver's reactions to the police officer's actions were also closely monitored. The offender's demeanor has been subdivided into four categories. The first three are

antagonistic, pleading for commiseration, and asking for “damai.”¹⁸ These classifications are mutually exclusive. This suggests that a driver could not possibly display two of these attitudes at the same time, for example, adopting an antagonistic attitude and at the same time asking for pity from the officer. (Without taking into consideration the fact that the driver might change his attitude later on, here the emphasis was on the initial expression of the driver to the officer.) A driver whose attitude did not fit the categories listed above was placed in a fourth category, that is, neutral, where indifference toward the outcome was shown. This category included drivers who only expressed their apologies, but did not suggest a solution or outcome.

An offender was classified as an antagonistic offender when he or she showed defiance or at least disrespect toward the officer. Examples: (a) a driver who refused to step out of the vehicle and/or to show documents when asked; and (b) a driver who asked the officer in a sarcastic tone what he had done wrong. Some police officers view drivers who deny their violations as being disrespectful. This attitude often leads to a debate (although these were not always initiated by an antagonistic attitude on the part of the drivers). As indicated previously, officers who gave nonconvincing explanations would also often provoke a debate.

¹⁸Actually, “damai” means a process or outcome of a dispute resolution between two parties disregarding their rights and obligations, but based upon good spirit on both sides. In this case, “damai” means that an offense is unofficially cleared, in which case the officer would not issue a citation but, contrary to what is supposed by the law, they would accept an amount of money submitted by the offender (pay-off). “Give-and-take solution” may be interchangeably used for this term.

An offender who requested commiseration not only apologized to the officer for his violation, but also pleaded that he not be given a heavy fine. Formal interviews revealed that this demeanor was exhibited most often by professional drivers from the lower socioeconomic class who were unable to pay either a fine or a bribe to the officer. In pleading for leniency from the officer, they usually displayed deep respect for the officer with their body language (such as nodding their heads when they listened to the officer explaining their offenses and stooping low when they made known their desire for leniency). One observer noted the demeanor of an “oplet” driver in the Pondok Gede area who had been stopped by an officer because he had boarded a passenger outside a legal loading zone. When listening to the officer’s explanation, the driver nodded his head and begged the officer to forgive his offense and let him go. He told the officer that he was only a substitute driver and that he did not have money to pay a fine. The driver was fortunate, because many of his passengers also appealed to the officer to forgive him, and the officer complied.

The majority of the offenders in these incidents asked for “damai” or, in street-level officers’ terms, “ji’un.” “Damai” was usually initiated when the driver apologized for the offense; they often used popular expressions, such as “damai saja, pak,” which roughly means, “Sir, let’s settle this” or “let’s finish this matter here.” The driver might also try to appeal to the officer with “Please don’t ticket me, Sir, please help me,” to indicate he wanted to resolve the matter without paying a fine. For example, one observer recorded these words by an offender: “Please don’t, Sir. My father will be angry with me if I get a ticket; let’s just settle it here.” Often just asking the officer not to give a ticket indicated

that the offender wanted to precipitate such a solution. A driver who had been stopped by an officer for cutting into a lane in a road next to the Halim area apologized and then said, "Sir, please don't ticket me." In this way he indicated to the officer that he wanted to give him money in exchange for being released.

Commercial drivers usually employ a quite different method for achieving "damai." If stopped by an officer, without even being asked they quickly hand him their paperwork with some folded money slipped inside, a procedure popularly known as "salam tempel." A truck driver was observed being stopped by an officer for violating a "Do Not Enter" sign at a street in the Kota area (an old section of downtown Jakarta). The driver soon gave the officer a document with something enclosed (apparently money). After placing that "something else" in his pocket, the officer gave back the driver's document and allowed the truck to proceed. Some drivers blatantly gave money to the officer immediately after their vehicle was stopped, even though there had been no signs that the officer was soliciting it. One observer commented on such an incident:

The driver was heard saying, "Please do not give me a ticket, Sir. I beg your cooperation. I know I was wrong. But if I added my speed, I was afraid the tire tube will break apart, while I have already used up two spare tires." (When the driver said this, he pulled out some money from his wallet and slipped it inside the officer's pocket). However, the officer snapped at him saying, "You give money again, I did not ask for money from you!" Then the driver replied, "No, Sir. You did not ask for money, but this is for you sir, to buy cigarettes. I am totally willing, Sir, no motives whatsoever, nothing at all!"

The data regarding driver's attitude/demeanor collected during field observations are shown in Table 11.

Table 11

Drivers' Reactions Toward Police Stops

<i>Driver's Reaction</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Antagonistic	63	10.2
Neutral	279	45.1
Asking "Damai"	236	38.2
Commiserating	40	6.5
Totals	618	100.0

While many drivers initiate informal settlement, it is not uncommon for the "damai" solution to be initiated by the police officer as well, at least in a disguised way. When this occurred an officer usually tried to provoke a response from the offender to initiate an informal settlement. For example, he might try to stall the process of ending the encounter. While talking to the offender the officer might pretend to write a ticket, or leave the offender to wait while the officer returned to regulate the traffic flow. In a situation like this, an offender who does not like to wait will probably choose to provoke an informal settlement. Observational data revealed that 11.5% of these encounters were marked by officers' attempting to stall the process.

In a more startling revelation, we found that an officer may ask questions that offer the offender alternatives regarding how he wants to end the process. Set out below is part of a conversation between an officer and a motorcycle driver who illegally made a U-turn in the Kebayoran area, as reported by a participant observer:

Officer: "Let's see, should I give you a ticket?"

Offender: "Please don't, Sir! I want your understanding!"

Officer: "You will pay Rp 35,000¹⁹ at the Court."

Offender: "Please don't, Sir! Here is some money to buy gasoline."

Officer: "How much money do you have?"

Offender: "It's Rp. 10,000 Sir."

Officer: "No way. You still have to pay Rp. 25,000."

Offender: "Please Sir, help me. I didn't know there was a No U-turn sign in that place."

Officer: "O.K. (while accepting the money). Go now. Next time be careful and don't repeat the same mistake."

The preceding account details the interaction that occurred between an officer and an offender. This process included an initial approach, the officer's explanation of the offense, and the reaction of the offender. Whether an offender's attitude/demeanor affects the police disposition or not will be discussed in the next section.

Patterns of Police Final Action/Disposition

As an expression of his final decision, the officer takes a particular action toward an offender. Thus, a stopped driver has to be released if the officer cannot lawfully find him guilty of a violation. An example would be a driver who was forced to stop in an illegal place due to vehicular problems. Similarly, an offender is quickly released if the officer

¹⁹As noted earlier, as of April 1, 1997, one U.S. dollar was equal to about 2,350 rupiah.

does not have the legal authority to act, particularly with regard to violations committed by members of the diplomatic corps, or by military figures.

Conversely, if the offender is lawfully guilty, an officer is expected to write a ticket. Appropriate sanctions may include suspension of the driver's license and/or car registration, and even impoundment of the offender's vehicle. However, a warning may sometimes be given instead, and this too is classified as a ticketing decision. On rare occasions, an offender may be placed under arrest by a traffic officer, as in the case of vehicular theft.

In these traffic-stop situations a third option is available and officers are not always expected to follow the above procedures. In Indonesia, Act No. 13 of 1961, on the Basic Provision of the INP, gives officers the authority to drop light cases unofficially, and these do not proceed to court (Republik Indonesia 1961). This provision gives the officer an alternative sanction which allows him to solve the case alone, on the spot. Thus, instead of issuing a ticket, the officer may choose to give only a warning.

At this point we note in summary that there are three lawful solutions for officers faced with traffic violations. These include simply letting the offender go, issuing a ticket, or just providing a warning.

We have noted earlier that this study revealed a fourth alternative with regard to street-level officers' decisions. This involves "damai," or a "give-and-take solution." Certainly, this alternative is not a legal resolution of the problem. In many cases, as in a ticketing situation, this option might also be followed with a warning to the offender not to repeat the same violation.

Study data reveal that out of 882 stop orders, only 798 vehicles were successfully stopped. Among the 84 vehicles that fled, 48 were chased, and 11 of these were able to elude capture. Furthermore, among the general total of 835 vehicles that were successfully stopped and pursued, only 758 cases (90.8%) could be monitored by field workers regarding their final outcomes. The final actions of officers against the other 9.2% of stops could not be monitored for various reasons. For example, the observer's view might have been blocked by traffic, or the subject and the offender might have gone to a confined place that could not be properly observed. These situations were likely of the “give-and-take” variety, although the field workers were generally unwilling to categorize them as such without directly having witnessed that the cases had been illegally cleared. Table 12 contains observational data regarding the officers' final decisions.

The study data presented in Table 12 indicate that giving a warning was the most commonly used solution to traffic stops, followed by “give-and-take” solutions, and then by the issuance of tickets. Few offenders were released without any sanction, since this would happen only if the officer could not lawfully accuse the offender of wrongdoing.

Table 12

Police Disposition

<i>Police Action</i>	<i>Amount</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Free	24	2.8
Warning	304	40.1
“Damai”	228	30.1
Ticketing	202	26.6
Totals	758	100.0

Several reasons why officers chose a particular decision alternative will be presented next. First, the offender's social status can play an important role in determining a street-level officer's decision making. Here social status has been categorized into two strata: the high/special social status offender and common offenders.²⁰ As noted in the previous section, an offender's social status was indicated by his personal appearance, his passenger's appearance, the condition of the vehicle driven, and/or information obtained from the subject when he was interviewed after an observational period. However, not every offender could be identified as holding a particular social status. In these situations this information was considered missing data. Included in the high social status category are high-ranking officials. For instance, after looking at the driver's license of an offender who had been stopped for a traffic sign violation in Jl. Gajah Mada, the officer returned it to the driver with a smile and a display of deference. When interviewed by the participant observer, he insisted that the offender was a member of a high state institution and therefore was treated unusually.

Surprisingly, the probability of receiving lenient treatment was related not only to the social status of the offender himself, but also to that of any passengers. If a passenger (based on his dress or uniform) was thought to be an important person, the officer often would ask the driver the identity of the passenger. If he was a VIP or high-ranking official,

²⁰Initially this observation also focused on military officials, who, when driving their personal vehicles, were sometimes mistakenly pulled over by officers. Although it was found that some of them (primarily lower level ranks) were given warnings, lawfully a police officer does not have the right to enforce the law upon military officials. Therefore, a discussion of these officers' treatment of military officials was excluded from this report.

the offender was likely to be merely given a warning. One bitter experience related by a police sergeant provided a lesson for street-level officers in this regard. Several years previously, the sergeant had stopped a car for violating a traffic sign in J1. Sudirman. Without paying any attention to a passenger who was sitting behind the driver, he issued a citation to the offender. Less than two hours later, he was called to meet with his commander. There the sergeant was surprised to learn that the offender he had just ticketed was carrying a high-ranking official. The sergeant received a formal warning for his "failure" to perform his duties appropriately, although he assured his boss that an offense had definitely occurred.

Offenders who enjoy special social status are also more likely to receive lenient treatment than are common offenders. These special persons include drivers who are relatives of police officers and who formally or informally establish relationships with members of the department. Offenders who are driving government-owned vehicles or even those of well-known companies are also more likely to be issued a warning than a citation. During formal interviews, one corporal acknowledged that he usually gave warnings instead of tickets to fellow employees. His justification for doing so was that they were all public servants paid by the government. Another example is revealed by the case of a truck violating the maximum allowable load for goods that had been stopped by an officer. It turned out that the driver was unable to produce any legal documents, although he did show the officer several company memos. In the end the offender was issued only a warning, because the officer who had stopped the driver didn't want any trouble with his boss, who was related to others working in that same company.

Officers' relatives and those known to have relations to an officer or his colleagues were also likely to receive lenient treatment rather than other sanctions. These actions revealed that the officers viewed other officers' relatives as part of one huge, extended family. For example, an observer watched an officer simply release a female offender who had driven a motorcycle through a red light. He then interviewed the subject:

Observer: What was your action toward the female driver running the red light, Sir?

Officer: I just let her go with a warning.

Observer: What is your reasoning, Sir?

Officer: She is a relative of my colleague. That's why I didn't do anything. What can I do? She is one of our huge extended family.

Another officer was content to just give a warning to an offender due to the fact that that person was working under his former commander. One officer even thought that he should tolerate a taxi driver's violation because his passenger was a military officer.

In Indonesia, "backing" is a popular term that is generally used to refer to a special relationship between a citizen and those who have authority. Those who have backing are often immune from any action taken by law enforcement agents, or at least they obtain special treatment from officials concerning particular procedures. In our case, backing also affects police decisions. One officer who was a participant observer reported the bitter experience of one of his colleagues. After unsuccessfully trying to stop a truck for the third time for violating a traffic sign on a toll road, he gave chase all the way back to the truck's pooling compound. "Kepalang tanggung, Pak," ("We have gone too far, Sir") he grumbled to the observer. It turned out that a higher-ranking police officer was already

there, “waiting,” and took over control of the case. The original officer grumbled to the driver. “Hey, just because you have backing, it doesn't mean you may do as you like on the street.” And then while getting into his car, he once more grumbled: “Backing again, backing again!”

Table 13 illustrates police disposition in regard to the offender's social status. According to these observational data, police final decisions are statistically and significantly explained by offender's social status at the .01 level with the coefficient as high as .324. This means that offenders who hold high/special social status are more likely to be warned and less likely to be punished than are offenders with common status. As noted earlier, this study used the driver's appearance, such as his dress, passenger's dress, the condition of the vehicle driven, and the information obtained from the subjects in order to classify them as of high or common status.

Table 13

Police Disposition and Offender's Social Status (in percentages)

<i>Police Action</i>	<i>High/Special n = 52</i>	<i>Common n = 532</i>
Free	13.5	1.2
Warning	73.1	38.3
“Damai”	9.6	32.5
Ticketing	3.8	28.0
Totals	100.0	100.0
Missing data = 154 (20 observations involving military officers have been excluded)		

During formal interviews subjects were asked to respond to this statement: "We have observed that traffic officers may give warnings to white-collar offenders more frequently than they do to blue-collar violators. If this is true, how frequently do you do this?" There were five optional answers: usually, often, sometimes, seldom, and never.

Among the 225 respondents, 6.7% said usually; 16% often; 37.3% sometimes; 28.4% seldom; and 6.2% said never. On the other hand, they were asked: "According to observational data, traffic officers appear to give citations to blue-collar offenders more frequently than to white-collar offenders. If this is true, how frequently do you do this?" Among the 227 respondents, 18.9% claimed usually; 28.2% often; 29.1% sometimes; 17.6% seldom; and 6.2% said never. These data indicate that officers tend to treat offenders who hold high/special social status more leniently than they do to those of common status.

Another question asked of respondents concerned the type of offenders to whom they should give special treatment, in terms of lenient actions. Among the interviewees, 32.8% said that government employees are protected, 28.4% pointed to a higher authority's relatives, and 25.3% claimed that they should give leniency to offenders possessing a higher authority's namecard/memo. The remainder (13.5%) affirmed that they were accustomed to being very careful with offenders who carry memos from a certain protected company. All these interview data confirm the observational data that traffic officers tended to give warnings to high social status offenders and to issue tickets to professional drivers. These findings have confirmed those of several studies undertaken in the U.S., such as the ones conducted by Black and Reiss (1967) and Gold (1966), who

discovered the influence of an offender's social status on law enforcement decision making. The reasons for police leniency toward particular offenders and offender classes will be discussed in the following chapter.

Another factor that is thought to influence police disposition is the offender's gender. It has already been noted that females often receive more lenient treatment than do males. Observational data presented in Table 14 below illustrate this relationship.

According to these data, police disposition is statistically explained by the offender's gender, which is significant at the .01 level with a coefficient correlation of .124. This suggests that male offenders are more likely to receive tickets than are female offender. This finding was confirmed by officers in their formal interview responses. Approximately 50% of the respondents claimed that they most often give warnings rather than citations to women. In contrast, however, 10% of the respondents claimed that they give tickets to female offenders more often than they give warnings. The remaining 40% of the respondents claimed that they consider the seriousness of the offense as the primary

Table 14

Police Disposition and Offender's Gender (in percentages)

<i>Police Action</i>	<i>Males</i> <i>n</i> = 711	<i>Females</i> <i>n</i> = 47
Free	3.1	4.3
Warning	38.8	59.6
"Damai"	30.1	29.8
Ticketing	28.0	6.4
Total	100.0	100.0
Missing Data = 0		

criterion for issuing a ticket or a warning. The reasons given for the leniency shown to women had to do with the fact that they were generally more polite and respectful to officers, and were quick to admit their mistakes and apologize.

The variable of offender domicile location also appears to affect officer's decisions, especially concerning traffic sign violations. Contrasted with town residents, persons living out of town are more likely to be released with a warning, because they are thought to be unfamiliar with the local traffic signs. For example, one sergeant gave a warning to a violator making an illegal turn in Pondok Indah area. When the participant observer interviewed him about the incident, he said,

Before taking an action, I should see whether an offender lives around here or not. If so, I'd give him a ticket. Since the offender I already stopped lives out of town, I just reminded him to make sure he doesn't make that mistake again.

Thus far we have discussed three offender variables that influence street-level officers' decisions, including social status, gender and domicile. It is clear that these are relatively static factors, meaning that they are fundamentally unchangeable values that the offender will carry into any situation. The fourth offender variable is more dynamic, and that is the offender's attitude/demeanor when interacting with a police officer.

We have found that the offender's attitude is an important consideration when the officer is deciding what to do about the observed offense. As noted above, we have categorized this variable into four types: antagonistic, obedient or neutral, "damai" or settlement seeking, and commiserating. Table 15 below presents the observational results regarding the relationship between the offenders' attitude and the police final action.

Table 15

Police Disposition and Offenders Attitude (in percentages)

<i>Police Action</i>	<i>Antagonistic</i> <i>n</i> = 60	<i>Obedient/</i> <i>Neutral</i> <i>n</i> = 242	<i>"Damai"</i> <i>Seeking</i> <i>n</i> = 218	<i>Commiserating</i> <i>n</i> = 40
Free	5.0	6.6	0.0	2.5
Warning	18.3	57.9	7.8	87.5
"Damai" Solution	6.7	12.8	71.1	5.0
Ticketing	70.0	22.7	21.1	5.0
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Missing data = 198				

The data indicate that warnings were often given to offenders requesting commiseration and much more so than for any other group. It is also clear that "damai" settlements were very often implemented for settlement seekers. On the other hand, tickets were most frequently given to offenders displaying an antagonistic demeanor. This suggests that police disposition may be best explained by the offender's attitude.

The observational results are consistent with those obtained in semistructured interviews. The majority of respondents (61.8%) agreed that they most often gave tickets rather than warnings to antagonistic offenders. Another group of respondents (29.4%) said that they tried to maintain self-control and to persuade the offender that he had committed their offenses, although this did not necessarily mean that a citation would not be issued. The remaining officers (8.8%) left the final decision-making to their supervising officers. Informal interviews supported these claims. For example, one sergeant ticketed the driver of a Mitsubishi Lancer who had made an illegal turnaround in a crossroad in

Depok. When asked by the observer why he ticketed the offender, he argued that he did not like an offender who argues with an officer. Similarly, in another case a bus driver who was unloading a passenger at an illegal place in the Kuningan area was ticketed by a sergeant following a prolonged argument.

Another group of offenders whom the officers labeled as antagonistic were drivers fleeing their orders to stop. For instance, an officer pursued a car that had run a red light and ended up ticketing the violator. When interviewed by a participant observer he stated, "I hate drivers not acknowledging police officers." Speeding up when ordered to stop by officers may be considered a major violation. In that case, even though an offender might try to achieve a settlement, he would still be ticketed. For example, a sergeant performing his job on a toll road along with a participant observer stopped a minitruck for violating a traffic sign. He then responded to the offender's offer of a bribe with a citation.

Offenders with neutral attitudes may also obtain lax treatment, however. It is apparent that such attitudes do not necessarily lead officers to issue tickets. Their rate of ticketing (22.7%) is not much different than that of those who ask for a "damai" solution (21.1%). It is important to consider that those included in this category are not merely passive people. They often display their regrets for the violation and also apologize profusely to the officers. However, they ask for neither a "give-and-take solution" nor for commiseration, but simply wait for the officers to make their decisions.

The plea for commiseration is somewhat effective in persuading an officer to be lenient. Only 10% of the 40 offenders requesting sympathy were refused it. For example, when interviewed by a field worker after releasing a truck driver who had been stopped

due to cutting into a lane in the Mampang area, an officer stated: "I sympathized with him because he not only obeyed an officer and apologized, but also asked for pity." A similar case involving an "oplet" driver in the Pondok Gede area was previously described. In that case the officer finally released the offender after delivering a stern lecture, because both the offender and his passengers asked the officer for commiseration.

The formal interviews also indicated that officers tended to treat offenders leniently if they begged the officers for sympathy. More than 85% of the respondents acknowledged that they often gave only a warning or a stern lecture to an offender who was economically weak, so long as he expressed regret for the offense. They claimed that humanitarian values are considered when they make their final decisions. Others (15%) maintained that in order for the law to be obeyed, they still issue tickets when necessary, especially for serious offenses.

Thus far we have discussed various factors affecting street-level officers' decisions, resulting in actions such as freeing, releasing with a warning, and ticketing. The officers were likely to select one of these three options if one or more of these factors were present and there were no other factors that might influence the decision. However, as previously noted, the officers might occasionally also choose the fourth alternative, that is, "damai" or the "give-and-take" solution.

The data presented in Table 15 illustrate that a "damai" solution might be explained by the offender's initiating such a settlement. For example, a vehicle driver pulled over by a sergeant was allowed to settle his case in this manner, as the offender asked the officer for such a solution. However, the data presented in the table suggest

that officers do not always acquiesce to an offender's request for an informal settlement.

A motorcycle driver who violated the maximum passenger load requirements, for example, was ticketed by the officer despite the offender's appeal for a "damai" solution.

A police observer may question whether offenders actually initiate "give-and-take" solutions or whether the officers themselves are responsible for doing so. As mentioned earlier, traffic officers sometimes employ special tactics to provoke the initiation of an unofficial clearance. These usually take the form of prolonged questioning or delaying tactics that encourage the violator to initiate the "damai" settlement in situations where an officer implicitly has shown a preference for this option. These techniques are usually used with drivers of private vehicles. If the strategy is successful, the "give-and-take" settlement is bound to occur. In a violation in which a motorcycle made an illegal U-turn, the officer baited the motorcyclist by asking: "Bagaimana ini?" ("How to handle this?") This question implied that the officer preferred settling the matter unofficially to issuing a ticket. After a negotiation, the officer finally "decided" to accept the offender's preference and said: "Carry on now. Just be careful next time."

The question about who initiates the settlement procedure is, however, an interesting issue. We need first to hear what officers said about it. Among 216 officers who responded to this question during formal interviews, 32.2% claimed that more than 90% of "damai" initiations are provoked by offenders; 17.1% said between 75% and 90% are; 26.9% said between 50% and 75% are; and the remainder (23.8%) claimed that less than 50% are. These data indicate that most officers claimed that a "give-and-take" solution is generally initiated by offenders rather than by them.

These claims were supported by drivers when they were informally interviewed regarding this issue. Among nine private drivers who were thought to have settled their cases unofficially, one third argued that “damai” was demanded by officers, two drivers said that they were only issued a warning by the officer, and the remainder claimed that they had requested that the officer settle their cases informally. Of the 42 public transportation drivers interviewed, 100% acknowledged that such a solution is generally requested by them. All these interview data, obtained from both officers and drivers, confirm the observational data that was collected during the offender-officer interaction stage. The data reveal that while 236 offenders (38.2% of encounters) requested the officers for “damai,” only 96 or 11.5% of the monitored encounters were marked by an officer’s attempt to encourage the violator to initiate the “give-and-take” settlement.

★ In support of these findings we can present some qualitative data gathered during field observations. Following is a portion of a field worker’s report on his interview with an “oplet” driver:

Interviewer: Are you often stopped by policeman due to loading/unloading passengers at illegal places?

Driver: Yeah, it can be said sometimes but not often. It depends on my fate--if unlucky, yeah, it might be caught.

Interviewer: If so, how do you usually handle such a problem?

Driver: Well, asking “damai.” If the officer sympathized with me, he would ask me to meet him later.

Interviewer: Who usually initiates “damai,” officer or driver?

Driver: Yeah, me, driver. I usually ask the officer not to issue a ticket and if so, we make an appointment where and when I can meet him.

Sometimes, without even being asked to do so, a driver automatically gives money to an officer, assuming that this is the correct procedure. In these cases it would seem that the driver believes that in such circumstances, officers usually expect money. Bus and “oplet” drivers even apply a fixed procedure in interacting with officers. If stopped by an officer, they just submit a document and then continue to drive, as if they understand that that’s the right thing to do. For his part, once he receives the document, the officer will just let the driver go, as he knows what the driver will do later. As previously discussed, this procedure is called “just seizing documents.” The succeeding process would be undertaken later at the officer’s police station, in which such cases are often informally settled. One observer reported the following:

A red public transport stopped practically in the middle of the road to discharge a passenger. A sergeant blew his whistle and signaled to the driver to stay. As the officer walked towards the vehicle, the driver knew the procedure. Without small talk, he handed the officer his license and went on his way. . . . Before I ended my observation, I saw a 16-year-old boy walk up to the officer and speak. I was unable to hear their conversation as they continued toward the police station nearby. From afar, I saw them sitting at a table, and then they proceeded to an enclosed room. After the boy had come out with the driver's license in his hand, I came up and asked him, “how much was the approval?” He said, “5,000 Rupiahs.” I asked him what the violation was, but he didn't know. All he knew was to get the license and pay off the officer in charge. It turned out that he was the driver's little brother.

Today, there is an even newer method for handling these problems--a settlement process handled by a “temer.”²¹ This is a person who usually solves violations with

²¹“Temer” is actually an employee of a public transportation company who supervises their drivers on the road. They informally offer a new “service” to handle documents seized by officers regarding traffic violations. Of course, for this service they routinely collect money from the members regardless of their offenses.

settlements. The interview below describes some of the pressures drivers are under to violate the laws:

Interviewer: Why do you always pick up people in illegal spots?

Driver: If I don't do it this way, I can't fulfill my daily quota.

Interviewer: If you violate, you can fulfill it?

Driver: Of course.

Interviewer: What if you get caught?

Driver: Well, we ask for a settlement, or we give him our license so a temer can take care of it.

The question of who initiates the settlement is not a problematic issue, particularly for the drivers of intercity public transportation, since they and the officers have established a specific procedure that both perceive as mutually beneficial. Drivers who are potential violators should not expect luckiness when passing certain posts. Based on their experiences, the officers have already recognized which kinds of vehicles are committing which types of offenses. Therefore, these drivers routinely employ a specific procedure called "ngemel" or "minta ijin lewat" (both terms mean reporting or asking permission to pass). In such cases, the driver stops his vehicle before passing a police station or post (permanent or mobile), and the conductor runs inside. He then shakes the officer's hand and slips him some money. If the officer is not there, the conductor will leave the money inside a hat or some other designated place. For example, an observer reported the following incident:

I saw an interstate bus about to pass an intersection where my subject was busy regulating traffic. Someone then got off the bus and ran towards the

officer. The officer then pointed towards a building. The person then proceeded to run to the building, then placed something on a table. He then ran back to the bus. There is a possibility that the bus was following an illegal route, using the city streets searching for passengers when he should have been using the toll roads.

“Ngemel” is also widely performed. Following is an example from an observer accompanying an officer while he was in a patrol car:

11:00 p.m. On the side of a street, the sergeant stopped the patrol car. After taking off his hat and wiping his sweat, he drank bottled water from a canister that he always brings when patrolling. He then turned off the engine, but stayed in the car. From behind us, I saw a truck approaching that was clearly overloaded with construction material. The truck driver stopped his vehicle right behind us. The sound of the brakes prompted the sergeant to turn his head. From the truck's cabin, I saw somebody jump out and run towards us. He came to the officer and gave him something. Then he ran back to the truck, and they were on their way.

Another participant observer reported that in areas where there are no police posts or stations, a box is prepared at peddlers' booths, and the conductors fulfill their duties there. After “ngemel,” the driver might continually drive illegally without being stopped by an officer until arriving at the next post where another “ngemel” would usually be expected.

Before discussing the factors explaining the “give-and-take” phenomenon in the next chapter, it is necessary to examine situational factors that influence street-level officers' decisions when they are performing their duties. Situational concerns are referred to here as the opportunity factor--a consideration of when, where, and with whom a settlement will be reached. We know that no matter how desperate an officer is for money, he will not accept a bribe on all occasions or from just anybody. Restraints are practiced by officers primarily for their own safety. For example, this practice is almost

never exercised on protocol roads (parade routes), since many high-ranking officials often travel there. At other posts, hidden locations for "dealing" are established, such as behind a building, in a police minivan, or even in a little peddler's eatery where the owner is already "86" (police code for "understanding") about this particular practice.

The times when this practice occurs are also crucial. During heavy traffic hours, when higher numbers of police authorities are present, "damai" settlements almost never occur. Daytime hours when these activities usually happen are from 10 a.m. to 12 p.m., and 2 p.m. to 4 p.m.²² Nighttime hours are seen as safe for participants to conduct this practice, as the public cannot then directly observe their behavior. Out of 19 such violations observed at night (between 11 p.m. and 5 a.m.) on Jl. Kebayoran Lama, Jl. Yos Soedarso, Jl. Daan Mogot, and Jl. Tol Cawang, 12 drivers were interviewed and 8 admitted to settling a violation illegally. The other four had been released because they possessed "special" documents or were accompanied by "influential relations."

It is also clear that the officers' wariness toward practicing "damai" settlement is not only for the purpose of their own safety, but also for the good of the corps. For example, they resist the acceptance of bribe settlements from public transport drivers when this interaction might be visible to the passengers. A field worker observed an officer, while patrolling a toll road, refuse to accept money from a bus driver for his violation of discharging a passenger illegally, by saying: "Hey, don't try to do so! See there! Your passengers are looking at us."

²²Between 12 and 2 p.m. traffic is somewhat heavy, because some employees, primarily high-ranking officials, usually leave their offices for lunch.

In another instance, a participant observer saw an officer stop a truck for driving in a traffic lane that was not designated for trucks. The driver apologized and slipped money under a page in a citation book being held by the officer. The following is a portion of their recorded conversation:

Officer: What's this?

Violator: Please help me out, Sir.

Officer: Help out with what?

Violator: Well, please help and not give me a ticket.

Officer: If I help you out, you will tell people that officers ask you for money when actually you offer it.

Violator: No, Sir. Really, I won't tell anybody.

Officer: Okay, I will accept this, but remember I did not ask for it.

Violator: Yes, Sir.

As discussed earlier, officers who accept bribes weigh their options when considering whom to deal with in this manner. Those who convincingly claim to have a good relationship with an officer's superior are clearly to be avoided. For example, after releasing a violator, a sergeant indoctrinated a rookie officer regarding what he had just seen. "What we can eat, we eat. What we cannot, we throw away. Don't swallow any stones. If we get into trouble, our wife and kids feel the pain. So don't eat what we can't, right?" The officer implied that one should avoid accepting a bribe from one's superior's relations, as it would only lead to problem. Formal interviews consistently revealed that "give-and-take" settlements are most often made with public transport drivers and with

professional drivers rather than with drivers of privately owned vehicles and white-collar drivers.

The observational analysis indicates that chance plays an important role in the final resolution of the decision-making process. This means that the “damai” solution, whether initiated by the violator or by the officer, is less likely to occur when the circumstances are not favorable.

The study data also suggest that a driver's past experience of being ticketed seems likely to affect a street-level officer's disposition, although in an unexpected way. Here, past experience does not relate to a driver's record of being ticketed long ago, but to an instance where he is currently holding a ticket while waiting for a court's adjudication of the matter. In a criminal trial, when deciding on the severity of the punishment, a judge will look at whether the violator has a previous police record. If he does, the judge is likely to demand a more severe punishment. That kind of reasoned judgment is hard to implement for street-level officers, who must make their decisions in a relatively short period of time. We found that although an officer does consider whether or not violators have other traffic violations in process, unlike a judge, if they do, he is likely not to give them another ticket.

This practice was confirmed in our field studies. For example, one sergeant decided not to write a ticket for a violating "Carry" minibus driver, who had been cutting into a lane, when he learned that his colleague had already ticketed the driver earlier for another violation. A public transport vehicle driver forgot to close his door and was then issued a warning when the officer was shown the original ticket which was still being

processed. During the formal interviews, a few said that a driver's past experience of being ticketed was considered when they made a final decision. Their reasoning for doing so was simple--they were unwilling to burden violators even further.

Up to this point, we have discussed only those factors that affect a street-level officer's subjective decisions. We know that these factors are not directly related to the violation itself, but merely reflect the individual characteristics of violators, their reactions and expressions when interacting with the officers, and the violator's past ticketing experience. Now we will discuss an objective factor, the seriousness of the offense.

When interviewed the officers claimed that the seriousness of the offense played a major role in their decisions to enforce the laws. It was suggested that the more serious an offense was, the more likely it was that the offender would be ticketed. The officers determined the seriousness of an offense in terms of its actual or potential consequences. That is, if the violation disturbed traffic and/or endangered people, it was seen as serious. In such cases, the offenders were said to be more likely to be ticketed. This gives rise to an important question concerning the criteria the officers use to define disturbing traffic and endangering people. It would seem that the officers' considerations were almost invariably subjective, since we could not pinpoint, for example, exactly when a particular violation could be classified as potentially endangering people or disturbing traffic. This issue regarding the subjective practice of officers' decision making was also discussed earlier. Here it seems safe to conclude that the officer's subjective preferences are dominant in his decision making.

An incident involving the commission of multiple violations provokes police officers to issue tickets more than does a single offense. For example, an officer pulled a motorcycle over for an illegal turn. The offender was then only able to produce a class A driver's license for cars, instead of a class C driver's license that is required for motorcycles. For these violations he was ticketed, while the driver of a car who had previously committed the identical violation had only been warned. Ticketing offenders who commit multiple violations occurs even when the violator has a good relationship with higher authorities. In one such case, a sergeant pulled over three people on an RX King type of motorcycle with an annoyingly loud muffler. All three riders were without helmets and licenses. Despite the driver's claims that he was the son of a higher ranking official, he was ticketed.

★ The officer in a multiple-violation case frequently will charge the offender with only one count, however. In the case described above, the officer ticketed the offender only for a traffic line violation. In the other case mentioned above the other officer ticketed the motorcycle rider only for failure to show a valid license. During formal interviews, the reason given for this kind of behavior was that the officers wanted to teach the violators a lesson without burdening them.

In sum, many complicated factors contribute to the decision-making process of street-level officers. We have shown that in any case, subjective factors such as the offender's gender, social status, attitude and demeanor affect the officers' decisions. The domicile, arrest experience and multiple-violation factors also contribute, although at a lower frequency. The seriousness of the offense is thought to affect police decision

making, even though this analyst has been unable to identify the exact criteria used by officers to determine seriousness. In the end, in situations where the offender indicates he would prefer a “damai” settlement, and the officer sees a favorable situation for accepting that resolution, it proves to be a more common way to resolve cases than formal ticketing or any other procedure.



CHAPTER 6

DISCUSSION: UNDERSTANDING TRAFFIC LAW ENFORCEMENT DECISION MAKING

The previous chapter described the patterns of street-level officers' decisions regarding traffic violations as well as the range of traffic violations discovered. We have also discussed situational factors that may help to explain those actions. In this chapter, we explore other factors that may influence traffic officers' behavior. We begin by discussing the influence of individual factors. This is followed by a description of the influence of organizational factors. Finally, we discuss our findings from social environmental perspectives.

The Influence of an Officer's Individual Characteristics

As proposed, the officer's individual characteristics that were examined here included age, rank, years in service, educational background, and special traffic training. Regrettably, the author was unable to examine the influence of officers' gender on their traffic decisions. This occurred because nearly all of the subjects who were observed in the study were male officers. Only four subjects were females, and this small percentage (1.5%) of the total did not allow for any firm conclusions to be drawn about the uniqueness of their actions.

The specific stages of police actions included initial actions as well as pursuit, offender-officer interactions, and final actions/disposition. The relevant statistics derived through bivariate techniques are presented in Table 16.

Table 16

Correlations Between Police Actions and Characteristics of Individual Officers

Police Actions	Age	Rank	Years in Service			Education	Training
			Policing	Traffic	Last post		
Initial action	-.028	.037	-.017	-.015	-.034	-.005	-.001
Pursuit	.134	.028	.061	-.163	-.258*	-.214	-.223
Approach	.034	.076	.089	.055	-.015	.118**	.050
Explanation	-.050	.108*	-.084	-.046	-.072	.374**	.133
Final action	.054	.058	.056	-.006	.022	-.009	.002

Using Pearson's correlation.
 * significant at the .05 level.
 ** significant at the .01 level.

Police Initial Action

The data in Table 16 indicate that police actions are not necessarily explained by the individual officer variables. In fact there is no significant correlation between the individual variables and the initial police action, which can consist of ignoring the offense, issuing a casual warning, making a temporary stop for merely seizing the driver's document, or completely stopping and processing violating vehicles.

The only significant variable accounting for pursuit-decisions (ranging from ignoring to pursuing) was the officer's years in service at the last post (ranging from less than 1 year to more than 12 years). The correlation between these two variables is significant at the .05 level. With the coefficient of .258, the correlation is negative, which

means that the greater the number of an officer's years in service at the last post, the less likely he was to pursue a fleeing vehicle. This finding suggests that this correlation may have been influenced by a third variable. The nature of traffic police duties on the streets involves almost no stimulating challenges. Routine observation and regulation of traffic may diminish the eagerness of officers to perform their duties properly, and especially when they are stationary for a long period of time.

Given these conditions, during formal interviews respondents were asked about their job satisfaction, and particularly with regard to their last assignment. They were offered five possible responses (very happy, happy, neutral, unhappy, and want to be rotated). The results reflect that job satisfaction was statistically related to the officer's years in service at his last post and was significant at the .01 level, with a correlation coefficient of .269.¹ The correlation was positive, indicating that the longer the officer's years in service at the last post, the more likely he was to be dissatisfied, and this in turn may have influenced his decisions regarding whether to pursue a fleeing vehicle.

Offender-Officer Interaction

The second variable examined was the officer's approach to the offender after stopping him. This included two categories: an approach with the 3Ss (meaning that the officer offered any one or a combination of a smile, greeting, or salute) and one without these procedures. As reflected in Table 16, the only variable that was significantly related to police behavior upon approaching an offender was the officer's educational

¹To obtain this coefficient, the author employed individual officers as a unit of analysis.

background. The correlation between these two variables was statistically significant at the .01 level with the positive coefficient of .118. Thus, the data indicate that the higher the educational attainment of an officer, the more likely he was to approach the offender with either a smile, greeting, or salute.

After approaching an offender, the officer would provide an explanation for the stop. Here the researchers were asked to assess how sympathetic the officer was when he asked the offender to show his papers and to step out of the vehicle, as well as how convincing he was in his explanation of the alleged offense. The data in Table 16 indicate that the independent variables significantly related to this behavior were the officer's rank, special training experience, and education. One must be cautious in interpreting these correlations, however. The correlation between the officer's rank and the explanation they provided the driver is significant at the .05 level. The correlation is positive, which means that the higher the officer's rank, the more likely he was to give the offender a sympathetic and convincing explanation. This correlation may reflect the fact that those who held higher ranks (middle-rank officers) had graduated from high school or above.² As a result, the significance of the relationship between the nature of the explanation and the officer's rank variables may be questioned due to the fact that the subjects' ranks are reflected in their educational attainment.

²This condition resulted from a policy change regarding officer recruitment in the mid-1980s. According to the new policy, the INP recruits only those applicants who graduate from high school or above to be second sergeants (middle-rank officers), whereas those applicants who graduate from middle school may be recruited for the second Bhayangkara position (lower-rank officers).

Similarly the correlation between the nature of the explanation process and the officer's training experience is also thought to have been affected by the education variable. The correlation is positive and significant at the .01 level, which indicates that those who had experienced special traffic training were more likely to provide the offender with a sympathetic and convincing explanation than were those who did not have such experience. This correlation, however, may be affected by the fact that those who attended special training had graduated from high school or above.³ Consequently, the significance of the relationship between these variables may be affected by the education variable.

In order to see whether or not the associations between the officer's rank and special training experience and the type of explanation offered about the alleged offense are spurious we have to examine their partial correlations. It is apparent that after controlling for the education variable, the partial correlation coefficients of the relationships become lower than the original ones. More importantly, the significant test results reveal that all of the relationships are not significant anymore. The partial correlation coefficient of the association between rank and the explanation process is $-.006$ ($p = .912$), and that of special training and the explanation process is $.047$ ($p = .339$). These suggest that both the relationships between officer's rank and training experience and the nature of the explanation they provided the violators are totally spurious due to the presence of a third variable, i.e., education. On the other hand, the partial correlation

³According to organizational policy regarding in-service training, the INP allows only middle-rank officers who graduated from high school or above to attend special training programs (Petri 1994).

coefficients of the relationship between the officer's education and the nature of the explanation they provided the offenders remain relatively stable and significant ($p = .001$), even when each other individual variable is controlled for.

Most importantly, the only individual variable significantly related to how adequately the officers explained of offense to the violator was education. The correlation coefficient of .478 is positive, which means that the higher the educational attainment of an officer, the more likely he was to sympathetically and convincingly explain to the offender about his offense. This interpretation is supported by the data in Table 17.

Table 17
Education and Explanation Process (in percentages)

Explanation	Educational Levels			
	Elementary School n = 3	Middle School n = 34	High School n = 326	College Experience n = 47
Nonsympathetic and/or convincing	100.0	91.1	38.0	6.4
Sympathetic and convincing	0.0	8.9	62.0	93.6
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Missing data: 136				

Police Disposition

The final dispositions made by the officers included outright release, giving a warning, settling through the "damai" process, or issuing a citation. The data in Table 16 indicate that these choices do not appear to be significantly related to the individual officer variables. Yet when specifically examining the "damai" solution, we find a relationship

between this particular type of decision and the officer's educational background (see row 3 of Table 18).

Table 18

Police Disposition and Education (in percentages)

Final Action	Educational Levels			
	Elementary School n = 7	Middle School n = 47	High School n = 452	College Experience n = 65
Freeing	0.0	2.1	3.1	1.5
Warning	0.0	40.4	40.3	46.2
"Damai"	42.9	36.2	31.2	16.9
Ticketing	57.1	21.3	25.4	35.4
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Missing data: 187				

The data reveal that the higher the educational attainment of an officer, the less likely he was to accept illegal solutions. This is consistent with the findings associated with our document examination of the issuance of tickets. By using the individual officer as the unit of analysis, we found that the number of tickets issued by the officers was related to their educational attainment. The correlation is significant at the .01 level with a positive coefficient of .307. This illustrates that the higher the educational attainment of an officer, the more frequently he would issue tickets.

In contrast to the findings in Table 16, we also initially discovered a relationship between ticket issuance and the officer's rank and years in police service. Using the individual officer as the unit of analysis, the data revealed that the number of tickets issued by the officers was significantly related to their years in police service at the .01 level. The

correlation coefficient of .292 is positive, meaning that the greater the number of an officer's years in police service, the more frequently he would issue tickets.

Consistently, the officers' rank (ranging from the lowest to the highest) was related to the ticket issuance. Here ticket issuance was measured by comparing the number of tickets issued by each officer among their unit members (ranging from the highest to the lowest). The coefficient correlation is -.229, which is significant at the .01 level. This indicates that those officers who held higher rank were likely to issue tickets more frequently than those of lower rank. However, these correlations may be affected by the organizational policy regarding ticket issuance. According to Act No. 8 of 1981 on Criminal Procedures, the policy is that only middle-level rank officers and above are even allowed to issue tickets (*Republik Indonesia* 1981). Additionally, several traffic units employed their own policies restricting the distribution of citations to those officers who had many years of police service. As a result, those officers who held lower-level ranks and who had just begun to be an officer were almost not represented in these data, as they were unlikely to issue tickets.

Contrary to the observational data portrayed in Table 16, the document examination of citation files also revealed a relationship between police final disposition and the officer's years in service at his last post. By using the individual officer as the unit of analysis, we found that ticket issuance by each officer was significantly related to the number of years he had been at his last post at the .05 level. The correlation coefficient of .165 is negative. This indicates that the longer the officer's years in service at the last post, the less likely he was to issue tickets.

To summarize, the only individual variables that were statistically significant in accounting for police job performance, i.e., decision making, were the officer's educational background and years in service at his last post. The finding regarding the relationship between education and police performance confirms the results of earlier studies reported by Swanson et al. (1993) as presented in chapter 2. Additionally, Cohen and Chaiken's (1975:195) study of the New York Police Department found a similar relationship. These authors also found that when the nature of the work is routine and unchallenging, certain traffic assignments, such as stationary observation and regulation of traffic, may result in officer dissatisfaction, particularly among the more intelligent and educated officers with long service. This implicitly confirms this study's findings regarding the relationships between an officer's job performance, years in service at last post, and job satisfaction.

The Influence of Organizational Factors

The managerial factors that were investigated here included the availability of resources, the mission of the organization, organizational rules and policy, and supervision activities. Analysis of the influence of interference by a superior will also be covered here as a part of supervision activities. The extent to which these factors may explain street-level officers' decision-making will be described below.

The Availability of Resources

The influence of resource availability, including both equipment and human resources, on police decisions was discussed above. It was learned that the street-level officers' decisions related to their initial actions and pursuit activities were largely

explained by this variable. The availability of resources, and particularly of vehicles, affected not only the officers' initial decisions whether to react to an infraction and to pursue a fleeing vehicle, but also to their mobility to perform operational duties in their jurisdictional area or at least around their post. We noted earlier that, when compared to the regulation and observation unit members (those assigned to a post without a car), mobile officers are more effective at controlling traffic, as they can monitor violations which might occur at any time or location. In Indonesia this advantage has not yet been realized, however, as these officers are more often directed to special duties, such as guarding state guests and monitoring VIPs, official ceremonies and parades, than they are to traffic patrol duties.

Some time ago, Bayley observed: "Are resources really the reason police are not more effective in reducing the levels of crime and violence in contemporary society? Are they so overburdened and underfunded that they cannot get the job done?" (1994:36). He then suggested that "the answer to both questions is no." Bayley claims that the reason police fail to prevent crime is not a lack of resources, but rather the irrational use of the resources they do have. His argument implies that sufficient resources are needed to accomplish any police job, but they must be used efficiently. This is consistent with the findings of LaFave (1965:124), who explained the influence of resources on the decision making of police officers, and Black and Reiss (1967:3), who found that communications and transportation equipment were the core of the modern police department. This is not to suggest that having communication and transportation equipment would necessarily result in increased effectiveness in terms of police job performance. Yet equipping the

officers with a minimum standard of necessary equipment is required in order for them to perform their operational duties well.

The Mission of the Organization

Here we will see how the mission of the JTPD has influenced individual officers' decisions in performing their jobs. In the previous chapter observational data were presented indicating that traffic officers tend to prioritize service activities, such as assuring the smooth flow of traffic, rather than law-enforcement duties. Thus, in the interest of keeping a steady flow of traffic on the streets with a minimum of congestion, policemen often ignore obvious violations as well as fleeing vehicles.⁴ During both formal and informal interviews they argued that their main task is community service. For example, when asked by a field worker why he did not stop a violating vehicle that had passed him, a sergeant maintained: "Well, if every offender were stopped, hundreds of vehicles would be parked here. Moreover, I am charged here to keep the traffic flow smooth, not to be a street judge."

The managerial officers who were interviewed confirmed these claims, suggesting that in conformity with the departmental policy, they often emphasized that their subordinates prioritize service activities. They also instructed officers not to pull over any violating vehicle if this would cause traffic problems. This means that the street-level officers' decisions to prioritize service activities are a direct product of management's

⁴ This finding regarding selective enforcement confirms those of previous studies. See, for example, Greene and Klockars (1991), and Bittner (1980). Bittner asserted that "when one looks at what policemen actually do, one finds that criminal law enforcement is something that most of them do with the frequency located somewhere between virtually never and very rarely" (1980:125).

objectives. This confirms earlier research by Simon (1957), an influential scholar of organizational behavior, who argued:

The values and objectives that guide individual decisions in an organization are largely the organizational objectives--the service and conservation goals of the organization itself. Initially, these are usually imposed on the individual by the exercise of authority over him, but to a large extent the values gradually become "internalized" and are incorporated into the psychology and attitudes of the individual participant. He acquires an attachment or loyalty to the organization that automatically--i.e., without the necessity for external stimuli--guarantees that his decisions will be consistent with the organization objectives. (1957:198)

The departmental policy that prioritizes service activities should be clarified, however. The managerial officers who were interviewed argued that the policy is based on Act No. 20 of 1982 on the Basic Provision of the State Defense and Security (*Republik Indonesia* 1982). Nonetheless, that law does not state that the INP must prioritize service activities, although it does establish three main tasks of the INP including law enforcement, order maintenance and social services, and social engineering in order to support the first two functions. This suggests that there has been a common misinterpretation regarding the mission of the organization with regard to traffic control, for the relevant rule does not suggest that law-enforcement duties may be disregarded.

Organizational Rules and Policies

A third managerial factor that was examined here consisted of organizational rules and policies. The first organizational policy concerns personnel rotation. We noted above that police initial actions as well as pursuit decisions are affected by the officer's years in service at his last post. Officers, and primarily those who had experienced more than 8 years in their last post (20% of respondents), expressed dissatisfaction because of the fact

that they had never been rotated. Three problems were identified with this practice. First, over time their eagerness to handle violations decreased. Second, they tended to establish good relationships with persons who regularly passed their posts, frequently leading them to ignore their offenses. Third, they were concerned about the impact of the workplace on their health.⁵ One officer stated: “I appeal to the authorities to reevaluate the policy regarding rotation. I have been assigned in the field for 12 years without rotation. I’m worried—what will happen after I retire if I get sick later due to long-term exposure to the lead in vehicle exhaust emissions?” (referring to cessation of medical benefits upon retirement).

The second organizational rule and policy to be examined concerned the determination of ticket quotas. It appears that this policy was never put in written form and consistently implemented. The rotation of the chief of the JTPD, which occurs almost every year, often impedes the implementation of this quota policy. The last chief had established a policy regarding ticket quotas with a formula of 1-1-2, which meant that one officer should issue two tickets every single day. However, in practice these quotas were rarely imposed consistently, so they are to be considered a target that should be achieved by traffic officers on the streets. It was apparent that only 6.2% of the subjects who were observed in this study issued more than 50 citations each month. Interview data revealed that the managerial officers tended to ignore the chief’s order to implement this policy.

⁵ The Bhayangkara University, attached to the Police Foundation, was doing a research project on this issue while this investigation was taking place in Jakarta.

They argued that actively adopting such a policy would result in many citizen complaints, because street-level officers would unfairly seek out violations in order to achieve their quotas. For example, they conducted what is called “nyanggong,” that is, they situated themselves in hidden places where drivers often violate traffic signs, in order to find a clear offense that could not be denied by the violator. Given that this policy was so inconsistently put into practice, however, its impact on police decision making could not be determined.

The last factor examined here concerns enforcement policy that may help officers make appropriate decisions. As mentioned earlier, the INP has established operational guidelines that classify offenses into serious, common, and light categories. Officers are expected to take appropriate action in accordance with these categories. For example, cutting into a lane is classified as a light violation and, therefore, the offender may just be warned. Apparently, this regulation is not consistently followed by the policemen on the streets, however. For instance, an observer reported how a sergeant treated five such violations which were stopped. The first violation, committed by a man driving a minitruck when traffic was medium, was settled informally. The second offense involved a man driving a passenger car when traffic was medium, and was resolved with a “damai” solution. The third case involved a woman offender driving a sedan when traffic was medium; she was simply released with a warning. The fourth offense, committed by man driving a sedan when traffic was heavy, was ticketed. The last one, involving a young man who was driving a sedan when traffic was heavy, was also ticketed. So in this case

five similar offenses were treated quite differently, that is, one resulted in a warning, two were give-and-take solutions, and two included ticketing.

The different treatments just described indicate that situational factors may play an important role in determining the disposition an officer settles on. We saw earlier that the characteristics of the offender, such as gender, social status and attitude, are all related to the decisions reached by officers. Additionally, the commission of multiple violations, the offender's domicile location, and one or more recent traffic citations having been issued to the offender may also affect the decision. The commission of multiple violations provokes traffic officers to issue tickets more than do single offenses. An offender who lives out of town is more likely to be warned than to be ticketed for a traffic sign violation. And a driver who holds a ticket that is still being processed is likely not to be given another. These findings are supported by other studies (Bittner 1980; Gottfredson & Gottfredson 1988; Lundman 1979). For instance, Lundman found that individualistic and situational contingencies are important factors explaining how the police exercise their discretion (1979:169). Bittner, too, said that "the appropriateness of police action is primarily determined with regard to the particular and actual nature of the case at hand, and only secondarily by general norms" (1980:120).

The decision making of traffic officers is also affected by the seriousness of the offense. The more serious a traffic offense is, the more likely it is that the offender will be ticketed. Yet here the seriousness of traffic offenses refers neither to legal definition nor to the policy mentioned above. This finding also confirms those of previous studies. Wilson (1968) has claimed that regulations do not instruct, but give the brass plenty of

rope with which to hang officers. Walsh (1991), based on his study of arrest rates in a New York City Police precinct, argued:

The street world of the officer is a pragmatic, day-to-day existence where demands are immediate. The radio must be answered, situations must be addressed immediately and solutions must be found to prevent further crises. Policy defines procedures to address a situation, but it does not provide solutions. It seldom takes into account the total milieu in which the problem is occurring; this the officer must do. (1991:361)

Additionally, based on his study of police departments in Los Angeles and the surrounding areas, Brown concluded that "decisions to ignore a violation are spontaneous, even arbitrary, rather than deliberate and reasonable. Most are governed not by policy or even painful reflection about priorities, but by personal inclination and the ubiquitous and salient factor of mood" (1991:287).

A question arises: Why do the street-level officers not follow the enforcement policy established in Juklap No. 155/1993? It is apparent that the policy was broadly formulated to encompass three categories of offenses: serious, common, and light. These designations were based on the nature of the threatened penalties. The street-level officers have argued that when put into practice these categories could not be fully followed. Despite this, there has not been any attempt to review this policy, let alone to study it systematically. As a result, traffic officers have implicitly developed their own "policy" based on their daily experience and understanding of traffic problems. The policy has been based on the assumption that the seriousness of an offense is determined by its actual or potential consequences. This raises the question of what criteria the officers use to define these potential consequences. In this study we found a great deal of interofficer variability and even of individual officer inconsistency with regard to these evaluations. As noted,

almost 50% of observed infractions were ignored, and only about 30% of all violators were actually pulled over. Among the latter group, only 26.6% were ticketed.

This finding regarding the street-level development of enforcement policy conforms with an earlier study of the Chicago Police Department conducted by Davis (1975), a leading expert on this subject. Davis found: "Top officers seem to have little to do with the making of enforcement policy. Some of the policy is made by officers of middle grade, but most of it is made at the bottom of the organization by ordinary patrolmen" (1975:38). A lesson that could be learned from Davis's findings is that when an official policy does not explicitly govern the decision making of street-level officers, but is broadly formulated, officers will implicitly formulate their own policies. These discretionary decisions of policemen reveal they actually enforce the law selectively rather than fully.

Supervision Activity

To see how the department under study here attempts to control the decision making of officers, we will discuss one other organizational factor—supervision activities. Supervision activities are categorized into three types of control mechanisms. These include regular control, occasional control, and superior interference. Occasional control deals with controlling activities performed by high-ranking officials, internal affairs agents, or military police officers. These activities may be performed in nonregular manners.

As already noted, during the 10th week of the field observations, the author detected a changing pattern in the subjects' behavior. This was thought to have been a result of the corrective action taken by a high-ranking police officer against an officer who

was suspected of accepting bribes at a road during the preceding week. Compared with previous weeks, during the 2 weeks following the reprimand officers more frequently ignored infractions. For instance, a sergeant was observed pulling over two violating vehicles and warning the offenders when observed a first time. During the second observation the same officer ignored one violation, casually warned one violating vehicle, and stopped six vehicles with final actions as follows: one driver was freed, two were warned, and three were ticketed. During the third observation the observer found that the same officer ignored one offense and accepted bribes for two other violations. When an additional, final, observation was undertaken, another observer found that the same subject ignored all 12 offenses which occurred at his post. Apparently, this changing pattern of behavior during the 11th week of the field investigation involved not only this sergeant, but also other officers, as demonstrated by the data in Table 19 below.

Table 19

Police Initial Action During the Last Weeks of Observations and Before (in percentages)

Police Initial Action	Percentage of Initial Action		
	Weeks III-IX n = 2,197*	Week X n = 135	Week XI n = 112
Ignoring	42.4	64.4	90.1
Casual Warning	11.6	11.1	4.5
Seizing Document	7.1	6.7	0.0
Completely Stopping	38.8	17.8	5.4
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0
	*about 314 ave./week		

The data in this table suggest that during the last 2 weeks of observation, traffic officers tended to ignore violations more frequently than they had during the previous weeks. Statistically, such a relationship between police actions and the different observational stages is significant at the .01 level with a correlation coefficient of .211. In other words, there was a significant difference between police initial actions during the last 2 weeks of observations and those from the earlier weeks, indicating the plausibility of the influence of the corrective action undertaken at the end of the 9th week. This interpretation is supported by the results of the document examination regarding ticket issuance in Table 20.

Table 20
Ticket Issuance per Unit During 3 Weeks Before
and After Corrective Action by the High Ranking Polri Official

Traffic Unit	Before Corrective Action			After Corrective Action		
	Week VII	Week VIII	Week IX	Week X	Week XI	Week XII
1. Central Jakarta	1,338	1,303	962	1,242	1,007	790
2. North Jakarta	736	829	1,028	876	769	742
3. East Jakarta	1,065	1,020	1,095	1,115	852	724
4. West Jakarta	1,051	1,070	1,091	889	924	902
5. Depok	772	908	577	615	325	223
6. Bekasi	846	1,015	1,093	1,006	739	586
7. Highway Patrol	454	420	402	291	224	146
Totals	6,262	6,565	6,248	6,034	4,840	4,113

- Notes
1. South Jakarta data were excluded from this table, as they were conducting a special operation from Week IX onward.
 2. Due to administrative processing, data regarding ticket issuance in a particular week appear in the following week's data.

These data illustrate that during the last 2 weeks of field investigation, traffic officers issued tickets less frequently than they had during the previous weeks; the tickets issued during Weeks XI and XII were respectively 77% and 65% of the averages of the previous weeks.

The foregoing documentary data confirm our finding that was based on the observational data. It seems plausible that the corrective action of the high-ranking Polri official undertaken at the end of the 9th week of observation provoked the changing patterns of officers' decision-making. One lesson that could be learned from this practice is that the good intentions of administrative action to control bribery do not necessarily have the intended result. It is apparent that the officers did not accept bribes during this period, but they also slowed down their enforcement activities.

★ Interview data also support the influence of this kind of supervisory activity on police job performance. The officers observed during the last week generally associated their reluctance to take an action with that corrective measure. For instance, a field worker noted his conversation with a sergeant after observing him as follows:

Observer: Why have you just ignored all offenses passing your post for almost two hours I observed you, friend?

Officer: Frankly speaking, I am fearful. You know, just last week a sergeant was caught. I don't want to follow him to the detention room.

Observer: Why do you have to be afraid as long as you do not practice bribery?

Officer: That's why, buddy. You know, even if we never asked for it, certain offenders might give us some money, when we are just warning them.

Observer: Just simply reject it, buddy!

Officer: Well, but you know, they often force us to accept it, or even put the money in our pocket, saying that it is just a thank-you [for not ticketing--observer].

Observer: And you need it, don't you?

Officer: Oh sure, given it is just a thank-you and considering the inadequacy of our salary. Yet, if we have bad luck, where a "tikus" ["mouse" or spy--observer] [an internal affairs agent or military policemen looking for illegal behavior--author] is watching we will be accused as if we were completely accepting of the bribery.

Observer: So what else can you do?

Officer: Well, a simple way is "persaudaraan" [informal settlement].

Observer: Have you ever experienced it?

Officer: Yes, last year. Yet, I was just lucky because the guys asked me, you know, just this [showing five fingers meaning 50,000 rupiah--observer]. Usually, he said, it takes hundreds of thousands.

★ A similar result was found on another occasion. As noted earlier, a subject often behaved in unusual ways if he was aware of being observed, suspecting that the observer was a "tikus." One field worker reported the following events when observing the officer in a sample post. At 3:30 p.m. the officer had not yet appeared at his post for an afternoon shift that began at 2 p.m. A street vendor working near the post remarked to the observer that ever since a special operation had been initiated by military police, officers assigned to the afternoon shift had always come late and those on the morning shift left their post earlier than they were supposed to. This finding was confirmed by other field workers who had been observing other posts in the same district. Later, when this issue was discussed during the formal interviews, street-level officers generally argued that they were supposed to be present at their posts primarily during peak hours, except

for certain posts, such as in the main streets and mass meeting places, which are supposed to be attended all day long by a number of officers. The managerial-level officers maintained that if the street-level officers were absent from their posts, they might have been performing special tasks at the main office or some other assigned place.

Another administrative control mechanism that was examined was interference by superiors. We pointed out in the previous chapter the observed relationships between particular types of vehicles and police initial action, and between the social status of an offender and police final disposition. As often claimed by the subjects during both informal and formal interviews, these relationships were thought to have relevance to occasions of inappropriate intervention by a superior. A case involving an officer who was criticized for ticketing a driver who was carrying a high-ranking official is an example of this practice. Another example was reported by an observer regarding a subject's concern: "Yet it is so. Even before the ink has dried on a citation, a telephone begins ringing, either from our boss, from another department, or even from a high-ranking official (through his adjutant). All ask to eliminate the citation." Here we see that when writing a citation for a particular class of offender, the officer must consider the fact that this decision is likely to be questioned by a superior.

During formal interviews, several respondents confirmed these practices. They argued that it is better to let these privileged violators go or to only issue them warnings rather than tickets. It is clear that such inappropriate intervention by a superior can produce two negative impacts. First, ticket production may actually go down, and second, it encourages officers to settle violations unofficially, since--they argued--"the

superiors basically play the same coin, only a different side.” Bittner (1980) made an interesting observation in his study comparing police behavior with that of army officers. He asserted that, unlike the army officer, “the analogously ranked police official is someone who can only do a great deal *to* his subordinates and very little *for* them. For this reason supervisory personnel are often viewed by the line personnel with distrust and even contempt” (1980:59).

On the other hand, managerial officers who were interviewed contended that although the issue regarding interference by superiors is real, it is not so serious that it affects traffic officers’ job performance. They argued that if a superior or other high-ranking official has questions about a case, it is just taken care of without involving those officers on the streets. “It depends on who their boss is. If he is easily influenced with such a complaint, his subordinate may be condemned, yet if he is a wise person, the case will be taken over by himself,” a senior officer in the directorate commented. Similarly, a lower-rank officer said: “It depends on our boss. A wise boss even defends us.”

The roles of the supervisor and unit commander are viewed by street-level officers as significant. When asked during formal interviews which external factors influence their job performance, nearly all of the respondents pointed to direct supervision by their bosses. Similarly, managerial-level officers also identified the same factor. However, when asked what supervisors could do in order to better control the street-level officer’s decision making, they generally said that nothing could be done, as it is an individual officer’s personal choice. The only things that a supervisor or an immediate commander can do are to observe the outcome of a particular decision, to give general direction to the

officers, to verify the presence of officers at their posts, and to take over a particular case if an officer is being confronted by particularly problematic offenders (violators with “friends in high places”) concerning whom he is reluctant to make a decision.

This discussion of the influence of supervision on police decision making provides two results. On the one hand, occasional control and inappropriate superior intervention or interference may actually discourage officers from properly performing their duties. The ineffectiveness of occasional control is related to the fact that such control activities are generally directed only at the discovery of illegal behaviors and punishment of the offender, without comprehensively examining what factors provoked the phenomenon. On the other hand, regular control may encourage street-level officers in properly performing their general duties. Although making a particular decision is an individual’s prerogative, the overall outcome of these decisions when made by a group of officers could be affected through proper control mechanisms.

Previously, several studies have found that police work can never be fully controlled (Bittner 1980; Reiss 1971; Wilson 1968). As Bittner has noted, although the police enterprise is highly bureaucratized and patrolmen are regulated in a scheme of strict discipline, they are quite alone and independent when dealing with citizens. A patrolman may get advice when he asks for it, but otherwise receives almost no supervision (1980:135). Bittner recognized that “only a limited set of legal restrictions can be conditionally imposed on the police which, however, still do not make it impossible for the police to proceed as they see fit” (Bittner 1980:34). In their study of the Dallas Police Department, Hochstedler and Dunning, consistent with Wilson (1967), found a significant

potential influence of lower-level supervisors on the morale and general performance of patrol officers (1983:66). It is clear that supervision activities may have a meaningful impact if they are properly conducted by lower-level supervisors.

It appears that properly carrying out supervision activities may be a necessary condition for controlling police officers' job performance; however, in order for this variable to be sufficient as well, there must be a feedback process, i.e., rewards and punishments. However, in this study only 7 of the 270 subjects (2.6%) we observed had received either formal rewards or punishments within the last one and one-half years (informal rewards and sanctions were not recorded). Since this number is so small, it is unreliable as a measure of the influence of such incentives and disincentives on police job performance, and especially on the officers' decision making. However, the data also reflect the fact that these control mechanisms have not yet been optimally performed. For example, only one subject had been formally punished for bribery.⁶ Additionally, during formal interviews a few respondents provided clarifying information. They said that there were actually many traffic officers who had been caught by internal affairs agents and military policemen for accepting bribes. Yet most of these incidents had been informally settled—in their terms, as a “persahabatan” or “persaudaraan” (friendship) solution. Corrective actions taken against the practice of bribery were seen as inconsistent, while those who had been arrested were seen as a few people who had experienced bad luck.

⁶ According to the data regarding the disciplinary and criminal violations of traffic officers, there were 10 cases bribery practices (39 cases all violations) uncovered during 1996 and 9 cases (36 cases all violations) uncovered during 1997.

Moreover, almost all respondents commented that the phenomenon of bribery could be drastically reduced if the well-being of officers were appropriately dealt with by increasing their incomes to adequate levels.

To summarize, we found that several factors may affect a street-level officer's job performance. The availability of resources, including both transportation and communication equipment, help to explain the officer's decisions as to whether to make stops or pursue fleeing violators. These decisions to stop or pursue may also be explained by the number of years an officer has been in service at his last post. Here we found that the officer's number of years in service at the post is primarily determined by the department's personnel rotation policy. The organization's mission stressing the importance of assuring the smooth flow of traffic appears to assure the continuance of practices of selective enforcement. Of course, police work can never be fully controlled, although these concerns are exacerbated by the fact that the mechanisms of control, both in terms of supervision and regulation, were themselves often found to be inappropriate and inconsistent. Supervisory activities have apparently been weakened by the fact that the phenomenon of bribery has been so pervasive in the department at large that rewards and punishments are ineffective in promoting better police job performance. On the other side, due to the vagueness of the policy on the appropriateness of different decision criteria, traffic officers on the streets have implicitly been forced to develop their own enforcement "policy," resulting in a great deal of interofficer variability. For these reasons, we will next discuss strategies for controlling these discretionary decisions.

Controlling Discretionary Decisions

The discretionary decisions of police officers have long been debated by experts in this field. Some have recommended that the most appropriate policy would be an attempt to eliminate police discretion. They argue that full enforcement is required, since it is unlawful for police officers to ignore any observed violation. This model has been rejected by others, however. Opponents argue that discretion permits officers to be flexible and adaptable in interpreting laws regarding specific situations, since laws cannot be written to anticipate and address all of the possible situations they may face. Therefore, "discretion is both inevitable and, in some instances, desirable, given the nature of criminal law, conflicting public expectations, and the reality of police work" (Walker 1992:209).

Additionally, Davis noted:

Police discretion is absolutely essential. It cannot be eliminated. Any effort to eliminate it would be ridiculous. Discretion is the essence of police work, both in law enforcement and in service activities. Police work without discretion would be something like a human torso without legs, arms, or head. (1975: 140)

However, accepting this position does not necessarily mean that discretion may be left unchecked. Unfettered discretion itself creates problems, such as the misuse of power, inconsistency of action, and interofficer variability. These problems were easily observable in this project, and they are at least partially due to the department's vagueness/ambiguity of the policy on decision criteria. As Davis stated: "vagueness of laws or enforcement policy is unconstitutional because it permits or encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law" (1975:137).

There are two major strategies that may be adopted in order to control discretion.

The first has been proposed by those embracing the professional model, and it is to enhance the professional ability of police officers to make good decisions. The proponents of this model seek to make police work a true profession. This means that since they are experts in their particular realm, officers should be granted the latitude to make decisions just as physicians, lawyers, and educators do (Walker 1992:209). Davis rejected this option, however, saying:

The principal procedure by which the Chicago police make enforcement policy is by leaving patrolmen free to make policy as they encounter problems in their patrol. Such policy is based mainly on guesswork and superficial impressions. Many policy decisions by patrolmen are guided by experience, observation, thoughtfulness, and understanding, but many are not. (1975:46)

The second strategy for controlling discretion is attempting to regulate it rationally through written policies. We have already discussed the fact that street-level officers implicitly develop their own enforcement policy. Here we may argue, as Gottfredson and Gottfredson (1988) proposed, that “the implicit policy, if made explicit, may afford a greater degree of control and hence an increased opportunity for attaining a greater degree of rationality” (1988:277). Davis (1975), the leading proponent of this administrative rulemaking model, proposed that while unnecessary discretion must be eliminated, necessary discretion should be confined, structured, and checked. In the Indonesian situation, unnecessary discretion might be letting a vehicle stop illegally outside of a loading zone, an action resulting in traffic congestion, while necessary discretion could be merely giving a warning to an offender who lives out of town for his failure to obey a

traffic sign, or not ticketing a driver who is speeding while rushing a patient to a hospital.

Pragmatically speaking, Davis said:

A rule that confines discretion says to the officers: "Here are the boundaries of your discretion. You are free to make your own choices within this area, but don't go outside the boundaries." A rule that structures discretion says to the officer: "Within the area in which you have discretionary power, let your discretion be guided by these goals, policies, and principles, and follow these procedures that are designed to minimize arbitrariness." Discretion of an officer is "checked" when it is reviewed by a supervisor, by a prosecutor, by a judge, by a private party, by the press, by legislators, or by someone else; discretion that is checked is obviously less likely to be arbitrary than discretion that is unchecked. (1975:145)

With regard to Indonesia, this suggests that the boundary between circumstances when an officer may ignore and when he must attempt to stop a violating vehicle should be clearly defined. An offense may be ignored, for example, if a single officer is necessarily regulating the traffic flow and the traffic will become worse if he leaves his post. When an offender refuses to sign the citation, the officer must fill out a departmental form which describes the violation.

Additionally, Gottfredson and Gottfredson (1988) proposed an idea for a feedback system in which controlling discretion would require coordinated research and management operations. This model first requires that the objective of the decision should be defined not only clearly, but also measurably. This would allow "further collaboration by the decision makers themselves and the research staff, possible revision, and a test of the model in order to determine how well it 'fits' as a description of the present decision processes" (1988:279).

These views regarding the development of law enforcement policies are supported by previous studies and have come to the attention of some high-ranking officials. Fyfe, who studied the impact of the restrictive policy of the New York City Police Department regarding deadly force, found that: “considerable reduction in police shootings and both officer and citizen injury and death are associated with the establishment of clearly delineated guidelines and procedures for the review of officer shooting discretion” (1979:322). For instance, the current Indonesian Minister of Justice, Oetoyo Oesman, has suggested that in order to deal with Indonesian law enforcement agents’ poor performance, such as their slowness in delivering services, misuse of power, corruption, bribery, and the like, a policy initiating administrative reform should be established (*Suara Pembaruan* 1997). A similar suggestion was made by Dr. Juwono Soedarsono, Vice Governor of National Resilience Institution and a professor of political science at the University of Indonesia. In an address presented at a seminar entitled “Development of the National Law System,” he said: “The current system of national laws should be reviewed. This relates to an attempt to create a state based on laws, not on the power of acting authorities” (*Kompas* 1997e). Thus it would seem that an attempt to officially formulate appropriate enforcement policies is a necessary condition for improving the performance of the INP, and especially traffic law enforcement.

The Influence of Social Environmental Factors

The influence of the individual and organizational factors discussed above relate to the general patterns of officers’ decision making. This study also revealed that street-level officers often make decisions illegally, (i.e. the “damai” solution), and subjectively, (i.e.

based on the offender's gender, social status, or attitude). To enhance our understanding of the nature of these decisions, we now review social environmental perspectives, including social culture, police subculture, economic factors, and social structure, i.e., the criminal justice system.

Social Culture

One observation we have made is that traffic officers may base their decisions at least partially on the identity of the offender. According to the data presented, specific police actions were often directly related to the offender's social status. This confirms Mr. Kunarto's (1995b) casual observations and the comments of Mr. Meilana (*Kompas* 1995), Mr. Pandy (1995) and Mr. Zainul (1995) noted earlier. A variety of earlier American studies also concluded that an offender's social status may influence law enforcement decision making (Black & Reiss 1967; Gold 1966; Hartjen 1975; Piliavin & Brian 1964; Sutherland, Cressey & Luckenbill 1992). For instance, Hartjen, based on his study of police-citizen encounters, concluded that "the seriousness of the behavior (especially in routine order-maintenance matters) is primarily defined by factors outside the act itself. In part, its definition is determined by the characteristics of the suspect" (1975:130).

In describing the research setting in Appendix A we noted that the Indonesian social system relies on a traditional paternalistic approach in the establishment of social relationships. According to Dr. Kuntjaraningrat (1978:15), a famous Indonesian anthropologist, the cultural value system of Indonesia is generally oriented vertically to the upper class of society. Consequently, people are reluctant to criticize openly or complain

about those who hold higher-status positions. If true, this value is also likely to affect the decision making of street-level officers when they are faced by offenders who hold high socioeconomic status.

Another anthropologist, Dr. Wignjosebroto (1991:5, 9), has noted that through centuries of tradition Indonesians have come to view the upper class of society as their “excellency,” a group that should not be complained about—and especially not in public—because it is assumed that, without even needing to be reprimanded, those who hold high social status tend to quickly acknowledge and amend any misconduct. This argument conforms with the reasons given by respondents during formal interviews that high social status offenders were generally more willing to admit their driving mistakes than were others.

We found, too, that an offender’s gender may be related to police decisions. Female offenders are more likely than males to be treated not only with honor and sympathy, but also with lenient dispositions. Conversely, male offenders are more likely to receive tickets than are females. Gender bias on the part of police—and criminal justice agents in general—has been addressed by many studies, such as one conducted by Visher in 1983. An interesting finding was reported much earlier by Reckless: “Female offenders have a much better chance than male offenders of not being reported, of not being arrested, and of dropping out of the judicial process” (1961:37).

During formal interviews, respondents stated that female offenders were generally more respectful to officers, quicker to admit their mistakes, and more likely to apologize quickly. However, the lax treatment of female offenders may also be related to traditional

views regarding the position of women in the social structure of Indonesian society. In Indonesia women are generally viewed as weaker than men, both physically and mentally.⁷ In public places, such as waiting rooms and on buses, younger people and men are often asked to give seating priority to elderly or disabled people and women as well as children. One of the eight obligations to be performed by ABRI members, including policemen, is to respect women.

The lenient treatment of female offenders should not be viewed as distinct from general cultural values. Indonesian culture respects humanitarian values (*Republik Indonesia* 1978). These social values teach people to be friendly with everyone and to assist those who are poor and/or weak, to love one another, to apologize to those who ask forgiveness, and to develop attitudes in line with *tenggang rasa* (the social familiarity principle). The humanitarian values must be viewed as central in the life of Indonesian people and are therefore socially and officially upheld by most Indonesians.

These same Indonesian humanitarian values are very likely thought to influence the decision making of officers when they face offenders who admit their mistakes and ask for forgiveness. Such offenders are often released with a warning rather than being ticketed. Moreover, offenders who appeal to an officer to commiserate with them are more likely to be treated leniently than are those who only ask for forgiveness.

⁷ In the Indonesian social system, a woman basically is not obligated to get a job, but is expected to take care of her children and household. Her father is viewed as responsible for taking care of her until her husband takes over this responsibility when they are married. If permitted by her husband, she may do light work in a role as a peddler, attendant, administrative worker or the like, including work as a police or military officer. In certain tribes, such as in Bali, women even do hard work, such as painting and bricklaying.

In relation to these social values it is necessary to add an explanation regarding the special relationship between traffic officers and public transportation drivers in the context of bribery practices. On the one hand, officers tend to feel sympathetic when they have to ticket public transportation drivers. During formal interviews several officers expressed their concerns about these drivers for their perseverance in basic survival. They drive for approximately 12 hours per day and earn a meager personal income from the small difference between what they collect from passengers and what they must provide to the owner of the vehicle. In order to net a reasonable amount, they feel they must carry passengers in excess of the maximum capacity allowed by law and pick up passengers whenever they are asked to stop.

On the other hand, public transportation drivers also empathize with the policemen, who must work hard on the streets, and yet earn an income that is less than what the drivers receive.⁸ Ultimately these two employee groups have established a sense of sharing a common fate as street-level workers in the ongoing struggle for survival. Grounded in humanitarian values, these two segments of society develop “pergaulan” (friendships) or “saling pengertian” (mutual understandings), so they often settle traffic violations informally rather than strictly following legal requirements. Moreover, the lower class of society prefer calling these illegal practices “damai,” “ji’un,” “salam tempel,” or “ngemel” —reflecting a give-and-take solution—rather than naming them “pungli” (bribery), the official government term for the behavior.

⁸A street-level policeman’s salary ranges between Rp 300,000 and Rp 400,000 per month, whereas a driver generally earns between Rp 25,000 - Rp 35,000 per day.

Police Subculture

The “damai” or “give-and-take” resolutions of traffic disputes exist throughout the general traffic law enforcement units of the directorate. In fact, they comprise nearly one third of the enforcement decisions made by traffic officers. We noted in Table 12 that 30.1% of observed police final dispositions utilized the “damai” solution. This number is undoubtedly an underestimate and would surely increase if the incidents of “seizing documents” and “unmonitored solutions,” which often led to informal settlements, were included. Contrary to many claims that only a few officers engage in this illegal conduct (*Republika* 1997; *Candi Zebra* 1997), here this practice involved 182 officers, or more than two thirds of all observed subjects. This number is probably also an underrepresentation since some of the nonparticipant subjects might have refrained from informally settling cases if they thought they were being observed by a field worker. In some instances, traffic officers were also concerned about being seen by the public in this compromising situation. For instance, when asked why he had rejected “damai” when it was offered by a public bus driver, one officer answered: “Well, the driver wanted to settle in ‘damai,’ but the passengers stood up and looked at me. So I just ticketed him.”

This finding supports survey results reported by two popular newspapers in Jakarta. In their study of public servants’ services in Jakarta, *Kompas* (1997b) found that 66% of the respondents acknowledged that they had settled traffic violations unofficially. *Republika* reported that in its study concerning the public image of the police, “62% of respondents claimed that police officers often resolve criminal acts or other law violations illegally, and 45% argued that officers often receive bribes” (1997).

Utilizing Sherman's (1978) theory of police corruption,⁹ bribery practice in the JTPD could be classified at his second level: Pervasive Unorganized Corruption.¹⁰ This is confirmed by the fact of the pervasiveness of this illegal practice throughout the posts observed (we did not measure the entire chain of corruption which might include that committed by managerial-level officers). This typology may also relate to Reiss's (1971:170) subcultural theory in which he proposed that when the acceptance of bribes is institutionalized and legitimated by the police subculture and organization, these practices are likely to increase. When discussing police initial action regarding traffic violations, we noted the unwillingness of street-level officers to enforce the laws against drivers of particular types of vehicles, perhaps as a direct result of their concerns about the existence of a relationship between the drivers and the traffic officers' superiors or their colleagues. Similarly, when observing police dispositions, we found a tendency for them not to take stern action against offenders who might have established relationships with other members of their corps. These observations suggest that this "damai" practice is also promoted by the solidarity that exists within the corps.

⁹ Sherman classifies police corruption based on "the pervasiveness of corruption, its organization, and the sources of bribes." The first type, the least serious one, is "Rotten Apples and Rotten Pockets," in which only a few officers are involved in corrupt acts. The second one, "Pervasive Unorganized Corruption," reaches a higher degree of intensity, where a majority of personnel are corrupt, but have no relationship to each other. The most serious form is "Pervasive Organized Corruption," in which corruption penetrates the higher levels of the department (Walker 1992:265-266).

¹⁰ The Knapp Commission, a committee studying widespread police corruption in the New York Police Department, distinguished briberies into two categories: the meat-eaters and the grass-eaters. They stated that "the meat-eaters are those policemen who . . . aggressively misuse their police power for personal gains. The grass-eaters simply accept the payoffs that the happenstances of police work throw their way" (Knapp Commission Report 1974:324).

The argument that implies there is a correlation between the officer's willingness to implement a "damai" solution and sustaining corps solidarity is certainly plausible. Indonesian police officers are members of the armed forces and as such are trained and accustomed to a military style of social environment where unity and loyalty are strongly held values. Occupational solidarity is also reinforced by the fact that police work involves physical fitness, agility, toughness, and so on, all of which require intimate relationships between officers. Skolnick described this as follows:

All occupational groups share a measure of inclusiveness and identification. People are brought together simply by doing the same work and having similar career and salary problems. As several writers have noted, however, police show an unusually high degree of occupational solidarity. . . . Set apart from the conventional world, the policeman experiences an exceptionally strong tendency to find his social identity within his occupational milieu. (1975:52)

Additionally, Bittner referred to this phenomenon as follows:

In fact, it is not unusual that some activities that are unpleasant as such are sought after if they are attended in a spirit of brotherly solidarity. Police officers often remark that one of the most cherished aspects of their occupation is the spirit of "one for all, and all for one." (1980:63)

Thus, as noted by the Knapp Commission, police *esprit de corps* can promote corruption because: "The rookie who comes into the Department is faced with the situation where it is easier for him to become corrupt than to remain honest" (1974:324).

Economic Explanation

The tendency of traffic officers to practice bribery can also be viewed from the perspective of personal economics. This relates to the officers' well-being, i.e., their income. For example, when asked by a participant observer why he accepted bribes, an officer claimed: "Frankly speaking, well, in order to keep my stove smoking, young friend.

My salary alone is barely enough for my operational costs. You see, who would pay for necessary gasoline and batteries, and food and drink here? Otherwise, how could I survive?" Another officer expressed his concern: "We traffic officers are often blamed for 'damai.' We don't collect money for fun, but in order to support our job performance. Of course, we could not use our salary for that purpose."

Officer claims regarding the inadequacy of police salaries¹¹ are supported by a variety of data. In this study, the practice of bribery was found to be related to family size and the housing costs where an officer lives. Formal interview data indicated that officers who lived in rented housing practiced the "damai" solution nearly twice as often (52.9%) as those living in a departmental housing facility (27.9%), or those living with their parents or in their own homes (19.2%). Thus, rented housing demands more money than the other forms. An officer who wants to live in a house provided by the department must pay the former "owner" in order to get into the facility; however, it is not as much as is needed for renting a common house.

Illegal settlements are more often conducted by married officers who have children (73.3%) than by those who are bachelors or who have a wife but no children (26.7%). Junior sergeants who had only recently graduated from the police academy were found to

¹¹ The net income of an officer ranges from 300,000 to 400,000 rupiah (Rp) per month. This includes salary and other benefits. In addition, he receives 18 kg of rice and an additional 10 kg for each family member with a maximum of three, which may add the equivalent of approximately 5% to his income. As an illustration, the cost for having lunch in a restaurant is approximately Rp 3,000 per person; lunch provided by a peddler is about Rp 2,000. Having lunch or dinner in a McDonald's or a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant, costing a minimum of Rp 5,000, would be uncommon for street-level officers.

seldom practice the give-and-take solution. When questioned by an observer, a junior sergeant responded:

I am not unwilling, but I have not yet done it. Since I don't have the needs as much as they [his seniors--observer] do, my salary is sufficient to support my own life. Yet when I get married and have to rent a house, yeah, like or dislike it, I will have to do so, right?

A related interesting question arises as to why some officers who have low salaries do not engage in bribery. During formal interviews, respondents were asked: "Do you have any supplemental sources of income?" Some of these officers indicated that they had a supplemental part-time job, such as a position as security officer of a company, technician, computer programmer, or the like. A second group said that their wives also work. Others acknowledged that they (illegally) act as brokers for expediting the administrative processing of driver's licenses and car registrations. Surprisingly, some even admitted that they obtained extra money from "damai" settlement. There were also a few respondents who practice bribery in an indirect way. These officers acknowledged that they had established financial relationships with the managers of particular enterprises which operate public transportation or own fleets of commercial vehicles. These vehicles regularly travel through the respondents' districts, and the officers then ignore any offenses, such as exceeding maximum load requirements, cruising forbidden routes, and the like.

It is commonly believed by both the public and other police officers that female officers perform their duties assertively and cannot be asked for a give-and-take solution. Several comments are necessary to explain why they apparently did not practice the give-and-take solution as the male officers did. When asked, high-ranking female and

managerial-level officers said that accepting traditional female roles may play an important part in preventing female officers from accepting “damai” solutions. These issues are regularly discussed by their superiors at female officers’ meetings. However, other factors may also explain this phenomenon. Generally, female officers’ primary jobs relate to providing public services, such as issuing driver’s licenses, car registrations, and the like, which are popularly known as worthy jobs because people may give them gratuities if they are well served. When assigned to perform additional duty on the streets,¹² they are equipped with vehicles that must have full gasoline tanks. When they are married, their salary becomes a secondary income for their family. Yet when they are unmarried, they may live in an official departmental housing facility. Therefore, female officers do not have financial problems to the extent that their male counterparts do.

The economic explanation for the widespread nature of bribery is confirmed by another study. In the survey described previously, *Republika* revealed that 85% of respondents suggested that police officers’ salaries are truly inadequate. One respondent claimed: “Officers’ salaries must be increased in accordance with their workload. If not, the government is not serious when it requires an improvement in police job performance” (1997). As also noted in chapter 2, several police observers pointed to the low income of the police as a major factor accounting for the practice of bribery (*Jayakarta* 1995;

¹² Female officers are assigned to perform extra duties on the streets for 3 - 4 hours every workday on rotating monthly shifts.

Khoidin 1995; Korry 1995). This suggests that the practice of bribery is explained by their low incomes.

The relationship between low income and bribery is suggested by several theories. According to Maslow's theory of needs, it is hard to ask people to achieve self-esteem needs, such as performing their duties better, before fulfilling their basic needs, i.e., physiological and security needs. Referring to earlier studies by Lawler and Pinder, Rainey concluded that "lower-level employees show more concern with material and security rewards, while higher-level employees place more emphasis on achievement and challenge" (1991:124). This relationship is also explained by a decision-making theory: the rational or traditional model. This theory assumes that "people are motivated predominantly by 'economic incentives'," and "money is usually used as a measure of value for the decision maker" (Swanson et al. 1993:481). Although this theory is not always explanatory,¹³ in our case—a developing country like Indonesia—it may be especially helpful in better understanding the phenomenon of bribery. These theories suggest that the decision making of street-level officers may be partly related to their low incomes.

It is necessary to emphasize that economic incentives are not the only factors fostering bribery. We saw earlier that the occurrence of this illegal conduct is actually

¹³ Swanson et al. (1993: 481) described this theory related to managerial decision-making. The authors argued that various factors such as emotions, politics, power group dynamics, personality, and mental health, are involved in the decision-making process. This makes it unacceptable for the proponents of the economic approach theory to maintain that a decision maker relies most heavily on money when he makes a *rational* choice of an alternative.

determined by the variables of when, where, and with whom a settlement is reached. All other factors, such as police subculture and economy, are likely to be inconsequential if the officer sees no way to settle the case informally. Given such circumstances, the officer may be concerned with both his own safety and the corps' image.

Social Structure: Criminal Justice System

The decision making of street-level officers may be affected by the criminal justice system itself. This includes both the current system of law enforcement and the nature of criminal law and of police work. First we will see how the current system of Indonesian traffic law enforcement may influence officer decision making. The law requires that officers seize a document from the offender whenever they issue a ticket.¹⁴

The offender may choose either to attend a trial in the court or to pay the fine directly in an appointed bank.¹⁵ If the offender prefers to pay the fine through a bank, he must then go to the police office to show a receipt as proof of payment. By choosing to attend a trial, though, an offender might think he will be excused from a penalty if he can prove he is not guilty. Yet in reality, of the 365 citation files examined, no offender was found to have been freed from the penalty imposed by judges. After the offender pays the required fine (penalty fee) to the clerk, he may immediately get his confiscated document

¹⁴ The ticket then can be temporarily used as a substitute for a driver's license or car registration.

¹⁵ A third way is simply to pay the legal fine through the officer. This is called "versteek" (originally from the Dutch). However, this is not commonly utilized since people seldom carry sufficient cash with them.

back from the court. But the problem is that the offender still has had to spend hours waiting for the trial. Moreover, the amount of a traffic fine is viewed by most drivers, particularly those who hold low social economic status, as expensive enough without also having to lose potential income due to waiting in court when otherwise they could be working.

Due to the established complicated procedures and costly fines, Indonesian offenders prefer settling their offenses informally. Interview results support this claim. For example, an observer reported his conversation with a public transportation driver, who had just settled his case informally:

Observer: Who actually asked for the “damai”?

Driver: Well, I did, rather than being ticketed.

Observer: Why did you prefer requesting a “damai” to following a legal procedure?

Driver: Well, once money was given to the officer, a dispute would be over. If ticketed, it would cost me time and energy, and finally I would still be fined. A fine is even more expensive, at least 25,000 rupiah. So I chose “damai”—it cost me only 5,000 rupiah.

Below is another example of an interview with a private driver as reported by an observer:

Observer: Who initiated the “damai,” you or the officer?

Driver: Well, me.

Observer: What was your reason for asking “damai”?

Driver: By settling “damai,” we do not need to spend as much money, and the procedure is just simpler.

Observer: And if you were ticketed?

Driver: Wow, being ticketed is hard. Besides, the procedure is complicated, and it could cost as much as 75,000 rupiah.

In this study the data demonstrate that 71.1% of “damai” actions were initiated by offenders requesting such a settlement. Of the remainder, only 24.6% were indirectly initiated by the officers, while 4.3% of cases could not be monitored by the field workers.

The nature of criminal law and of police work may also foster the phenomenon of bribery. In many cases, violations of the traffic code are classified as victimless offenses. “Victimless crimes foster corruption in the administration of justice primarily because not everyone believes these acts should be criminalized” (Walker 1992:267). For example, given that driving a vehicle without a license is a victimless offense, no one other than the officer and the offender may resolve it. One police scholar pointed to the nature of police work as a factor promoting bribery practices. Sherman, who specially studied police corruption, claimed:

The legal authority of police departments and the nature of law violations in their jurisdictions provide organizational resources that can be exploited for personal gain. The nature of these resources varies greatly among and within police departments according to the nature of police tasks performed and the social characteristics of the police task environment. Some police departments have greater resources for exploitation than others, just as some police units within the same department have greater resources than others. (1978:38)

The offender’s inherent preference, along with the complication of legal procedures and the expensiveness of the fine, may easily be exploited by officers for personal gain.

According to Walker, “the police enforce the law and, inevitably, some people seek to avoid arrest by offering a bribe. Thus, officers face constant ‘temptations’ from people seeking to corrupt them” (1992:269). Another aspect of the nature of police work seen by Walker as a factor fostering bribery is its “low visibility,” as the officers generally perform their duties alone or in pairs and without direct supervision.

Police functions cannot be separated from the fact that they possess the authority to use coercive force. Reiss (1971:63), in his study concerning police-citizen encounters, emphasized that the role of implied force is "as much a police function as are coercive roles of authority." Bittner (1991) described the capacity to use force as the core of the police role.

The expectation that they may and will use force is left entirely undefined. In fact, the only instructions any policeman ever receives in this respect consist of sermonizing that he should be humane and circumspect, and that he must not desist from what he has undertaken merely because its accomplishment may call for coercive means. (Bittner 1991:44)

The authority to use coercive force may also encourage officers to display authoritarian behavior; they expect offenders to be respectful to them and associate such respect with their decision-making choices. This is indicated by the fact that traffic officers tend to treat antagonistic offenders quite differently than they do cooperative ones. The observational data in this study revealed that those offenders who assumed a deferential demeanor were most likely to receive a simple warning. This finding confirms those found in several previous studies. Although some investigations found no support for it (Klinger 1994), many others confirmed the influence of citizen demeanor, either directly or indirectly, on police arrest decisions, and primarily in minor cases (Black & Reiss 1967; Lundman 1994; Piliavin & Briar 1964; Visher 1983; Worden & Shepard 1996). For instance, Worden and Shepard (1996:96) analyzed the results of a field observation conducted by the Police Services Study, including 24 police departments in three metropolitan areas (Rochester, New York; St. Louis, Missouri; and Tampa-St. Petersburg, Florida). Police dispositions of 847 traffic stops were analyzed; the offender's

demeanor was measured in terms of the observer's characterization of it as either antagonistic or civil. It was found that "the estimated effect of a disrespectful demeanor is substantial and statistically significant without and with controls for other offenses" (Worden & Shepard 1996:97).

In Indonesia, both formal and informal interview data also indicated that traffic officers tended to expect offenders to be respectful to them and to associate the degree of such respect with their decision making. They often claimed that they did not like those offenders who displayed sarcastic or disrespectful attitudes toward them. When faced with hostile offenders, they preferred issuing a ticket to giving them a warning.

The attitude of expecting deferential respect from citizens belongs not only to policemen but also to most Indonesian bureaucrats, and this is seen as a by-product of the social environmental system. For example, results of a survey conducted by *Kompas* (1997b) revealed that 74% of respondents claimed that in delivering their services, governmental employees in the capital city of Jakarta tend to behave not as public servants but rather as "state" (authoritarian) superiors. A popular Indonesian expert on social culture, Mr. Mochtar Lubis, argued that Indonesian bureaucrats still often adopt "feudalistic" approaches, since they tend to base their services on how citizens treat them rather than on what they are supposed to do for their citizens. He said that this attitude has been inherited from the long period of feudalistic tradition of Indonesian history (*Kompas* 1997d).

A recent survey of 400 foreign executives conducted by the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC) revealed that Indonesia was viewed as one of the


countries (others were Thailand, South Korea, and the People's Republic of China) that have the worst institutions, whereas Singapore, Hong Kong, and Japan were seen as the best in Asia. It was found too that although economic development has been substantial, the political institutions seem to have no influence or authority. Indonesian policing was evaluated poorly and the organization is faced with a serious *public relations nightmare* [original italics] (*Kompas* 1997a).

In summary, several key points were made regarding the influence of social environmental factors on police decision making. The cultural value system, generally oriented vertically to favor the upper class of society, is thought to be related to the lenient treatment of any driver who holds high social status or who has established an intimate relationship with the officer's superior. The humanitarian values upheld by most Indonesians are thought to explain why officers treat female offenders leniently, as well as those offenders who ask for their forgiveness and sympathy. These humanitarian values may also encourage professional drivers to readily offer bribes to the officers and, conversely, often influence officers to ignore their violations.

The economic concerns of the officers served as another important factor accounting for the incidence of "damai" solutions. Despite the widespread nature of this phenomenon in police work, a give-and-take solution will not be undertaken if other conditional factors are present. For example, an offender must explicitly or implicitly express his willingness to settle the case informally, whether this resolution is initiated by himself or implicitly by the officer, and an officer must then determine whether the situation is safe or not. However, it is the criminal justice system itself, i.e., the nature of

criminal law, the nature of police work, and the traffic law enforcement system, that provides organizational resources that can be utilized for personal gain.

Finally, the criminal justice system may provoke officers to adopt authoritarian attitudes and behaviors. Consequently, they often base their services on how the citizen views them rather than with regard to their duties. Not surprisingly, the study data revealed that, unlike cooperative offenders, those who are antagonistic are more likely to be ticketed than to receive merely a warning.



CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The decision making of street-level officers concerning traffic law enforcement may be assessed in terms of two general events. The first considers the officer's reactions (initial actions) to observed offenses, which may include simply ignoring the violation, casually warning the driver by using a hand signal or shouting at him without stopping the vehicle, merely seizing a document from the driver and letting him go, or completely stopping the vehicle and processing the violation. Occasionally a violating vehicle does not stop; this action may provoke one of four possible types of police reaction: (a) ignoring the action; (b) exhibiting frustration due to being unable to take any action if a walkie-talkie or a car is not available; (c) dispatching information through a walkie-talkie to a chase car or command center; or (d) pursuing the fleeing vehicle.

The second general decision-making event is the officer's disposition (final action) regarding the offender. This may involve one of four possible actions: (a) freeing the driver due to extenuating circumstances or a legal technicality; (b) releasing the offender with just a warning; (c) employing a "damai" solution; or (d) issuing a ticket.

This study revealed that street-level officers' decisions exhibit several general patterns. First, traffic officers tend to prioritize service activities, i.e., assure the smooth flow of traffic, over law-enforcement duties. It was found that only one third of observed

violators were actually pulled over, and only one tenth were finally ticketed as the law requires.

Second, when interacting with offenders, officers occasionally display undesirable and unprofessional behavior. It is apparent that the specific organizational guidelines calling for the officers to approach drivers with a smile, salute, and greeting (known as the "3Ss" approach) are often not followed, and the way an officer explains the driver's offense to him is sometimes nonsympathetic and/or unconvincing.

Third, when making a final decision, officers tend to consider subjective factors more than objective ones. These factors are not directly involved with the violation itself, but merely reflect the individual characteristics of offenders, such as their social status, gender, domicile location, attitude and demeanor, and any recent experience of having been ticketed. We found that those who hold high social status, relatives of police officers, or those who have "backing" (a special relationship with an officer's superiors) are often immune from any action that might be taken by street-level officers.

Fourth, the only objective factor considered by street-level officers in their decision making is the seriousness of the offense. While superficially they might appear to be making an objective, rational decision, here they relate the seriousness of traffic offenses neither to what the law says nor to any organizational policy, but rather to the actual and/or potential consequences of a violation based on their own experience and understanding.

Fifth, if an offender is willing and the occasion allows for it without endangering the officer, a "damai" or give-and-take solution is often chosen as the final decisional

alternative. It is apparent that this practice of bribery is extremely common; here more than two thirds of the observed subjects participated in it.

Various interrelated factors have been identified as influential in the decision making of traffic officers. These include the officer's individual characteristics, organizational and social environments, and situational factors. Among the characteristics of individual officers that were examined, educational background and years in service at the last post were the only variables that were found to influence their decision making significantly.

From an organizational perspective, the mission of the organization, the availability of resources, the policy of personnel rotation, and control mechanisms were found to affect police job performance. The decision-making process is also thought to be specifically related to the native social culture, primarily the traditional paternalistic approach and humanitarian values that are respected by most Indonesian people.

Social stratification, which is rooted in ancient Indonesian history (Wertheim 1956), seems to be a significant barrier to proper law enforcement by the police. Common people tend to view themselves as the "tiny" and the upper-class society as their "excellency" (the "mighty"). Consequently, people are reluctant to criticize openly or complain about those who hold higher social status (Kunarto 1995b). This tradition is likely to affect police officers' decision making. Street-level officers, who in some circumstances view themselves as the "tiny," tend to treat higher-status persons and their relations (the "mighty") more leniently and deferentially. On the other hand, when these officers view themselves as holding higher status (the "mighty"), they tend to be

authoritarian when they are faced by offenders who hold social status lower than theirs (the “tiny”).

This social stratification determines not only different treatment of different social classes, but also the way the police handle their socioeconomic life. High-ranking officials are viewed by street-level officers as developing good relationships with those who are economically advantaged, and then in turn becoming a part of high-class society. On the other hand, primarily when economic considerations and humanitarian values are involved, both street-level officers and members of lower-class society (i.e., professional drivers) establish a sense of sharing a common fate as street-level workers. They develop a mutual understanding (*saling pengertian*) and friendships (*persahabatan*) in their own ways to deal with their ongoing struggle to survive. This practice is viewed by the authorities as illegal; hence, it is officially called “pungli” or bribery, whereas street-level workers prefer calling it “damai,” “ji’un,” “salam tempel” or “ngemel”—reflecting a give-and-take solution.

It turns out that the pervasiveness of the practice of bribery is also influenced by other factors. The inadequacy of an officer's legal income, on the one hand, and the complicated procedures and costly fines involved in the traffic enforcement system, on the other hand, are thought to be central causes. However, the occurrence of this misconduct requires the presence of appropriate opportunities, considering when, where, and with whom the transaction might be accomplished. Of course general factors, such as the police subculture itself and the nature of criminal law and of police work, may also contribute to this practice and other undesirable behaviors by officers.

The general patterns of traffic law enforcement identified above indicate that situational factors are central in explaining the decision making of street-level officers. It is clear that the individual traffic officer plays an important role as a decision maker. This is confirmed by the fact that police work can never be fully controlled. We found that attempts to supervise police job performance can provoke unintended consequences, such as work slowdowns, when they have been conducted inappropriately. This is not to suggest that police work cannot be controlled at all, however. In fact, we learned that supervision activities were not consistently followed by corrective actions; punishment, as a feedback control mechanism, is currently meted out to only a small percentage of those who act illegally. The department's current enforcement policy regarding appropriate decision criteria, the basic tool for controlling officer's job performance, not only was formulated so broadly that it could not be implemented effectively, but also had never been reviewed and revised. Consequently, street-level officers have developed their own individual "policy" regarding the seriousness of different traffic offenses. As a result we found a great deal of selective enforcement as well as significant interofficer variability. This finding confirms frequent citizens' complaints about the inconsistent administration of police duties and the unfair enforcement of laws. It is believed too that these in turn substantively contribute to the seriousness of Jakarta's traffic problems.

The study data unpredictably revealed that Jakarta's traffic problem, and especially traffic congestion, is partially affected by police actions regarding traffic law enforcement. It was found that many drivers, and particularly public transportation personnel, often commit particular offenses such as loading/unloading passengers in illegal places--actions

which exacerbate the city's traffic problem. It is apparent that traffic officers often ignore these infractions, behavior which may encourage drivers to commit or repeat them.

Implications

Given the importance of the role of individual officers as decision makers in enforcing traffic laws, any policy designed to improve the performance of Polri (the INP) should be oriented toward enhancing their status as law enforcement agents. They should be treated as agents who are accountable to the law rather than as ranked officers who are responsible only to their superiors (Bittner, 1980). This means that street-level officers must feel confident that their decisions related to traffic violations will be supported regardless of the offender's identity. Their decisions must also be seen as "absolute," unless or until a higher-level decision is made by a judge to overturn it. In this way the inappropriate intervention by superiors to undermine their authority could be prevented. This new system would not provide any room for the existence of the now-common "backing" practice that results in particular offenders' being immune from any law enforcement actions.

Initially, an enforcement policy must be clearly developed in order to help street-level officers make appropriate discretionary decisions regarding traffic violations. The policy must establish a clear distinction between necessary and unnecessary discretion (Davis 1975). Certainly unnecessary discretion must be eliminated by prohibiting officers from making their own arbitrary rules. For instance, failure to take action against public transportation drivers who stop outside loading zones (thereby causing traffic problems) or not issuing a ticket for multiple violations must stop. Violation of such obligations

must be subject to administrative or disciplinary penalties. This should be clearly declared as an organizational rule.

On the other hand, necessary discretion must be confined and structured.

Discretion may be confined by fixing the boundaries within which a traffic officer may be free to make his own choices. For example, an officer may not stop a violating vehicle when he is regulating traffic if doing so will only lead to worse congestion. Another example is that an officer may just issue a warning if he is confident that an offender who is an out-of-towner has unintentionally violated an unfamiliar traffic sign.

Discretion can be structured by guiding officers' with specific written goals, policies, and principles to be utilized when they make choices, all within a set of acceptable boundaries. For instance, although a smooth flow of traffic should be maintained, it does not follow that an officer may simply ignore all offenses in order to accomplish this. Rather, each officer must stop any vehicle that is observed violating traffic laws in the surrounding area. However, the officer may not stop the violating vehicle when he is regulating traffic if doing so will lead to further congestion, or if the traffic flow is too heavy and doing so will only make conditions worse. In such a situation he must dispatch the relevant identifying information to the next post or to the command center, or at least issue a casual warning by using a hand signal and/or yelling "door . . . door" or "helmet . . . helmet," for instance.

Actually, the INP has already formulated operational guidelines regarding the appropriate criteria for decision making (Polri 1993). The problem is that the policy has never been evaluated, let alone scientifically studied. Judging from experience, any new

enforcement policy should be continually reviewed to determine whether the model "fits" the decision processes present in the field setting. For this purpose coordinated research and management operations would be most helpful (Gottfredson & Gottfredson 1988:279) and these could ensure the policy's usefulness by including a substantial commitment to continued scientific evaluation (Barlow 1995). It is also necessary to note that those who would actually be expected to implement the policy should be involved in its formulation and development. This would not only make the policy more pragmatic, but would also engender a greater degree of responsible participation in its implementation.

After clearly establishing the enforcement policy, a supervision mechanism must be ensured. Job descriptions for the positions of supervisor and unit head must be clarified. Here we should emphasize that the main tasks of a first-line supervisor are not only to assign and to check on the presence of his subordinates, but also and more importantly, to ensure that his subordinates perform their duties within the established boundaries. The supervisor should be obligated to issue an informal warning first when an officer has either overstepped the limits of his authority or has failed to take some required action. Issuing these warnings should be limited to two or three occasions. Any subsequent violation by the same officer should be brought to the attention of the unit head at large or to the directorate for further corrective action in accordance with organizational rules. Likewise, any finding regarding undesired behavior, including "damai" solutions, must be consistently followed up by disciplinary action.

If a disciplinary action follows a specific citizen's complaint, this outcome should be communicated to the complainant so that the public may be assured that their complaints are listened to. Additionally, since offenders sometimes deny that they have committed a violation when accused of doing so by the officer, or refuse to sign the citation, the officer should be obligated to fill out a report form describing the violation and any related circumstance, which will allow his supervisor and/or a judge to review the decision.

It must be emphasized that merely monitoring police discretionary decisions cannot substitute for actively responding to poor job performance. Nevertheless, organizational financial circumstances impose certain restraints. A central finding of this study is that the inadequacy of the officers' legal income fosters the practice of bribery in the department and this undermines other control efforts. In Indonesia, a developing country hampered by limited financial resources, the proposal of salary increases is always a sensitive subject. This is especially true when considering the idea of increasing the salaries of all 200,000 officers throughout the country. Perhaps the best solution at present, given that their inadequate salaries have not yet been dealt with, is to provide street-level officers with an additional benefit, i.e., reimbursement for daily operational costs to cover such expenses as transportation, food and drink, batteries, etc.

To support these expenditures, the government could reassess its existing budget by using the cost-benefit approach (Rhoads 1994:11). Of course, financial support should be prioritized toward maximizing operational effectiveness, which may help to resolve the seriousness of the traffic problem faced by many citizens on the streets, rather than simply

giving more money to support administration that may not have any impact on traffic problem solving on the streets. Moreover, in this research setting (Jakarta Police Region), those officers who work on the streets to enforce traffic laws annually deposit to the Treasury Department more than 10 billion rupiah which are collected from citation fines.¹ If only half of this governmental income were redistributed to the approximately 2,000 Jakarta traffic officers, each would receive about 10,000 rupiah for daily operational costs.² It is believed that the reduction in governmental revenues would be compensated for by reduced usage of the "damai" solution and a consequent increase in the number of tickets written. This is not to suggest that the phenomenon of bribery could be totally eliminated, however. Indeed, it exists because of various factors, including the current system of traffic law enforcement itself.

Based on the findings of this study, it is evident that the current system of traffic law enforcement in Jakarta exhibits several weaknesses. One difficulty is that current fines for violations are excessive, given the extremely low incomes of most Indonesian drivers. A second problem is that the formal procedure for processing cases is much too complicated. These concerns encourage many drivers to attempt to settle their offenses informally rather than proceeding in accordance with the law. For instance, the existing procedure calls for the seizing of documents that may be returned only after the offender

¹ According to a Jakarta Traffic Police Directorate (JTPD) report on ticketing activities, the amount of fines collected during 1996 was Rp 11,340,983,800 and during 1995 was Rp 12,720,992,800.

² Among the 70% of officers who responded to the interview question on how much money per day they generally expect to obtain from "damai" solutions, 12.5% mentioned less than Rp 10,000, 55.3% named 10-20 thousand, 21.7% said 21-30 thousand, while the rest (10.5%) claimed more than Rp 30,000.

has paid the fine. This means that offenders are forced to spend not only relatively large amounts of money for paying costly fines, but also time, energy, and other costs (such as lost work time) for following the procedure. Therefore, the current system of traffic law enforcement should be revised by reducing the amounts of the fines and by eliminating the unnecessary procedure that results from seizing documents. This practice has been based on the suspicion that an offender would avoid paying the fine without such an incentive. Elimination of this procedure could be accompanied by the imposition of even greater penalties for those who fail to pay their fines on time. This penalty could be charged at the time when the offender extends his annual vehicle registration. We believe that implementing these two changes would likely lead to more legal dispositions of cases instead of illegal "informal" settlements.

It is apparent, too, that the mission of the traffic police organization should be reexamined. The current emphasis on maintaining the smooth flow of traffic results in street-level officers' frequently ignoring traffic violations. Thus, the officers now often only regulate the traffic rather than enforce traffic laws. They generally utilize "mengipas" (blowing their whistles and signaling with their hands) to direct vehicles in the desired direction. The strenuous effort involved in these activities leads them to take frequent breaks and even to leave their posts earlier than they are supposed to. Moreover, this study revealed that traffic jams are frequently related to particular types of traffic violation (illegal stops) committed by particular types of vehicles (public transportation). This practice has been tolerated by traffic law enforcement officers. We believe that in

conformance with Act No. 20 of 1982, traffic law enforcement duties should be emphasized as well (*Republik Indonesia* 1982).

The last policy implication of this study regards resource management. It is suggested that the Indonesian police review their policy regarding the allocation of personnel and equipment, prioritizing the support of operational activities rather than administrative ones. Additionally, personnel policy should emphasize rotation of those officers whose years in service at the last post have been extensive, as the data revealed that this variable is significantly related to declining performance on the part of street-level officers. Likewise, educational background should be taken into account so that officers are assigned to jobs commensurate with their educational attainment.

Overall, several policy changes have been suggested in order to improve police job performance, i.e., decision making. One very important issue, however, has remained virtually untouched—the influence of social stratification on police decision making. The class stratification which has existed since ancient times still pervades the Indonesian social system, despite the dramatic social and political changes that have taken place since the emergence of Islamic kingdoms at beginning of this millennium and Dutch colonialization of the country in the late 16th century (Wertheim 1956). New laws regarding criminal procedures were established in 1981 in accordance with the Constitution, dramatically changing the principles of upholding human rights and equal protection. Nevertheless, social relationships are basically still colored by the ancient tradition, leading police officers to worry about the possible consequences of criticizing individuals who hold higher social status or their companions (Wignyoebroto 1991). This lingering concern

indicates that serious efforts must be made to change this outdated tradition, although social relationships, especially in urban areas, are already beginning to reflect a more democratic attitude. Keeping pace with the modern world challenges primarily high-ranking officials to seriously promote environmental change, for instance, by guaranteeing subordinates that any action they take to enforce the law, regardless of the violator's social status, will not damage their careers as long as they conduct themselves legally.

Finally, several areas that require further research have been identified. First, while the link between educational background and officers' decision making was clear, the potential effects of special training on decision making or job performance in general was not explained. This finding may have been a product of the study's sampling procedure, which selected for sample traffic posts first and then chose individual officers who were attending those posts. This may have led to an inappropriate representation of individual officers. While the influence of general educational background on police job performance has been thoroughly researched, here we failed to find any previous study which had examined the issue of the effect of special training on decision making. Further study of the effectiveness of this training program is called for since it requires a great deal of grant money, currently awarded by the Dutch government, which helps to develop and provide specialized training for a select group of officers.

A second recommended subject for future research would be a replication of this project in other settings, including smaller cities such as Medan in North Sumatra and Ambon in Maluku. It is necessary to note that this investigation failed to separate assessments of how sympathetically and how convincingly officers explained the driver's

offense; here these assessments were combined into one variable. Since this subject involves two different dimensions, it would be better for the next research to separate these phenomena into two different variables. In replicating this study, these findings can be tested again, and if they are valid, the results may be generalized. New policy could then be implemented nationwide throughout the traffic force of the Indonesian National Police, primarily related to the decision making of traffic law enforcement officers.



APPENDIX A
THE RESEARCH SETTING



APPENDIX A

THE RESEARCH SETTING

This research was conducted in Indonesia, within the Jakarta Regional Police territory. The following provides general descriptions of the study setting, the Indonesian National Police (INP) and their historical development, and the Jakarta Regional Police.

General Description of Indonesia

It is necessary to begin this description with a brief investigation of the socioculture of the country within which the INP operates. Here, the term *socioculture* primarily refers to the common value system shared by the Indonesian people. This is not to suggest that there is only one sociocultural pattern throughout the country, however, for Indonesia, like most other countries, is quite heterogeneous. Indonesia is the largest archipelago in the world, comprising more than 17,000 islands. The archipelago's strategic location, at a crossroads between the Pacific and the Indian oceans and between the continents of Asia and Australia, influences the cultural, social, political, and economic life of the country (Department of Information 1994:9).

On February 5, 1997, the Indonesian government announced the birth of the baby that brought the nation's population to 200 million. This population is concentrated at the rate of 170 persons per square mile. The nation embraces 36 major ethnic groups,

several religions (although a majority of citizens are Islamic), and over 400 distinct languages (Warshaw 1992:225 & 229).

The contemporary heterogeneity of the nation does not mean that there is no unity, however. Before gaining their independence on August 17, 1945, Indonesians had to be united in the struggle against their colonial rulers, Holland (1602-1942) and Japan (1942-1945). This was motivated by *Sumpah Pemuda*, a youth oath that had been sworn to by a number of young freedom fighters from each ethnic group, religion, and island since 1928. They were committed to the unity of country and nation and to a shared language. This inspired the creation of the current national coat of arms, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity), symbolized by *Burung Garuda* (a golden eagle). Wertheim correctly noted that Indonesia's islands, "scattered over a sea surface exceeding the total area of the United States of North-America, foster a cultural isolation, even though the cultures of the different islands have a common root" (1956:1).

Indonesia had experienced a long period of control by Hindu kingdoms (from ancient times until the 1600s) and a series of Islamic kingdoms (1400s - 1903) until it was totally conquered by the Dutch, who had warred with the Islamic kingdoms from the time of their arrival in Indonesia at the end of the 16th century. These spiritual influences must now be viewed as central to the lives of the Indonesian people.

In keeping with these spiritual influences, the republic was established based on *Pancasila*, the ideology and the basic principles of state philosophy. Pancasila includes five inseparable, interrelated principles: (1) Belief in the One and Only God; (2) Just and Civilized Humanity; (3) The Unity of Indonesia; (4) Democracy Guided by the Inner

Wisdom in the Unanimity Arising Out of Deliberation Amongst Representatives; and (5) Social Justice for the Whole of the People of Indonesia (Department of Information 1994:54).

Pancasila, crystallized from the values that exist within Indonesian society, is the life philosophy of the nation and represents the way of life of all Indonesian people.

Pancasila teaches that it is the will of God that human beings are individual, as well as social, creatures. Every individual is thought to have rights as well as obligations.

Pancasila teaches people to respect humanitarian values and to assist those who are poor and/or weak. It also teaches them to love one another, to maintain an appropriate balance between rights and obligations, to develop attitudes in line with *tenggang rasa* or *teposliro* (the social familiarity principle), etc. (Republik Indonesia 1978). An example of *tenggang rasa* is that one should neither chastise another in public, nor speak or act in any way that might cause bad feelings, nor should one show off material possessions to his neighbors.

These familiarity principles direct most Indonesian people in their attempts to solve any problem, ranging from individual matters to national issues, including crime. For example, many misdemeanors and even more serious cases, such as insults, assaults, and domestic batteries, may be resolved unofficially by community members and even by the police. If a serious traffic accident case is sent to court, it is generally accompanied by a statement from both the victim and the offender declaring that their case has actually been unofficially resolved already. This approach often affects the sentencing decision of a judge (Muhammad 1996). According to Soekanto and Abdullah (1987), both professors

of the sociology of law at the University of Indonesia, these resolutions contribute to continued social harmony. Litigants generally do not wish to go to court because they know that the court would eventually create a winner and a loser, thus leading to an inharmonious relationship. As a result, social values, and especially the familiarity principles that exist in the Indonesian socioculture, appear to exert an important influence on the effectiveness of law enforcement.

Another typical Indonesian value calls for a paternalistic approach in establishing social relationships. According to Dr. Koentjaraningrat (1978:15), a professor of anthropology, the cultural value system of Indonesia is generally oriented vertically toward the upper class of society. Experience proves that people tend both to imitate the behavior and to follow the directions of those who are professional and political as well as informal superiors. Moreover, people also tend to be reluctant to criticize and complain about those who hold higher-status positions. This tradition has existed since the ancient history of this agrarian society. W. F. Wertheim, a professor of modern history and sociology of Southeast Asia at University of Amsterdam, noted:

The social functions within the village were fulfilled according to tradition. A son as a rule followed the trade of his father. In so far as there were specialized artisans within the village, their function was assigned them by heredity and tradition. Tradition, too, determined each person's status within the social hierarchy. In communities organised on genealogical lines, mainly to be found in *ladang* [shifting cultivation] areas, the rank one held depended upon the social status of the clan one belonged to, and upon one's traditional position within the clan. (1956:5)

Dr. Wignjosoebroto (1991:5 & 9) argued that for centuries there has been a tradition of viewing the relationship between a government official and the people as one between "his excellency" and subordinates, the relationship between the "mighty" (as personification of

a macrocosmos) and the “tiny” (as personification of a microcosmos). In these relationships, it is taboo to complain about one’s superior.

Various social and political systems have arisen in Indonesian society since its origins. At the beginning of this millennium, Islam spread throughout the country. In the late 16th century Dutch merchants arrived and colonized the country until the end of World War II. Then Indonesia was proclaimed as a law-based state when it became independent in 1945. Liberal democracy was implemented during the 1950s. “Despite the dramatic changes within this sphere of secular and spiritual leadership, . . . every new dynasty had to conform to the ancient pattern, . . . though minor changes in the system of administration occasionally occurred” (Wertheim 1956). In 1981, a new law of criminal procedures, which in accordance with the Constitution dramatically changed the principles of upholding human rights and equal protection, was established. However, social relationships are basically still colored by this tradition, leading people to worry about criticizing individuals who hold higher social status or their companions (Wignjosoebroto 1991). Even though social relationships, especially in urban areas, are beginning to reflect a more democratic attitude, the tradition still exists. Nowadays, it is common for those who are economically advantaged not only to have a maid, a house boy, and/or a private driver, but also to treat them (who also want to be treated) as lower-class persons and even as “slaves.” All of these customs indicate that changing this tradition will demand a great deal of effort.

Indonesian Government and The Legal System

The Republic of Indonesia is a unitary state governed by laws based on the Pancasila and Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (the Constitution). This constitution guarantees basic human rights and directs that all citizens, without exception, shall have equal status in, and shall be obligated to respect, law and government (Republik Indonesia 1945). The sovereignty vested in the people is exercised by an elected Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly, abbreviated MPR), which is the highest political institution in the state. Its functions are to sanction the constitution, determine the guidelines of state policy, and elect the president and vice-president for 5-year terms of office. Under the People's Consultative Assembly, there are five organs of the state. These include the Presidency (and cabinet), the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat), the Supreme Advisory Council (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung), the State Audit Board (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan), and the Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung).

The Indonesian criminal justice system consists of the police, public prosecutors, the courts, and correctional institutions. The central level consists of the Supreme Court, the Office of the Attorney General, the Department of Justice, and Police Headquarters. Unlike police forces in many other countries, the INP is an integral part of the Indonesian Armed Forces. Nevertheless, they still are expected to perform the duties of both law enforcement and maintenance of public order, as well as community policing.

The Indonesian National Police

The origin and development of the INP have been closely linked with the Indonesian struggle for independence during the years 1945 to 1949. Serving as the only armed force of Indonesia at the beginning of that period, the INP took part in the struggle, first against the Japanese Army, and then against the Dutch and their allied army who intended to reestablish control over the islands after the end of World War II. For example, in August 1945, in West Sumatra, the police distributed weapons to the freedom fighters in order to force the Japanese to relinquish their authority to the Indonesian government. On November 10, 1949, in Surabaya, East Java, fierce fighting broke out between the Dutch allied troops and the Indonesian freedom fighters, led by (among others) police inspector Moch. Jasin. This vital role supported the development of the Indonesian Armed Forces. Given these historical facts, the INP is now recognized as being a part of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia. Therefore, even though it was originally placed under jurisdiction of the Secretary of Internal Affairs, Attorney General, and Prime Minister (during 1950-1959), the INP was then integrated into the Armed Forces organization in 1961 (Republik Indonesia 1961).

As an integrated part of the Armed Forces, the INP had to modify its organization in terms of structural, personnel, material, and financial systems, in order to accommodate the established Armed Forces systems. The organization is structured with five levels, including headquarters, regional, subregional, district, and subdistrict levels. Only the last two levels deal basically with operational matters.

Personnel systems are a crucial issue in relation to the successful integration of these components. According to Act No. 20 of 1982 on State Defense and Security, a police officer is a soldier and a member of the Armed Forces (Republik Indonesia 1982). Police ranks, and hence their salaries and other benefits, are the same as those of other Armed Forces members, including those in the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The ranks are divided into three levels: lower, middle, and higher. The ranks of the lower level consist of Second Bhayangkara, First Bhayangkara, Second Corporal, First Corporal, and Chief Corporal. The ranks of the middle level consist of Second Sergeant, First Sergeant, Chief Sergeant, Major Sergeant, Second Assistant Lieutenant, and First Assistant Lieutenant. The ranks of the higher level consist of Second Lieutenant, First Lieutenant, Captain, Major, Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel, Brigadier General, Major General, Lieutenant General, and General. The income¹ of an officer ranges from 200,000 to 700,000 rupiah per month.² As a soldier, an officer is not paid for any overtime work. If necessary, officers may even be ordered to do their jobs during a nonregular time and without compensation. In 1991, the total force of the INP was 177,406 sworn officers (10.3% occupying the higher, 65% the middle, and 24.7% the lower levels) and 23,945 civilians (Kapolri et al. 1993:39; Dispullahta 1992:215-219).

Police education is also designed in accordance with armed forces principles and practices. There are two types of education, pre-service and in-service training. The

¹ This consists of salary and other benefits, such as rice and side dish benefits. An officer may also receive part of health and medical service costs, and security benefits when he retires.

² As of April 1, 1997. \$1 was equal to approximately Rp 2.350.

former is directed to police candidates before they can become officers. In-service training, on the other hand, is required of working police officers in order to increase their rank and/or to improve their abilities. The pre-service education is directed at three levels of intake: lower, middle, and higher levels. Officers from the first rank of the lower level are recruited from elementary or middle school and are trained for 6 months; the first rank of the middle level are recruited from high school and then trained for 11 months; and the first rank of the higher level are recruited from high school and then trained for 3 years, or from college and then trained for 11 months. The current system requires that a traffic officer must have graduated from high school, although some officers remain with lower levels of education who were hired under the old recruitment system.

Education and training programs are administered by employing almost all of the military approaches. Discipline, hierarchy, and honor are principles that must be respected by officers, not only when they are in the educational and training process, but also later when they are actually in service. In this instance, police officers are also subject to military discipline and criminal codes. Military police have the duty to observe and control the Armed Forces' members' behavior, including that of police officers. Indeed, when an officer has performed his job improperly, violated the disciplinary code, or received a complaint filed by a citizen for improper behavior, he must first be adjudicated by his direct commander.

The Jakarta Regional Police

The Jakarta Regional Police (JRP) are located in the special province of Jakarta. Their territory covers not only the city, but also includes three districts of the province of

West Java (Bekasi, Tangerang , and Depok), all located around Jakarta. The geographical area of the territory is about 661 square kilometers and is populated by about 8.5 million people.


As a regional department, JRP answers to the INP headquarters. Its main functions are similar to those of the INP including: (a) maintaining order; (b) enforcing laws; and (c) social engineering in order to support the first two functions. The operational directorates of JRP consist of intelligence, criminal investigation, patrol, traffic, and community policing. The total force of JRP is 16,442 personnel (10.6% the higher level, 71.7% at the middle, and 18.7% at the lower level) and 1,733 civilians (Dispullahta 1992:215-219).

The Jakarta Traffic Police Directorate (JTPD) is one operational directorate of JRP. Its main functions include: (a) maintaining traffic order; (b) enforcing traffic laws; (c) investigating traffic accidents; (d) conducting traffic social education; and (e) handling driver and car registrations. The organization of the JTPD consists of: the director and his staff; the driver's license and car registration section; the traffic community policing section; the traffic investigation section; the traffic problem study center; the traffic law enforcement section; and nine regional units. The total force of JTPD consists of about 1,540 sworn officers and 235 civilians (Direktorat Lahu Lintas Polda 1995).

The focus of this study was primarily on the traffic law enforcement units at the regional and district levels, hereafter called the general traffic law enforcement unit or, interchangeably, the general traffic police unit. A general traffic police unit is basically a mini traffic police directorate, yet it handles traffic accidents only at the early stages until a

traffic accident investigator assumes responsibility for the case. It does not deal with social education programs, or with driver's licenses and car registrations.



As noted earlier, although the INP is an integrated part of the armed forces, its duties include both law enforcement and the maintenance of public order, as well as community policing. In relation to this study, unlike most police departments in the U.S., the functions of the administration of the traffic police are separate from those of patrols in Indonesia. When the American literature discusses patrols, that may also include traffic functions, which is not the case in Indonesia. A traffic officer generally does not deal with criminal behavior, and therefore is not generally dispatched--even if he has a walkie-talkie--in order to restore order and provide general assistance unrelated to traffic problems. However, if the officer sees, or is informed of, a crime occurring, he must deal with it until a qualified officer takes over the case. Also, if the officer is asked by a citizen on the street to provide general assistance, he must do so.



APPENDIX B
MAP OF JAKARTA
(AREA STUDIED)



APPENDIX B
MAP OF JAKARTA REGIONAL POLICE TERRITORY



APPENDIX C

SAMPLE SELECTION



APPENDIX C
SAMPLE SELECTION

No.	Traffic Police Unit	Post		Personnel			
		Population	Sample	Population	Sample	Valid Obser.	Interviewed
1	Central Jakarta	13	11	84	25	22	18
2	North Jakarta	15	11	75	22	21	19
3	East Jakarta	17	13	105	31	30	24
4	South Jakarta	14	8	90	27	23	20
5	West Jakarta	8	5	60	18	15	14
6	Depok	12	11	58	17	15	12
7	Bekasi	13	9	68	20	17	14
8	Tangerang	8	4	40	12	12	11
9	Special Task (Gasus)	30	21	330	98	86	78
	Stationary Posts Subtotal	130	93	910	270	241	210
10	Patrol/mobile posts			420	29	29	20
	Total			1,330	299	270	230

APPENDIX D

OBSERVATIONAL DATA RECORDING FORM



OBSERVATIONAL DATA RECORDING FORM

Code Number:

1	Violation order number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
2	Type of violation:												
	(1) Maximum load limit												
	(2) No stopping												
	(3) Stop outside loading zone												
	(4) Lane/zigzag/marks violation												
	(5) Traffic light												
	(6) Traffic sign												
	(7) Helmet												
	(8) Speed limit												
	(9) Others												
3	Type of vehicle:												
	(1) All government vehicles												
	Public/commercial vehicles:												
	(2) Taxi												
	(3) Bus												
	(4) "Oplet"/other passenger car												
	(5) Truck												
	Private vehicles:												
	(6) Motorcycle												
	(7) Passenger car												
	(8) Luxury sedan												
4	Traffic flow:												
	(1) Jammed												
	(2) Heavy												
	(3) Medium												
	(4) Light												
5	Police initial action:												
	(1) Ignoring												
	(2) Casual warning												
	(3) Seizing document only												
	(4) Stopping and processing												
6	Driver's reaction:												
	(1) Stop												
	(2) No stop												
7	Police reaction to fleeing vehicle:												
	(1) Ignoring												
	(2) Dispatching												
	(3) Pursuing												
	(4) Expressing frustration												
8	Officer's car/motorecycle												
	(1) Official												
	(2) Private												
	(3) No car/vehicle												

(continued on next page)

1. Fill out by using only one check mark (✓) on each variable.
2. No mark indicates unmonitored (missing data).
3. Note additional information on blank spaces and reverse side if necessary.

9	Officer's walkie-talkie																			
	(1) With walkie-talkie																			
	(2) No walkie-talkie																			
10	Officer's Approach to driver:																			
	(1) With smile, greeting and/or salute																			
	(2) Without smile, greeting or salute																			
11	Officer's explanation:																			
	(1) Sympathetic and convincing																			
	(2) Sympathetic or convincing																			
	(3) Not sympathetic and convincing																			
12	Offender's gender:																			
	(1) Male																			
	(2) Female																			
13	Offender's social status:																			
	(1) High/special																			
	(2) Military member																			
	(3) Common																			
14	Offender's attitude/demeanor:																			
	(1) Antagonistic																			
	(2) Neutral																			
	(3) Asking "damai"																			
	(4) Asking commiseration																			
15	Debate																			
	(1) Yes																			
	(2) No																			
16	Delaying decision:																			
	(1) Yes																			
	(2) No																			
17	Police final action:																			
	(1) Freeing																			
	(2) Warning																			
	(3) "Damai" solution																			
	(4) Ticketing																			

1. Fill out by using only one check mark (✓) on each variable.
2. No mark indicates unmonitored (missing data).
3. Note additional information on blank spaces and reverse side if necessary.

APPENDIX E

FORMAL INTERVIEW QUESTIONS



APPENDIX E

FORMAL INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

For: Street-Level Officers

I. Traffic Jams and Violations

1. a. Based on your experience, could you identify those factors most likely to produce a traffic jam?
- b. Are there particular types of violations and which are most likely to produce a traffic jam?
2. We have observed that officers often ignore violations committed by public transportation vehicles stopping outside loading zones, even though they hamper traffic flow. Why is this so?
3. We also observed that during heavy traffic situations, officers may intentionally ignore violations while regulating traffic ("mengipas"). What is the reason for this?

II. Performance and Decision Making

4. Could you identify all of those factors that you usually consider when making a decision to stop a violating vehicle?
5. We found that officers often overlook traffic law violations when they involve particular types of vehicles. Has this also been your experience, and if so, could you specify what vehicles enjoy this protection and the reasons for it? [VERIFY FIELD

DATA: LUXURY CARS, CARS WITH FAVORITE TAG NUMBER, VEHICLES WITH SPECIAL LOGO, GOVERNMENT AND WELL-KNOWN COMPANY-OWNED VEHICLES]

6. Many traffic officers have told us that the seriousness of a traffic violation is a factor to be considered when making a decision to stop a vehicle. Could you clarify what this means?
7. What factors affect your decision making about whether or not to pursue a fleeing vehicle?
8. How do you usually approach an offender who has been stopped?
9. In practice, we noted that officers seldom employ the 3Ss procedure (smile, greeting and salute) or even one single S. Could you tell us what determines whether or not this procedure will be implemented?
10. What factors do you usually consider when making a final decision to take an action against an offender!
11. We have observed that traffic officers may give warnings to white-collar drivers more frequently than they do to blue-collar drivers. If this is true, how frequently do you do this?
 - (1) Usually;
 - (2) Often;
 - (3) Sometimes;
 - (4) Seldom;
 - (5) Never.

12. Traffic officers appear to give citations to blue-collar offenders more frequently than they do to white-collar offenders. If this is true, how frequently do you do this?

- (1) Usually;
- (2) Often;
- (3) Sometimes;
- (4) Seldom;
- (5) Never.

13. Are your final actions taken against female offenders any different that those for male offenders?

14. Do you think that you should give special consideration to particular offenders? If so, please explain. [VERIFY FIELD DATA: GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES, OFFENDER WITH SUPERIOR'S NAME CARD/MEMOS, OFFICER'S RELATIVES]

15. What final action do you usually take when facing an offender who shows defiance, disrespect, and/or sarcasm?

16. How do you usually treat those offenders who admit their mistakes and ask forgiveness?

17. Please specify actions you generally take when facing an offender who begs for your sympathy and asks you not to ticket him due to financial problems. Please explain.

18. Based on your experience, who usually initiates the request for a "damai" solution, an officer or a driver?

19. Why do drivers ask for "damai?"

20. In your unit, are there officers who are well known for never accepting “damai” solutions? [ESTIMATE THE PERCENTAGE]
21. What factors lead officers to ask for or to accept “damai” settlements?
22. How much is your salary compared to your living costs and other expenditures?
[DISCUSS FOR DETAILS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE THE SUFFICIENCY OF SALARY]
23. Do you have any supplemented sources of income?
24. What is your average daily income obtained from those who thank you for your decision not to issue a ticket?
25. Are there any circumstances when officers would not accept a “damai” solution? What are they? [WHEN, WHERE, AND WITH WHOM]
26. Based on your experience, which of the following factors affect officer performance?
- (1) Rank: _____
 - (2) Age: _____
 - (3) Years in service with policing: _____
 - (4) Years in service with traffic: _____
 - (5) General education: _____
 - (6) Special training: _____
27. Does direct supervision by your immediate commander have any effect on your performance?


III Organizational Management

28. Does the department provide an enforcement policy that may help officers in their decision making? [DISCUSS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF "PETUNJUK LAPANGAN" NUMBER 155/1993].
29. Does the department establish a ticket quota that must be achieved in a particular period of time? [PROBE THE IMPLEMENTATION, IF ANY].
30. Could you describe your supervisor and immediate commander's management style? [DISCUSS THE FREQUENCY AND THE MANNER THEY PERFORM SUPERVISORY ACTIVITIES]
31. How effective are the department's external controls, such as those conducted by internal affairs agents and military policemen as well as other superiors? [VERIFY FIELD DATA REGARDING "TIKUS" (A SPYING OFFICER) AND SUPERIOR INTERVENTION]
32. How does the department implement rewards and punishments? [PROBE THEIR CONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION AND RELATION TO PROMOTION].
33. Do you feel that it would be desirable to reduce the number of "damai" settlements? If so, how could this be done?
34. Do you have any other suggestions about how the department might improve police job performance?

IV. Status and Personal background

35. Age in years:
36. Rank:

37. Years in service as an officer:
38. Years in service as a traffic officer:
39. Years in service at the last post:
40. How do you feel about your experience at the last post?
- a. very satisfied;
 - b. satisfied;
 - c. neutral;
 - d. not happy with it;
 - e. want to be rotated.
41. Level of education:
- (1) Elementary;
 - (2) Middle;
 - (3) High;
 - (4) College Experience.
42. Type of police special training:
- (1) None;
 - (2) Non-Traffic;
 - (3) Traffic.
43. Marital status and number of dependents:
44. Housing facility:
- (1) Rent;
 - (2) Official facility;



(3) Private.

For: Police Supervisor/Manager

1. Does the department provide an enforcement policy that may help officers to make decisions? [DISCUSS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF "PETUNJUK LAPANGAN" NUMBER 155/1993].
2. Does the department establish a ticket quota that must be achieved by an officer in a particular period of time? [PROBE THE IMPLEMENTATION, IF ANY].
3. Could you explain the policies established by your department regarding traffic law enforcement and traffic regulation?
4. Does your department provide any specific criteria for handling (stopping, reprimanding, or ticketing) violations and their follow-up?
5. Could you explain your experience, if any, regarding intervention by a superior in processing citations? How does it affect police job performance?
6. Could you specify factors promoting the acceptance of "damai" solutions by officers?
7. How frequently do you control the way an officer performs his job?
8. Could you specify your method for directing an officer to do his job?
9. Could you evaluate the effectiveness of supervision/control, including that by external control agencies, such as internal affairs and the military police?
10. Could you explain how rewards and punishments are implemented in your department? [PROBE HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE PROMOTION PROCESS]

11. What are the dominant factors influencing the officers' job performance? (Be specific with your answer!)



APPENDIX F
HUMAN SUBJECTS AND
DEPARTMENTAL APPROVALS





Office of the Vice President
for Research
Tallahassee, Florida 32306-2811
(850) 644-5260 • FAX (850) 644-4392

APPROVAL MEMORANDUM

from the Human Subjects Committee

Date: January 13, 1998

From: Jack Brigham, Chair 

To: Farouk Muhammad
2131 N. Meridian Road, Apt. 125
Tallahassee, FL 32303

Re: Use of Human Subjects in Research
Researcher's Dept.: Criminology

Project entitled: Traffic Law Enforcement Decision Making in the Indonesian National Police

The forms that you submitted to this office in regard to the use of human subjects in the proposal referenced above have been reviewed by the Human Subjects Committee at its meeting on November 12, 1997. Your project was approved by the Committee.

The Human Subjects Committee has not evaluated your proposal for scientific merit, except to weigh the risk to the human participants and the aspects of the proposal related to potential risk and benefit. This approval does not replace any departmental or other approvals which may be required.

If the project has not been completed by January 13, 1999 you must request renewed approval for continuation of the project.

You are advised that any change in protocol in this project must be approved by resubmission of the project to the Committee for approval. Also, the principal investigator must promptly report, in writing, any unexpected problems causing risks to research subjects or others.

By copy of this memorandum, the chairman of your department and/or your major professor is reminded that he/she is responsible for being informed concerning research projects involving human subjects in the department, and should review protocols of such investigations as often as needed to insure that the project is being conducted in compliance with our institution and with DHHS regulations.

This institution has an Assurance on file with the Office for Protection from Research Risks. The Assurance Number is M1339.

:hh
cc: B. Bullington
98/commapp.doc
APPLICATION NO. 97.237

ANGKATAN BERSENJATA REPUBLIK INDONESIA
 MARKAS BESAR
 KEPOLISIAN NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA



SURAT PERINTAH
 No. Pol. Sprin/1992/VII/1997

Pertimbangan : Bahwa sesuai dengan laporan perkembangan pendidikan Program S2/S3 Ilmu Kepolisian di Amerika Serikat a.n. Kol. Pol Drs. Farouk - Mohammad Nrp 49100176, dianggap perlu memerintahkan Pamen yang bersangkutan untuk mengadakan penelitian Polda Metro Jaya.

D a s a r : Surat Perintah Kapolri No. Pol. Sprin/688 /II/1996 tanggal 21 Pebruari 1996, tentang penugasan Kol Pol Drs. Farouk Muhammad mengikuti Program S2/S3 Ilmu Kepolisian di Amerika Serikat.

DIPERINTAHKAN

Kepada : DRS. FAROUK MOHAMMAD
 KOLONEL POLISI NRP 49100176

Untuk :

1. Melaksanakan penelitian mengenai "Pengambilan Keputusan Dalam Penegakan Hukum oleh Kepolisian di Indonesia" di Lokasi Wilayah Polda Metro Jaya.
2. Kegiatan penelitian dimulai pada Bulan Juli 1997 s/d Bulan September 1997.
3. Hal-hal yang berkaitan dengan kegiatan penelitian akan didukung pembiayaannya dari dinas.
4. Melaksanakan perintah ini dengan seksama dan penuh rasa tanggung jawab.

Selesai.

Di keluarkan di : Jakarta
 Pada tanggal 3 Juli 1997

A.n. KEPALA KEPOLISIAN REPUBLIK INDONESIA

DEPUTI KAPOLRI BIDANG ADMINISTRASI



[Signature]
 SR. ROESHANHADI, SH
 MAJOR JENDERAL POLISI

Tembusan:

1. Kapolri (sbg. laporan)
2. Kapolda Metro Jaya
3. Dirrendalpers Polri
4. Dir Dik Polri



PEMERINTAH DAERAH KHUSUS IBUKOTA JAKARTA No. 006000
 Jl. Medan Merdeka Selatan No. 8-9
 JAKARTA

SURAT-KETERANGAN

No. : 27/VII/SV/Pem/19.97.

Gubernur Kepala Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta menerangkan bahwa sesuai dengan permohonan dari Kolonel Polisi Farouk Muhammad tanggal 30 Juni 1997.

Nama : FAROUK MUHAMMAD
 Pekerjaan : Mahasiswa Program S-3
 No. Mahasiswa :
 Alamat : 2131 N. Meridian Apt.125 Tallahassee, FL 32303
 Amerika Serikat

adalah Mahasiswa pada : PROGRAM PENDIDIKAN S-3 ILMU KEPOLISIAN
 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY (FSU).

mulai tanggal : 9 Juli s.d 30 September 1997

akan mengadakan Pengumpulan Data dalam rangka penulisan Skripsi/Disertasi/Thesis/Makalah/
 Tugas Mata Kuliah tentang : " PENGEMBIAN KEPUTUSAN DALAM PENEGAKAN HUKUM
 LALU LINTAS OLEH KEPOLISIAN DI INDONESIA "


Lokasi penelitian : DKI JAKARTA (POLDA METRO JAYA)

Dengan ketentuan :

1. Kepada para Kepala Wilayah (Walikota, Camat) dan Kepala Kelurahan serta Instansi/Lembaga/ Badan dan RT/RW setempat, diharapkan agar memberikan bantuan yang diperlukan dengan catatan apabila menyangkut Data-data ke-Wilayah-an, Saudara tersebut diatas sebelum melaksanakan tugasnya harus memberitahukan terlebih dahulu kepada Walikota, Camat dan Kepala Kelurahan yang bersangkutan.
2. Pemegang Surat Keterangan tersebut diatas sesudah menyelesaikan tugasnya diminta untuk menyampaikan laporan tertulis hasil pelaksanaan Pengumpulan Data dimaksud (Skripsi) kepada Gubernur Kepala Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta c.q. Biro Bina Tata Pemerintahan, Jalan Medan Merdeka Selatan Nomor 8-9, Blok G Lantai 10. Selambat-lambatnya tanggal 30 Oktober 1997.

Jakarta, 9 Juli 1997

A.n GUBERNUR KEPALA DAERAH KHUSUS
 IBUKOTA JAKARTA
 Kepala Biro Bina Tata Pemerintahan,



ABDUL HAMID DHARNADY
 NIP. 010049263



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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Born in Bima, Indonesia in 1949, Farouk Muhammad currently holds the rank of Police Colonel of the Indonesian National Police (INP). He has worked with the department since his graduation from Indonesia's four-year police academy in 1972. He began his professional career as Head of the Criminal Investigation section at a local police district and then worked as a member of the Planning and Budgeting Staff of the Chief of INP. He also was Chief of Cilegon Police District and Chief of Cianjur Police District during the period of 1986-1990 before being reassigned as a teaching assistant at Perguruan Tinggi Ilmu Kepolisian or PTIK (Police Science College), where he taught criminology until 1993.

During his service in the INP, Col. Muhammad completed several academic programs. He received the degree of Doctorandus (Drs.) Ilmu Kepolisian (Bachelor of Arts in Police Sciences) in 1981 from PTIK, after writing his thesis on the integrated system of police sciences in the PTIK curriculum. During 1985-1986 he attended the Police Command and Management Course in Bandung. While serving in PTIK, from 1991 until 1993, the writer attended the undergraduate program in criminal law at Faculty of Law of Pancasila University in Jakarta. He earned the degree of Sarjana Hukum (S.H.) (Bachelor of Criminal Law) after defending his thesis on unofficial clearance of criminal cases by the Jakarta Regional Police in 1996. Meantime, he also attended a graduate

program at the Institute of Business and Management Jayakarta (IBMJ) and received the degree of Master of Business Administration (M.B.A.) after writing his thesis regarding private security education in 1993.

During 1993-1994 Col. Muhammad continued his studies at Oklahoma City University and received the degree of Master of Criminal Justice Administration (M.C.J.A.). The author then moved to Tallahassee, Florida, and pursued his doctoral program in the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Florida State University from 1994 to 1998. During his postgraduate career, he has presented several papers at professional meetings and has published a scholarly article in the *Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology*, entitled The Role of the Informal Justice System in Resolving Indonesia's Crime Problem.

